Title

Chapter 6

Identifier

http://www.nflibrary.ca/nfplindex/show.asp?b=1&ref=oo&id=297958

page

204-243

Bibliographic Citation

Richardson's War of 1812.

10168041

Richardson's War of 1812.

Type

Text

extracted text

TECUMSEH'S SPEECH

XI
THE BATTLE OF MORAVIANTOWN

With the loss of our fleet vanished every hope of maintaining our positions against the enemy, who, already
assembled in the neighborhood of Forts Sandusky and
Meigs, to the number of ten thousand men, only awaited
the result of the action to decide on their future movements. A vast number of boats had been collected for
the purpose of transporting them across the lake, under
cover of their squadron, whose recent success leaving
them undisputed masters of that element, necessarily
precluded all probability of effectual opposition. A council was accordingly assembled, and the various chieftains
summoned to attend. After a brief exposition of the
defenceless state of the garrison, the almost utter impossibility of preventing the landing of the enemy, and the
alarming destitution into which the magazines of provision had fallen, General Procter proposed that the
forts of Detroit and Amherstburg, together with the various public buildings, should be destroyed, and that the
troops and Indians should retire on the Centre Division at
Niagara. This proposal was met by the chieftains with
divided sentiments ; but Tecumseh, whose gallant and
i mpetuous spirit could ill brook the idea of retiring before his enemies, had no sooner heard the conclusion,
than he arose, and, in a speech of much length, and accompanied by powerful energy and gesticulation, protested against the infamy of abandoning the position
without first using every exertion for its defence. He -addressed the commanding officer in the severest terms ;
accused him of cowardice ; and after having compared
his conduct with that of Captain Barclay, whose noble
defence had inspired him with an enthusiasm surpassed
204

205

the regret he entertained at his failure, concludonly by
'declaring
it to be his fixed determination to remain
e d by
with his warriors and defend the place himself.
" Father,—(he thundered), Listen to your children !
You see them now all before you. The war before this,
our British father gave the hatchet to his red children
when our old chiefs were alive. They are now all dead.
In that war, our father was thrown on his back by the
Americans, and our father took them by the hand without our knowledge, and we are afraid our father will do
rte

t, when I came forward with my red
eart before last,
so Summer
brethren, and was ready to take up the hatchet in favor
of our British father, we were told not to be in a hurry—
that he had not yet determined to fight the Americans.
Listen ! When war was declared, our father stood up
and gave us the tomahawk, and told us that he was now
ready to strike the Americans—that he wanted our assistance ; and that he would certainly get us our lands back,
which the Americans had taken from us.
Listen ! You told us at that time to bring forward
our families to this place—we did so, and you promised
to take care of them, and that they should want for
nothing, while the men would go and fight the enemy—
that we were not to trouble ourselves with the enemy's
garrisons—that we knew nothing about them, and that
our father would attend to that part of the business. You
also told your red children that you would take good care
of their garrison here, which made our hearts glad.
Listen ! When we last went to the Rapids, it is true
we gave you little assistance. It is hard to fight people
1
who live like ground-hogs.
Father—Listen ! Our fleet has gone out ; we know
they have fought ; we have heard the great guns ; but
know nothing of what has happened to our father with
one arm.' Our ships have gone one way, and we are
=The allusion here is to Captain Robert Herriott Barclay, R.N.,
who arrived from England in May, 1813, and after some service on
Lake
akeaOne
Ontario was assigned the command on Lake Erie about the
Lk
first of July. He served with Nelson at Trafalgar, where he lost
an arm. A court-martial was held upon him for the loss of the fleet
on
Erie, which decided that he was " fully and honorably
acquitted." After returning to Great Britain he lived in Edinburgh. The inscription on his tombstone, in Greyfriar's churchyard, states that he died on the 8th of May, 1837, aged 52 years.

206

THE BATTLE OF MORAVIANTOWN

much astonished to 'see our father tying up everythin g
and preparing to run away the other, without letting hi s
red children know what his intentions are. You always
told us to remain here and take care of our lands ; it
made our hearts glad to hear that was your wish. Our
great father, the king, is the head, and you represent
him You always told us you would never draw your
foot off British ground ; but now, father, we see you are
drawing back, and we are sorry to see our father doing
so without seeing the enemy. We must compare our
father's conduct to a fat animal, that carries its tail upon
its back, but when affrighted, it drops it between its legs
and runs off.
Listen, father ! The Americans have not yet defeated
us by land ; neither are we sure that they have done so by
water ; we therefore wish to remain here, and fight our
enemy, should they make their appearance. If they
defeat us, we will then retreat with our father.
At the battle of the Rapids, last war, the Americans
certainly defeated us ; and when we 'retreated to our
father's fort at that place, the gates were shut against us.
We were afraid that it would now be the case ; but
instead of that we now see our British father preparing
to march out of his garrison.
Father ! You have got the arms and ammunition
which our great father sent for his red children. If you
have any idea of going away, give them to us, and you
may go in welcome, for us. Our lives are in the hands
of the Great Spirit. We are determined to defend our
lands, and if it is his will, we wish to leave our bones
upon them."
No sooner had the last words of this startling speech'
died away upon his lips, than the various chieftains
started up to a man, and brandishing their tomahawks in
the most menacing manner, vociferated their approbation
of his sentiments. The scene altogether was of the most
imposing character. The council room was a large, lofty
building, the vaulted roof of which echoed back the wild
yell of the Indians ; while the threatening attitude and
=This speech was delivered on September 18th, 1813.
In the yard of Mr. Simon Fraser, ex-mayor of Amherstburg, is
preserved a large boulder upon which Tecumseh used to stand
when addressing his braves.

;V PREPARATIONS FOR RETREAT
,

207

diversified costume of these latter formed a striking contrast with the calm demeanor and military garb of the
officers grouped around the walls. The most prominent
feature in the picture, however, was Tecumseh Habited
in a close leather dress, his athletic proportions were admirably delineated, while a large pl'ame of white ostrich
feathers, by which he was generally distinguished, overshadowing his brow, and contrasting with the darkness of
his complexion and the brilliancy of his black and piercing
eye, gave a singularly wild and terrific expression to his
features. It was evident that he could be terrible.
Tranquillity being at length restored, General Procter,
through the medium of his interpreters, entered into a
more detailed account of the motives by which he was influenced, and finally succeeded in prevailing on the warrior to assent to a second proposal, which was to retire
on the Moravian village, distant nearly halfway between
Amherstburg and the outposts of the Centre Division, and
there await the approach of the enemy.
It having been resolved to move without loss of time,
the troops were immediately employed in razing the fortifications, and committing such stores as it was found
impossible to remove to the flames, kindled in the various
public buildings ; and the ports of Detroit and Amherstburg for some days previous to our departure presented a
scene of cruel desolation. At length, the baggage waggons and boats having been sent in advance, the troops of
the latter garrison commenced their march early in the
last week of September, and being joined by those of
Detroit, proceeded up the mouth of the Thames, a river
navigable for small craft, and separated from that of Detroit by the Lake St. Clair, into which it empties itself.
Our movements were extremely dilatory ; and although
the bridge near Amherstburg, already described in the
early part of this narrative, had been destroyed by our
rear-guard, it was speedily repaired by the American

208

DEFEAT OF THE BRITISH

THE BATTLE OF MORAVIANTOWN

general who, on the third day after our departure from
Amherstburg, crossed the lake in boats ; and hastening
to overtake us with a corps of five thousand men, was
within a few leagues at the moment we approached the
position where it was originally intended the little army
should entrench itself.
The Moravian village, situated in a small plain, offered
every facility of defence, being bounded on one flank by
a thick wood, highly favorable to the operations of the
Indians, and on the other, by the river Thames, while
immediately in front, a deep ravine, covered with brushwood, and commanded by our guns, presented an
obstacle peculiarly unfavorable to the passage of cavalry,
of which, we were sufficiently informed, a large portion
of the advancing columns consisted. Yet, notwithstanding the excellence of the position, from some singularly
selfish motive, the project was entirely abandoned. On
the evening of the 4th, the enemy had captured our
boats and, with them, the guard by which they were accompanied. Lieut. Holmes, of the Provincial Dragoons,
an active and enterprising officer, who, with a small detachment of men, was of great service to the army during
its retreat, also fell into the hands of the enemy on this
day, having been taken while in the act of swimming his
horse across the Chatham river,' on his return from destroying some bridges. On the 5th, at one o'clock in the
afternoon, we were within two miles of the Moravian village, but in defiance of that repeated experience which
should have taught us the hopelessness of combating a
concealed enemy, the troops were ordered to defile into
the heart of a wood, not very close it is true, yet through
the interstices of which it was impossible for the view to
extend itself beyond a distance of twenty paces, much
less to discover objects bearing so close a resemblance to
the bark and foliage of the trees and bushes as the cosiMcGregor's Creek, which debouches into the Thames about
the centre of the presenecity of Chatham.

209

of the Americans ; whereas, on the contrary, the
glaring red of the troops formed a point of relief on which
the eye could not fail to dwell. In this position we continued to remain during two hours, our left wing extending to the road, in which a solitary six pounder was
posted, and the right flanked by the Indians to the number of 1,000 under Tecumseh; when the bugles of the
enemy sounding at length to the attack, the engagement
commenced. The result of an affair, against a body of
such numerical superiority, and under such circumstances,
may easily be anticipated. Closely pressed on every
hand, and principally by a strong corps of mounted
riflemen, the troops were finally compelled to give way,
and completely hemmed in by their assailants, had no
other alternative than to lay down their arms—about
fifty men only, with a single officer of the regiment,
(Lieut. Bullock), contriving, when all was lost, to effect
their escape through the wood. General Procter,
• mounted on an excellent charger, and accompanied by his
personal staff, sought safety in flight at the very commencement of the action, and being pursued for some
hours by a detachment of mounted Kentucky riflemen,
was in imminent danger of falling into their hands.
In this affair, I had an opportunity of witnessing the
zuel dexterity and despatch with which the Indians use
the tomahawk and scalping knife. A Kentucky rifleman,
who had been dismounted within a few yards of the spot
where I stood,—and the light company, to which I was attached, touched the left flank of the Indians—was fired at
by three warriors of the Delaware tribe. The unfortunate
ma n
their several balls in his body, yet,
l at
from loss of blood, he made every exertos
at t ave himself. Never was fear so strongly depicted
eointh
udee
human countenance, and the man's hair (for he
was uncovered) absolutely seemed to me to stand on end,
as he
attempted to double a large fallen tree, in order to
the weapons of his enemies. The foremost of his
Wine

210 THE BATTLE OF MORAVIANTOWN

pursuers was a tall powerful man—a chief whom I well
knew, having, only a few days before we commenced our
retreat, obtained from him a saddle in exchange for a
regimental coat, purchased at the sale of the effects of
Lieut. Sutherland, wounded at Maguaga. When within
twelve or fifteen paces of the rifleman, he raised and
threw his tomahawk, and with such precision and force,
that it immediately opened the skull, and extended him
motionless on the earth. Laying down his rifle, he drew
forth his knife, and after having removed the hatchet
from the brain, proceeded to make a circular incision
throughout the scalp. This done, he grasped the bloody
instrument between his teeth, and placing his knees on
the back of his 'victim, while at the same time he fastened
his fingers in the hair, the scalp was torn off without
much apparent difficulty and thrust, still bleeding, into
his bosom. The warrior then arose, and after having
wiped his knife on the clothes of the unhappy man, returned it to its sheath, grasping at the same time the
arms he had abandoned, and hastening to rejoin his
comrades. All this was the work of a few minutes.
While this brief scene was enacting, the main body of
the enemy, who had by this time succeeded in breaking
through our centre, and had wheeled up, in order to take
the Indians in flank, moved rapidly upon us in every direction ; so that the resistance the light company had
hitherto opposed, was now utterly hopeless of any successful result. Persuaded moreover, from the sudden
cessation of the firing in that direction, that our centre
and left (for the wood intercepted them from our view),
had been overcome, we, at the suggestion and command
of Lieutenant Hailes, the only officer with us, prepared
to make good our retreat, but, instead of going deeper
into the wood as we purposed, we mistook our way, and
found ourselves unexpectedly in the road ; when, on
glancing to the right, we beheld, at a distance of about
five hundred yards, the main body of our men disarmed

BRITISH RETREAT CUT OFF

2

I

I

_gr ouped together, and surrounded by American troops.
On turning to the left, as we instinctively did, we saw a
strong body of cavalry coming toward us, evidently returning from some short purpuit, and slowly walking
their horses. At the head of
ese, and dressed like his
men, in Kentucky hunting frocks, was a stout elderly
officer whom we subsequently knew to be Governor
Shelby, and who the moment he beheld us emerging from
the wood, galloped forward and brandishing his sword
over his head, cried out with stentorian lungs " Surrender
surrender, it's no use resisting, all your people are
taken, and you had better surrender." There was no
alternative. The channel to escape had been closed by
the horsemen in the wood, as well as those in the road,
and a surrender was unavoidable. We .accordingly
moved down to join our captured comrades, as directed
by Governor Shelby, yet I well recollect burying my
musket in the mud, which was very deep, in order to
avoid giving it up to the enemy. Perfectly also do I
recollect the remark made by a tall Kentuckian as I
passed by him to the group—" Well I guess now, you
tarnation little Britisher, who'd calculate to see such a
bit of a chap as you here ?" But I heeded not the sneer
of the Kentuckian. My eye had fallen and rested upon
a body of American Indians, about fifty in number, from
some one of whose tomahawks, I apprehended the deathblow—I had seen their weapons too often exercised (and
indeed, as has been seen, only a few minutes before) to
feel anything like security. But my fear was without
foundation. As I watched them more narrowly, I found
that their countenances wore an expression of concern,
and that, so far from seeking to injure us, they seemed
rather to regret our fate. Nor is this at all unlikely, as
it was well known that the greater portion of the warriors
who had taken up the hatchet in favor of the United
States, had been induced to do so from compulsion
alone. This little anecdote, otherwise too personal per-

212

THE BATTLE OP MORAVIANTOWN

haps, affords another in support of the many striking
evidences of the strong attachment of the Indians for the
British.
The most serious loss we sustained on this occasion
was that of the noble and unfortunate Tecumseh. Only
a few minutes before the clang of the American bugles
was heard ringing through the forest, and inspiriting to
action, the haughty Chieftain had passed along our line,
pleased with the manner in which his left was supported,
and seemingly sanguine of success. He was dressed in
his usual deer skin dress, which admirably displayed his
light yet sinewy figure, and in his handkerchief, rolled
as a turban over his brow, was placed a handsome white
ostrich feather, which had been given to him by a near
relation of the writer of this narrative, and on which he
was ever fond of decorating himself, either for the Hall of
Council or the battle field. He pressed the hand of each
officer as he passed, made some remark in Shawnee, appropriate to the occasion, which was sufficiently understood by the expressive signs accompanying them, and
then passed away forever from our view. Towards the
close of the engagement, he had been personally opposed
to Colonel Johnson, commanding the American mounted
riflemen, and having severely wounded that officer with a
ball from his rifle, was in the act of springing upon him
with his tomahawk, when his adversary drew a pistol
from his belt, and shot him dead on the spot. It has
since been denied by the Americans that the hero met his
death from the hand of Colonel Johnson. Such was the
statement on the day of the action, nor was it ever contradicted at that period. There is every reason to infer
then that the merit (if any merit could attach to the destruction of all that was noble and generous in savage
life), of having killed Tecumseh, rests with Colonel Johnson. The merit of having flayed the body of the fallen
brave, and made razor strops of his skin, rests with his
i mmediate followers. This too has been denied, but
TECUMSEH.

DEATH OF TECUMSEH

2 13

denial is vain. On the night of the engagement, when
seated around a fire kindled in the forest, partaking, on
the very battle ground, of the meat which Gen. Harrison's aids-de-camp were considerately and hospitably
toasting for us on long pointed sticks, or skewers, and
which, half-famished as we were, we greedily ate without the accompaniment of either salt or bread, the painful subject was discussed, and it is not less an eulogy to
the memory of the high-minded Tecumseh, than a justice
to that of General Harrison to add, that that officer was
the first to deplore his death ; while the sentiments he
expressed, when the circumstance and manner of his fall
were made known, were such as to reflect credit on himself, both as a man, a Christian, and a soldier.
Doubts as to the fact of Tecumseh having fallen at all
at the Moraviantown, have, in the same spirit of party
which has denied to Colonel Johnson the act of having
shot him, been entertained ; and it has even been asserted
that the mutilated remains which were supposed to have
been his, were in reality those of another Chief. Would
for the honor of humanity it had been so : but this is incorrect. Several of the officers of the 41st, on being apprized of his fall, went, accompanied by some of General
Harrison's Staff, to visit the spot where Tecumseh lay,
and there they identified (for they knew well) in the
mangled corpse before them, all that remained of the
late powerful and intelligent chieftain. Of the pain with
which the sight was viewed, and the deep regret with
which his death was regarded, no stronger evidence can
be given than in the fact that there was scarcely an officer of the captured Division who, as he reposed his head
upon the rude log, affording him the only pillow that
night, did not wholly lose sight of his own unfortunate
position in the more lively emotion produced by the untimely fate of the lamented and noble Indian. It has
ever been a source of profound regret to me that I was
not present at this inspection, for although the sight of

214

THE BATTLE OF MORAVIANTOWN

the mutilated hero could not have failed to inflict upon
my heart pain of the most poignant kind, it would have
been at least a consolation to have seen the last of his remains on earth : and this not more from the reverence
and honor in which I had, and have, ever held the Warrior; than from the opportunity I should now possess of bearing attestation to the fact and manner of his
fall, from my own positive and personal observation. I
was not, however, aware of the purposed visit until the
party had returned, and made it the subject of conversation, in presence of General Harrison, as already stated.
Nor was there time afforded for remedying the unintentional omission.
But the battle of the Moraviantown (if indeed battle
it can be called) embracing as it does an important portion of Canadian History, and involving the honor of the
British arms, is not thus briefly to be dismissed. The
Right Division has been grossly vilified for its conduct on
the occasion, and that vilification stands on public
record. The proud—the honorable—the gratifying task
of refuting the unmerited aspersion has devolved on the
young, and humble, and comparatively unnoticed volunteer, who had the advantage of tracking it throughout
its whole course of unceasing service, and whose lot it
seems to be to have been nursed in the regiment, chiefly
to become, at this distant day, the impartial chronicler of
its deeds, and the'vindicator of its unjustly sullied name.
First on the list of calumny stands the general order
issued by Sir George Prevost—a commander whose
marked imbecility and want of resolution, on more than
one occasion, (reflecting the deepest disgrace on the
British arms), had doubtless been ordained as a fitting
punishment for his arrogant censure of the conduct of a
corps, whose general excellence he was incompetent to
appreciate, and whose only positive crime was that of its
weakness, its physical disorganization, and its utter
destitution. Here is the insulting and most uncalled for

PREVOST' S GENERAL ORDER

215

document, and who, on perusing it, after having traced
the regiment through its previous course of glory will
fail to entertain a sentiment of deep indignation at its injustice ?
General Order,
Head Quarters, Montreal, Nov. 24th, 1813.
His Excellency the Commander of the Forces has received an Official report from Major-General Procter of
the affair which took place on the 5th October, near the
Moravian village, and he has in vain sought in it, for
grounds to palliate the report made to His Excellency by
Staff Adjutant Reiffenstein, upon which the General
Order of the 18th October was founded—on the contrary
that statement remains confirmed in all the principal
events which marked that disgraceful day ; the precipitancy with which the Staff Adjutant retreated from the
field of action, prevented his ascertaining the loss sustained by the division on that occasion ; it also led him
most grossly to exaggerate the enemy's force, and to
misrepresent the conduct of the Indian Warriors who instead of retreating towards Machedash, as he had stated,
gallantly maintained the conflict, under their brave
Chief Tecumseh, and in their turn harassed the
American Army on its retreat to Detroit.
The subjoined return states the loss the Right Division
has sustained in the action of the fleet on Lake Erie on
the loth Sept., and in the affair of the 5th October near
the Moravian village. In the latter but very few appear to
have been rescued by an honorable death, from the ignominy of passing under the American yoke, nor are
there many whose wounds plead in mitigation of this reproach. The Right Division appears to have been encumbered with an unmanageable load of unnecessary, and
forbidden private baggage—while the requisite arrangements for the expeditious, and certain conveyance of the
ammunition, and provisions, the sole objects worthy of
consideration, appear to have been totally neglected, as
well as all those ordinary measures resorted to by officers
of intelligence, to retard and impede the advance of a
pursuing enemy. The result affords but too fatal a proof
of this unjustifiable neglect. The Right Division had
quitted Sandwich in its retreat on the 26th September,
having had ample time, for every previous arrangement,

11

,

7

THE BATTLE OF MORAVIANTOWN

PREVOST'S GENERAL ORDER

to facilitate and secure that movement ; on the 2nd October following, the enemy pursued by the same route, and
on the 4th succeeded in capturing all the,,, tores of the
division, and on the following day attacked and defeated
it almost without a struggle.
With heart-felt pride and satisfaction the Commander
of the Forces had lavished on the Right Division of this
army, that tribute of praise which was so justly due to its
former gallantry and steady discipline. It is with poignant grief and mortification thlt he now beholds its wellearned laurels tarnished, and its conduct calls loudly for
reproach and censure.
The Commander of the Forces appeals to the genuine
feelings of the British soldier from whom he neither conceals the extent of the loss the army has suffered, nor the
far more to be lamented injury it has sustained in its
wounded honor, confident that but one sentiment will
animate every breast, and that zealous to wash out the
stain, which by a most extraordinary and unaccountable
infatuation, has fallen on a formerly deserving portion of
the army, all will vie to emulate the glorious achievements recently performed, by a small but highly spirited
and well-disciplined division, led by officers possessed of
enterprise, intelligence, and gallantry, nobly evincing
what British soldiers can perform, when susceptible of
no fear, but that of failing in the discharge of their duty.
His Excellency considers it an act of justice, to exonerate most honorably from this censure the brave soldiers
who were serving as marines on board the squadron on
Lake Erie, the Commander of the Forces having received the official report of Capt. Barclay of the action
which took place on Lake Erie on the ioth September
when that gallant officer, from circumstances of imperious
necessity was compelled to seek the superior force of the
enemy, and to maintain an arduous and long-contested
action under circumstances of accumulating ill fortune.
Captain Barclay represents, that the wind, which was
favorable early in the day, suddenly changed, giving the
enemy the weather-gage, and that this important advantage was, shortly after the commencement of the engagement, heightened by the fall of Captain Finnis, the commander of the Queen Charlotte. In the death of that intrepid and intelligent officer, Capt. Barclay laments the
loss of his main support. The fall of Capt. Finnis was

followed by that of Lieut. Stokoe, whose country
was deprived of his services at this very critical period
leaving the command of the Queen Charlotte to Provincial Lieutenant Irvine, who conducted himself with great
was too limited in experience to supply the
courage,
conuern ,
q
ocer as Capt. Finnis, and in conse place of ssuch an officer
ce this vessel proved of far less assistance than might
expected.
c at e d .
Th
Theaction commenced at about a quarter before 12
e
be
o'clock,
oxcik , and continued with great fury until half-past 2,
when the American Commodore quitted his ship, which
struck shortly after, to that commanded by Capt. Barclay (the Detroit.) Hitherto the determined valor dis. played by the British squadron, had surmounted every disadvantage, and the day was in our favor ; but the contest
had arrived at that period when valor alone was unavailing
—the Detroit and Queen Charlotte were perfect wrecks,
and required the utmost skill of seamanship, while the
commanders and second officers, of every vessel, were
either killed or wounded : not more than fifty British
seamen were dispersed in the crews of the squadron, and
of these a great proportion had fallen in the conflict.
The American Commodore made a gallant, and but too
successful an effort to regain the day. His second largest vessel, the Niagara, had suffered little, and his numerous gun-boats which had proved the greatest source of
annoyance during the action, were all uninjured.
Lieutenant Garland, First Lieutenant of the Detroit,
being mortally wounded, previous to the wounds of Captain Barclay obliging him to quit the deck, it fell to the
lot of Lieutenant Inglis, to whose intrepidity and conduct
the highest praise is given, to surrender His Majesty's
Ship, when all further resistance had become unavailing.
• The enemy, by having the weather-gage, were enabled
to choose their distance and thereby avail themselves of
the great ad van
t age they derived in a superiority of
heavy Ion
long guns, but Captain Barclay attributes the resuit of the day, tto the unprecedented fall of every Commander, and second in command, and the very small
number of able seamen left in the squadron, at a moment
when the judgment
ju gment of the officer, and skilful exertions of
the sailor were most immediately called for.
To th
the British seamen, Captain Barclay bestows the
highest praise—that
.
they behaved like British seamen. From

2 16

soon

21

218

THE BATTLE OF MORAVIANTOWN

PREVOST CHARACTERIZED

the officers and soldiers of the regular force serving as
marines, Captain Barclay experienced every support
within their power, and states that their conduct has e x
-citedhswarmnkdito.
Deprived of the palm of victory, when almost within
his grasp, by an overwhelming force which the enemy
possessed in reserve, aided by an accumulation of unfortunate circumstances, Captain Barclay and his brave
crew have, by their gallant daring, and self-devotion to
their country's cause, rescued its honor and their own,
even in defeat.
EDWARD BAYNES,
Adjutant-General.
Return of the Right Division of the Army of Upper
Canada :
Detachment serving as marines on board the squadron
in action on loth September, 1813.
Killed—I lieutenant, i sergeant, 2I rank and file.
Wounded-3 sergeants, 46 rank and file.
Prisoners-2 lieutenants, i asst. surgeon, 4 sergeants,
4 drummers, 167 rank and file.
Killed, wounded, and missing in the retreat and in the
action of the 5th October, 1813 :
inspecting field officer, i dep. asst. qr.-master-general,
i fort adjutant, r hospital mate, i lieutenant-col., 6 captains, 12 lieutenants, 3 ensigns, I paymaster, I asst. surgeon, 34 sergeants, 13 drummers, 559 rank and file, 46
horses.
Assembled at Ancaster on the 17th October, 1813 :
1 major-general, i major of brigade, i aid-de-camp,
staff adjutant, 3 captains, 5 lieutenants, 2 ensigns, I adjutant, i quarter-master, 2 asst. surgeons, 15 sergeants,
9 drummers, 204 rank and file, 53 horses.
Total strength of the Right Division on the loth September, 1813:
i major-general, i inspecting field officer, i major of
brigade, i dep. asst. q.m. gen., i aid-de-camp, i staff adjutant, i fort adjutant, i hospital mate, i lieutenantcolonel, 9 captains, 20 lieutenants, 5 ensigns, i pay
master, i adjutant, i quarter-master, 4 assistant surgeons, 57 sergeants, 26 drummers, 997 rank and file, 99
horses.
Killed—Lieut. Garden, Royal Newfoundland Regt.
-

-

EDWARD BAYNES,

Adjutant-General.

219

Well timed indeed, and with a befitting grace does the
insulting censure, contained in the opening of the above
order, emanate from the man who had previously made a
descent upon Sackett's Harbor, with a view of destroying
the enemy's naval and military works, and who at the
very moment of accomplishment of the object of the expedition, and when the Americans were retreating, turned
and fled with precipitation to his boats, presenting to the
troops, who were unwilling sharers in his disgrace, the
monstrous yet ludicrous anomaly of two hostile armies
fleeing from each other at the same time. Well does it
become the leader who, at Plattsburg, covered the British
army with shame, and himself with enduring infamy, by
retiring at the head of 15,000 men—chiefly the flower of
the Duke of Wellington's army—before a force of Americans not exceeding as many hundreds ; and this even at
the moment when the commander of these latter was preparing to surrender his trust without a struggle. Well
does it proceed from him, who through timidity and
vacillation alone, at an earlier period of the war, entered
into a disgraceful armistice with the enemy at the very moment when General Brock was preparing to follow up his
successes on the western frontier, by sweeping the whole
southern border of the St. Lawrence. Happily was it devised by the authority to whose culpable inattention and
neglect alone was owing the loss of the gallant Barclay's fleet, and the consequent helplessness of that very
Right Division he has hesitated not to condemn for a
disaster attributable to himself alone. Nay, well and
most consistently does the sting issue from the Commander of the Forces, who, on the occasion of the capture of Detroit, and the victory obtained at the River
Raisin, ordered royal salutes to be fired in honor of conquests which had been achieved principally by the 41st
Regiment, and whose remarks, even on the occasion of
their unavoidable repulse at Sandusky, convey rather a
compliment than dispraise.

HARRISON'S REPORT CRITICIZED

220 THE BATTLE OF MORAVIANTOWN

That Sir George Prevost had been induced to issue this
order, on the gross misrepresentation of General Procter,
who, in order to shield himself from the consequence s of
his incapacity, scrupled not to sacrifice the reputation of
the regiment, which had so often repaired, by their valor,
what his marked inefficiency had endangered, there can
be no question. It is only necessary to refer to an earlier
memorandum on the subject to be fully satisfied of the
fact. But this does not the more exonerate Sir •George,
whose duty it was, before publishing a document, the
tendency of which was to cast odium on a corps which
he himself admits to have previously won his warmest
admiration, to possess himself of the true facts of the
action ; nor, by any exercise of undue severity, to have
provoked commentaries on his own conduct of a far more
humiliating character. But posterity will judge of the
Right Division, not by the sweeping and unfounded denunciations of an angry and misjudging Governor, but
by its universally admitted gallantry on all former occasions.
Who on looking over the state of the 41st Regiment,
which ostentatiously appears at the close of the General
Order, would not infer that, in the action of the Moraviantown, they mustered at least I,000 men, including
non-commissioned officers ? Even General Harrison, in
his most voluminous despatch, enumerates the prisoners
taken by him in such a way as to create the impression
that his (admitted) force of 3,000 had been opposed by
600 British regulars, present in action. This is not worthy
of General Harrison, who must have known that our
actual force in the field was, according to the state of the
adjutant of the regiment—the original of which is before
me at this moment—t lieut.-colonel, 6 captains, 9 lieuts.,
3 ensigns, 3 staff, 26 sergeants, 18 corporals, 4 drummers,
and 297 rank and file—and these divided into two open,
and irregular lines. The remainder of the 600, captured
by General Harrison, many of them sick and wounded

221

wen, had been taken, without a possibility of opposition,
in the boats conveying stores, during the early morning
of the action, and on the preceding day. Yet the American general seriously claims the palm of " superior bray " for his force of 3,000 men, opposed in their native
ver
woods (wherein he himself admits in his despatch they
" can ride better than any other people ") to not as many
hundreds, and these almost wholly unaccustomed to
them. It is impossible to entertain a feeling of disrespect
for General Harrison, but there is something so absurd in
this remark, that the reader cannot forbear a smile. Nor
can it be pretended that the Indians are to be considered
as having formed any portion of our force during the first
advance of the enemy, for General Harrison has distinctly
stated that he formed his assailing columns in such manner as to direct them wholly upon the 4ist, leaving the
Indians unmolested, until he should be enabled to break
through our feeble and extended line, and then turn their
position. This plan was acted upon. What then was
there in this defeat to.justify Sir George Prevost, in the
sweeping and splenetic denunciation cast upon a corps
who had done so much for the country, and had only now
been overcome through the incompetency of their chief ?
But let us turn to General Procter.
That officer has stated in his specious defence before
the court-martial which tried him for general misconduct
in the retreat, that he had drawn up his men in a position the most favorable for a successful stand against the
enemy's cavalry, and that he had expected a result which
the wa
vi e v

nntt of

the subject ? Who, with him, will aver that
the river onand
hishisthat he was justified in the selection,
n t two miles
es n his rear, were numerous houses in
os tp
th
th
s men, a wood on his right flank, and

o

row

s left, while immediately in front ran a

222

THE BATTLE OF MORAVIANTOWN

ravine difficult of access by cavalry, and capable of bein
ein g
swept by his guns, which, singularly enough, had already
been stationed there without the slightest use or servic e
in the battle planned by him to be waged. On what do es
General Procter ground his claim to be considered as coin_
petent to decide upon the success which ought to attend
his military movements? Is it on his dispositions at the
River Raisin, where, instead of attacking an unprepared
enemy sword in hand, he absurdly and unaccountably
apprized them of their danger, giving them ample opportunity to arm and cripple his own force, in such a manner
as to render victory for a period doubtful ? Is it on his
arrangements at the Miami, where he suffered an important line of batteries to be left without the support of
even a single company ? Is it on his attack upon Sandusky, where he ordered his men to storm before any
breach had been effected, without a fascine or scaling ladder, and with axes so blunt that he might have been suspected of treason in suffering them to be placed in the
hands of the unfortunate men who perished while fruitlessly wielding them ? Yet this man, whose brows the
41st Regiment covered in these several instances with
glory, when they rather should have been bowed to the
earth in shame, turns upon his gallant supporters in the
moment of their misfortune, and, in his base attempt to
redeem his own blighted military reputation, scruples not
to charge them with misconduct in the field. Where was
this misconduct? In what did it consist ? It has been
seen that 3,000 men, 1,50o of whom were mounted riflemen, dashed through the front line, composed of something less than 200 men, receiving the only two volleys
there was time to pour in before they had completely surrounded them. Was it possible to make a more lengthened defence against an enemy who thus overwhelmed
them en masse ? The true matter for surprise is, not that
the force yielded so soon, but that it had ever made a
stand at all ; for the strong conviction on the mind of

REBUTTAL OP PROCTER'S DEFENSE

223

every officer and man present, was that General Procter
Was making a wanton sacrifice of their lives, for the sole
purpose of covering the departure of his family and personal effects from the Moraviantown ; and that it was for
this reason also that he had drawn them up in the heart
of a wood, in preference to occupying a position which
all had been previously informed was susceptible of the
best defence against the expected cavalry.
I have said that only two volleys were fired by the men
before they were overwhelmed by the American force.
This was I believe the case on the centre and left, upon
which the main attack of the enemy was directed. On
the right, and near Tecumseh's flank, where the horsemen opposed to us were less numerous, the action was of
at least twenty minutes' duration, and in this time much
desultory firing took place. The instance I have already
given of the shooting, tomahawking, and scalping of an
American rifleman, who had been dismounted in the
action, is an evidence that the engagement was not so
speedily brought to a close as General Procter sought to
make it appear. But I will relate another fact in corroboration. Only a few minutes before this scene was
enacted before our eyes, a mounted rifleman was in the
actt of taking aim at one of the light company, who was
moving quickly at the time, and whom therefore he could
not conveniently cover. My attention was called to this
man by Lieut. Hailes (since commanding the 28th Regiment), who was near me at the time, and who suggested
that I should fire at him. I raised my musket, supporting it against a tree, and before the American, who was
still following his object with his eye and weapon, could
find what he deemed a favorable moment for discharging
it, I fired, when his rifle tumbled from his shoulder to
thear
ch
d ground,
u n , a ni d he sank over his horse's side.
Now if, as General Procter states, the line " had distheir pieces without orders, had given way, and
dispersed in a manner to preclude all hope of their

224 THE BATTLE OP MORAVIANTOWN

being again formed," there could have been no time for
these two deliberate actions. When a few minutes afterwards, we, from a consciousness of having been cut off
from our main body, attempted a retreat, we were not so
sorely pressed as to have failed in our object, had w e
taken the proper direction. We had continued firing to
the close, and it was only on emerging from the wood into
the road, and beholding our captured comrades, that we
found resistance to be hopeless. Including Lieut. Hailes
we were then about twenty in number.
I have already stated that General Procter was without
the confidence of his army. This is strictly correct. So
far from their having the slightest knowledge of the
object of his movements, or of his intentions, not even
his second in command was consulted on any one occasion during the retreat. As for the expression of surprise, contained in the defence, that Dover had not been
fortified it is perfectly' ridiculous. Independently of its
peculiar unfitness for that purpose, no such instructions
had ever been left with Colonel Warburton, who, when
repeatedly asked by the officers of the Division what was
purposed to be done, or to what tended General Procter's
unaccountable conduct, could only shrug his shoulders,
and in a manner indicative of mingled mortification and
contempt, reply that they knew as much of the matter as
he did. How, indeed, and under what direction was
Dover to be fortified, when, as General Procter himself
admits, he had taken with him to the Moraviantown the
only officer of Engineers (Captain Dixon) who was attached to the Division ?
Such was the general feeling of distrust, produced by
General Procter's continued absence from, and in advance
of the army, at a moment when the enemy were known
to be near us, and when the second in command was left
wholly in the dark, as to the course it was expected of
him to pursue, that serious intentions were formed of
depriving that officer of his authority, and investing

AN OFFICER'S DIARY

225

Colonel Warburton with it. This indeed was only not
done, because it was assumed that any disaster which
might, in consequence of the extraordinary delay and
want of military capacity hitherto manifested in its conduct, occur to the Division, would be gladly seized hold
of by the General, with a view to exonerate himself from
the heavy responsibility he was already so fearfully incurring. Of the sentiments entertained by all, a tolerably
correct estimate may be formed from the following memoranda at the time by an officer of the regiment.
" 3rd Oct., Dolsen' s. A report of the Americans being
within two or three miles of us. Our dragoons fell in
• with their advanced guard. The General at Moraviantown, 26 miles from Dolsen's or Dover. Marched from
this place 2
miles ; halted and formed on the bank of
the river in expectation of the enemy every instant.
Marched a few miles further and halted for the night.
Col. Warburton did not appear to know how to act/ the
General not having left any directions, but he decidi_d on
falling in with the wishes of the Indians.
4th Oct. This morning the Indians thought it advisable to proceed at once to Moraviantown. We accordingly marched : at dusk the rear guard halted at Richardson's ; the remainder proceeded about a mile farther,
within five miles of Moraviantown.
5th Oct. This day we proceeded towards Moraviantown, and when within a mile and a half of it, were halted
and marched back a few paces, when we halted a second
time : no person appeared to have any idea of what was
going to be done. A report came in of the Americans
being within a very short distance of us, and that they
had taken all our boats, in which was most of our baggage and the whole of the ammunition, except what the
men had in their pouches. After having halted for
nearly an hour, we were suddenly ordered to form in
the midst of a very thick wood apparently without any
previous arrangement and in such a manner that the
Grenadiers were nearly in the centre of the line, and the
light company towards the right—a second order came
for the Grenadiers and No. i company to march to the
rear as a reserve, which was done. The men were
formed at extended order, and the enemy, it was said,

226

THE BATTLE OF MORAVIANVOWN

were strong in cavalry and mounted riflemen. N.B. N o
brushwood to prevent the cavalry acting. About four
o'clock the enemy attacked us, and succeeded in driving
us from our ground. The company I commanded had
not received their provisions for the two last days, until
the very moment before we received the order to march :
the consequence was that those men who had time to do
so, cut off a slice of the raw beef and ate it uncooked.
The rest had none at all.
Mem.--While at Dolsen's was told by G— e that a
council of war was going to assemble immediately, in
order to decide whether or not the command should be
taken from the G. The day before the action Captain
Muir remarked to me that the G. ought to be hanged for
being away, and that Col. W. ought to be hanged for not
assuming the command. A few moments before the
action Captain D. said it was downright murder if we attempted to make a stand where we were—Colonel Elliott
told me that the day the G. went to the Moraviantown,
the Prophet (Tecumseh's brother) asked him, Col. Elliott,
where the G. was going, and on being informed remarked
that he had a great mind to take the epaulettes off his
shoulders, for he was not worthy to wear them."
General Procter furthermore asserts in his defence,that
his original intention was to fortify a position on the
Thames, for the two-fold purpose of protecting the Centre
Division, and conciliating the Indians. I am, not pre
pared, at this distant day, to state with exactn, ss what
was the original proposal made to thelndians in the celebrated council, but my strong impression has ever been
(and I was present during the whole of the debate) that
it was only in consequence of the deep and unconcealed
indignation, manifested by Tecumseh and many of the
inferior Chiefs, on his intimating the necessity which
existed for a retreat upon the Centre Division, that he was
compelled to yield to the will of the Indians, and to name
the Moraviantown as the understood termination of his
proposed march. Even this proposal was received by
Tecumseh with mingled regret and disdain, for he was
desirous of meeting the Americans at the moment of their

PROCTER'S DEFENCE REVIEWED

227

landing, and trying the chances of battle before incurring the odium of a retreat ; but on the inexpediency of
defending a fortress which had been wholly deprived of
its heavy guns for the purpose of arming the fleet, being
further discussed and pointed out to him, he finally
assented, and in a second short speech, which does not
appear to have been placed on record, consented to retire
as far as the Moraviantown, declaring however, at the
same time, that at that place he was fully determined to
conquer or lay down his life. Had the retreat been commenced from that moment, and the Moraviantown fortified, as it ought to have been, no matter how imperfectly,
none of the subsequent disasters would have occurred.
It is insincere in General Procter to state that his march
was delayed in order to afford the Indians time to remove
their effects, and cross the Detroit river. Those who
understand the manners and active habits of the red-men
of the forest must be aware that twenty-four hours were
quite sufficient with them for any purpose of the sort ;
neither is there less absurdity in the assertion that it was
necessary to linger on the road, in order to enable them
to overtake us. The Indians could march, in a single
day, more than we did in five, and even if they had not
overtaken us, it was our object to be in position to cover
them, if pursued by the enemy, and to be enabled to
oppose to these latter something like a respectable attitude
of defence. All this might, and should, have been done,
and
in can the onus of neglect fall, if not on Gend on w h o
al
Procter ?
There are yet two points in the defence to which it is
essential to advert. General Procter very gravely complains that the gun placed in the road on the left of the
line, in the affair of the Moraviantown, and on which he
so much depended, had been deserted "without an effort."
What will be thought of the general conduct of the
retreat, when it is known that there was not a single
r
ound of ammunition for the gun, it having by some un-

MAJOR FRIEND'S LETTER

229

228 THE BATTLE OF MORAVIANTOWN

fortunate accident been left behind, on resuming our
march in the morning ! It is true General Procter cannot be held individually responsible for this omission,but
had the only officer of artillery, attached to the Division,
been where he ought to have been—in the action—instead
of posting himself, by the direction of his Chief, with
the reserve guns at the Moraviantown, his sagacity and
forethought would have prevented this difficulty. That
there was fault with those who had immediate charge of
the field-piece there can be no question, but it is unjust to
the last degree that such fault should be visited by a general condemnation of the conduct of the troops engaged.
Yet even had the gun been supplied with ammunition the
result must have been nearly the same. One discharge
might have temporarily checked the advance of the
enemy upon the road, but as this was open only a few
hundred yards in front, the range commatiiied was necessarily so limited, that the American cavalry might have
dashed in upon it, before the Artillery men could have
time to load and fire again ; moreover there was the certainty of its being turned through the wood. General
Procter alludes to twenty Provincial Dragoons of Lieut.
Holmes' command (that officer then, it has been seen, a
prisoner with the enemy), as having been posted by him
in support of the gun, and confesses disappointment that
they had not maintained their trust. What could be
expected from so mere a handful of men against the masses
that were opposed to them? And how absurd to suppose
that they could have offered the slightest resistance.
Again, General Procter adverts to an attempt made by
him to rally the broken line, and in a manner to show
that his prosecutors had admitted such attempt,although
they denied its efficacy. How this admission (if made)s
was wrung from them, it is difficult to understand,unles
that it had been made inadvertently. General Procter
had stationed himself in rear of the second line, and he
made no attempt, at any one period of the brief action,

to pass it. When the first line retreated upon the second, and the latter opened its fire upon the advancing
cavalry, he fled precipitately, accompanied by the whole
of his personal staff, leaving the Division to maintain the
unequal conflict in the best manner they could. This has
been asserted by an officer who was near him during the
wlwflethoef the
impression created by the cruel and ungenerous
Of
order, issued by Sir George Prevost on this occasion, a
tolerable estimate may be formed from the following
communication, addressed to Lieut. Bullock by Major
Friend, then in command of the znd Battalion of the
regiment. In the reply will be found so full an explanation that beyond it, it will not be necessary to pursue the
subject.
Barton Heights, 3oth Nov., 1813.
Sir, —I request you will, with as little delay as the
nature of the report will admit, furnish me with every
circumstance within your knowledge, and that you may
have heard from undoubted authority, relative to the late
unfortunate affair that took place between General Harrison's army and the 1st Battalion 41st Regiment at
Moraviantown on the 5th October last, for the purpose
of transmitting it to Lieut.-Gen. Champagne. As you
are the senior and only officer of the regiment who has
escaped from the field, that was in the ranks, it is highly
incumbent on you to state most minutely the nature of
the ground on which the regiment were formed for
action, the manner in which it was formed, the number
then of the regiment actually in the field, the number of
the enemy opposed to you, and of what they consisted,
and what resistance was made by the regiment previous
to its defeat—if it had received provisions regularly, was
complete in ammunition, and could have got supplies
when required, and in short every circumstance that
happened from the commencement of the retreat from
Amherstburg relative to the regiment. You cannot be
too particular in your statement, as I am sorry to say
there are reports afloat disgraceful in the extreme to the
regiment, .and every individual with it that day. I think
it but proper to inform you that I saw Major-General

230

'1.1117. BATTLE OF MORAVIANTOWN

Procter's official report which highly censures the eo n .
duct of the regiment, and in which he says, that he
never went into action more confident of success,
I have the honor to be, kkc_
Your very obed't. linable serv't.
Richard Friend,
Major Cormug. 4.[St Reg.
Lieut. Bullock- ,
41st Regiment.
Cross Roads, Barton Heights,
Mh Dec., 1813,
Sir,—The following report is made, in compliance with
your orders to we in a letter dated 30th Nov. last, ill
which you request I would furnish you with every circumstance within my knowledge, and what I may have
heard from undoubted authority, relative to the late unfortunate affair which look place between the American
army under Gen. Harrison, and the ist Eat, 4r51 Regt.
near Moraviantown, on the 5th October last. the nature
of the ground on which it was formed, the 'lumberer
men of the Regt, actually in the field, the number of the
enemy iu the field opposed to it of what they consisted,
and what resistance was made by the Regiment previous
to its defeat ; if it had received provisions regularly, was
complete in ammunition, and could have got stipplies
when required, and in short every circumstance that
happened from the commencement Of the retreat from
Amherstburg relative to the Regiment. As a platoon
officer I cannot positively say whether the whole regiment was complete with ammunition or not, but tlus I
can say. that a number of the "nen clan escaped from the
enemy that day, were not complete before the action
commenced ; and this I am inclined to believe was the
case with many of those killed or taken, and in the
event of expending the ammunition in their pouches
they could not have received a fresh supply, she whole of
the spare ammunition being taken by the enemy sotne
hours before the action, which circumstance was known
to many of the regiment. I now proceed to give every
other information required in your letter, as correctly as
my rank, and situation on various occasions, enabled tile
to observe.
The force under Major Gen. Procter consisting of tile.
i t Bat. 41st Regiment, a few of the moth Vetervat 5,

LIVAPT, BULLOCK'S Ri•.PLY

23 I

{about t8 or 2cil some Artillery. and a body of Indians
retreated front Amhersiburg on— Sept, last to Sandwich,
from whence lge retired on the 27th of the same month
to t h e River Thames. the banks of which, at a place
ca ned Chatham t5.1 miles front Sandwich. and 7o from
Antherstburg) Gen. Procter had promised the Indians to
f or tify, with a view to await the enemy. On this retreat
commanded the grenadier company. We arrived
within three miles of Chatham. at a place called Dolsen's
on the ist Oct. On the 3rd GUI]. Procter was at Morav i an to • it , 26 miles from US, 011 the road lending to the
head of Lake Ontario; when information was received
that the enemy was within 4 or ,5 miles of us, and we retired 1 ,,4 a mile by order of Lieut.-Col. Warburton,
second in command, and formed oft the bank of the river
in expectation of an attack. At the expiration of half an
hoar we retired to Chatham, The Indians were encamped on the opposite hank of the river, and on our
. arrival, sent to say to me, that we should not proceed
• beyond the ground we then occupied—that Gen. Procter
had promised them to await the enemy on that ground
and fight them ; and had also promised to erect fortifications there. After endeavoring to reason with them,
4ieut. Cal. Warburton was compelled to remain there for
the night, and informed the Indians, through Col. Elliott
of the Indian Department, that whatever had been promised br Gen. Procter should he fulfilled, as far as he
(Lieut.-Col. Warburton) had it in his power. I was then
ordered on picquet with the Grenadier company, and at
the same tune received such particular instructions from
ieut. Cols, Wiu.hurton and Evans. that I have no doubt
they expected the enem3.' that night. Capt. Chambers of
the Qr.-Mr.-Gen. Department, accom pan ied me a tid pointed
out the ground my picquet was to occupy, which was one
mile and a half in advluice, towards the enemy. Early
next morning the picquet was called in. On arilving at
C11'1111011, where the rest of the regiment had passed the
tight, provisions were issued ; the meal was raw, and before it could he divided, we were ordered to march. in
consequence of the approach of the enemy. We retired
11 1
,_1 1/ miles whensire were joined by Gen. Procter, on
Aril"
r
return front Moraviantow n.
We m arched all
Ai
aY , the roads were excessively bad; about eight o'clock
evening Capt. Muir's Company was halted at

230

THE BATTLE OF MORAVIANTOWN

LIEUT. BULLOCK'S REPLY

Procter's official report which highly censures the conduct of the regiment, and in which he says, that he
never went into action more confident of success.
I have the honor to be, &c.
Your very obed't. humble serv' t.
Richard Friend,
Major Commg. 41st Regt.
Lieut. Bullock,
41st Regiment.
Cross Roads, Barton Heights,
6th Dec., 1813.
Sir,—The following report is made, in compliance with
your orders to me in a letter dated 3oth Nov. last, in
which you request I would furnish you with every circumstance within my knowledge, and what I may have
heard from undoubted authority, relative to the late unfortunate affair which took place between the American
army under Gen. Harrison, and the ist Bat. 41st Regt.
near Moraviantown, on the 5th October last, the nature
of the ground on which it was formed, the number of
men of the Regt. actually in the field, the number of the
enemy in the field opposed to it, of what they consisted,
and what resistance was made by the Regiment previous
to its defeat ; if it had received provisions regularly, was
complete in ammunition, and could have got supplies
when required, and in short every circumstance that
happened from the commencement of the retreat from
Amherstburg relative to the Regiment. As a platoon
officer I cannot positively say whether the whole regiment was complete with ammunition or not, but this I
can say, that a number of the men who escaped from the
enemy that day, were not complete before the action
commenced ; and this I am inclined to believe was the
case with many of those killed or taken, and in the
event of expending the ammunition in their pouches
they could not have received a fresh supply, the whole of
the spare ammunition being taken by the enemy some
hours before the action, which circumstance was known
to many of the regiment. I now proceed to give every
other information required in your letter, as correctly as
my rank, and situation on various occasions, enabled me
to observe.
The force under Major Gen. Procter consisting of the
1st Bat. 41st Regiment, a few of the loth Veterans
,

231

'about 18 or 20) some Artillery, and a body of Indians
retreated from Amherstburg on-- Sept. last to Sandwich,
from whence we retired on the 27th of the same month
to the River Thames, the banks of which, at a place
called Chatham (54 miles from Sandwich, and 7o from
Amherstburg) Gen. Procter had promised the Indians to
fortify, with a view to await the enemy. On this retreat
I commanded the grenadier company. We arrived
within three miles of Chatham, at a place called Dolsen's
on the ist Oct. On the 3rd Gen. Procter was at Moraviantown, 26 miles from us, on the road leading to the
head of Lake Ontario; when information was received
that the enemy was within 4 or 5 miles of us, and we retired IA a mile by order of Lieut.-Col. Warburton,
second in command, and formed on the bank of the river
in expectation of an attack. At the expiration of half an
hour we retired to Chatham. The Indians were encamped on the opposite bank of the river, and on our
arrival, sent to say to me, that we should not proceed
beyond the ground we then occupied—that Gen. Procter
had promised them to await the enemy on that ground
and fight them ; and had also promised to erect fortifications there. After endeavoring to reason with them,
Lieut.-Col. Warburton was compelled to remain there for
the night, and informed the Indians, through Col. Elliott
of the Indian Department, that whatever had been promised by Gen. Procter should be fulfilled, as far as he
(Lieut.-Col. Warburton) had it in his power. I was then
ordered on picquet with the Grenadier company, and at
the same time received such particular instructions from
Lieut.-Cols. Warburton and Evans, that I have no doubt
they expected the enemy that night. Capt. Chambers of
the Qr. -Mr. -Gen. Department, accompanied me and pointed
out the ground my picquet was to occupy, which was one
mile and a half in advance, towards the enemy. Early
next morning the picquet was called in. On arriving at
Chatham, where the rest of the regiment had passed the
night, provisions were issued ; the meat was raw, and before it could be divided, we were ordered to march, in
consequence
oi s
ce from
of the approach of the enemy. We retired
about 6 miles when we were joined by Gen. Procter, on
n s e return
om Moraviantown. We marched all
day, the roads were excessively bad; about eight o'clock
in the evening Capt. Muir's Company was halted at

232

LIEUT. BULLOCK'S REPLY

THE BATTLE OF MORAVIANTOWN

Richardson's, six miles from Moraviantown, and the
Grenadier company was left with it, to support in the
event of an attack ; the remainder proceeded on, the advance being at a house called Shearman's, one mile from
where the rear guard had halted. At daybreak next
morning (the 5th) the rear guard and Grenadier company
moved to Shearman' s,where the whole regiment collected.
At this place, after having halted some time, a few head
of cattle were shot, but before the meat could be divided,
the enemy were reported to be close at hand,and we were
ordered to march. We proceeded to Moraviantown, and
when within 'IA miles of it, were ordered to halt. After
halting about 5 minutes, we were ordered to face to the
right about, and advanced towards the enemy in files, at
which the men were in great spirits. Having advanced
about 5o or 6o paces we were halted a second time, at
which the men appeared dissatisfied, and overhearing
some of those nearest to me express themselves to the following effect, " that they were ready and willing to fight
for their knapsacks : wished to meet the enemy, but did
not like to be knocked about in that manner,doing neither
one thing nor the other," I immediately checked them,
and they were silent. About this time several of the Regi ment came up without arms or accoutrements, who had
escaped from boats cut off by the enemy's cavalry. From
these men we learnt that the enemy was within a mile of
us, and had a large force of cavalry. We had halted
about half an hour, when the Indian alarm was given
that the enemy was advancing : most of our men were
sitting on the logs and fallen trees by the side of the
road. On the alarm being given we were suddenly
ordered to form across the road. From the suddenness
of the order, apparently without any previous arrangement, the manner in which we were situated when it was
given, the way in which it was given, which was " form
up across the road," and from the nature of the ground,
the formation was made in the greatest confusion ; so
much so,that the Grenadier company was nearly in the
centre of the line and the Light company on the right.
A second order, as sudden as the first, was given for the
Grenadiers and No. 1 to march to the rear and form a
reserve. The Grenadiers and part of Capt. Muir's company accordingly fosrmed a second line, about 200 yards
in rear of the first, under command of Lieut.-Col. War,

233

burton the left of it about 8 or to yards to the left of
the road, and extending to the right into the woods,
formed at extended order, the men placing themselves
behind trees, and consequently much separated. The
ist line I could not distinguish, but from what I have
been informed by Lt. Gardiner, 41st Regt., commanding
ix-pounder, it was formed in the following manner—
as
a six-pounder was placed in the road, having a range of
50 yards, the 41st Regt. drawn up on its right, extending
in the wood ; on each side of the limber of the 6-pounder
were some of the Canadian Light Dragoons. From the
men of the Regiment, who escaped from that line, I
understand they were not formed at regular extended
order, but in clusters and in confusion. To the left of
the road in which the 6-pounder was placed, and parallel
to it,ran the River Thames. To the right and left of the
road was a remarkably thick forest, and on the right,
where we were formed, free from brushwood for several
hundred yards, and where cavalry could act to advantage.
My position at this time, (being on the right of the 2nd
line) and the thickness of the forest precluded me from
noticing the manner in which the enemy attacked the ist
line. The attack commenced about two hours after the
order was given to form up across the road. I heard a
heavy firing of musketry, and shortly after saw our
dragoons retreating together with the limber of the 6pounder—placed on the left of the 1st line. About a
minute afterwards I observed that line retreating in confusion, followed closely by the enemy's cavalry, who were
galloping down the road. That portion of the 1st line
which had escaped the enemy's cavalry, retreated behind
the 2nd line, which stood fast, and fired an irregular volley obliquing to the right and left, which appeared to
check the enemy. The line having commenced firing,my
attention was directed to that part of the enemy moving
down directly in my front. Hearing the fire slacken, I
turned towards the line and found myself remaining with
3 non-commissioned officers of the Grenadier company.
Thealernemy's cavalry had advanced so close, before the
reserve could commence firing, from the number of trees,
that before a third round could be fired they broke through
the left, and the rest not being formed in a manner to repel
were compelled to retreat. The number of the
Regiment actually in the field were one Lieut.-Col., 6

234

THE BATTLE OF MORAVIANTOWN

captains, 9 lieutenants, 3 ensigns, 3 staff, 26 sergeants,
18 corporals, 4 drummers, 297 rank and file. In what
manner the rest of the Regiment was distributed you will
be made acquainted with by the enclosed state signed b y
the Adjutant of the Regiment. The number of Indians
we had in the field was 800. The number of the enemy
I cannot positively affirm, but from the information obtained from individuals of the regiment taken prisoners
on that day, and who afterwards escaped, the number
could not have been less than 6,000 ; of which 1,200 or
1,500 were cavalry and mounted riflemen. The number
of our dragoons did not exceed 20. Our loss on this
occasion was 3 sergeants, and 9 rank and file killed, and
36 wounded, that of the enemy 15 killed, and from 4o to
5o wounded. Having been thus far particular in stating
everything to which I was an eye witness, and which
has come to my knowledge, I beg leave to remark that,
from the well-known character of the Regiment,any observations emanating from those whose interest it is to cast
a direct or indirect reflection upon its conduct, cannot be
received with too much distrust.
I have the honor to be, sir,
Major Friend,
Your very obed't humble serv' t, &c.
Comm'g 2nd Batt.
Richard Bullock,
41 st Regiment.
Lieut. 41st Grenadiers.
The following is the American General's very prolix
account of the affair of the Moraviantown.
Copy of a letter from Maj.-General Harrison, to the

Secretary of War, dated
Head-Quarters, Detroit, Oct. 9th, 1813.
SIR,---In my last letter from Sandwich, of the 30th
ult., I (lid myself the honor to inform you, that I was
preparing to pursue the enemy the following day. From
various causes, however, I was unable to put the troops
in motion until the morning of the 2nd instant; and then
to take with me only about 14o of the regular troops,
Johnson's mounted regiment, and such of Gov. Shelby's
volunteers as were fit for a rapid march ; the whole
amounting to about 3,500 men. To Gen. McArthur,
(with about 700 effectives), the protection of this place,
and the sick was committed. Gen. Cass's brigade, and
the corps of Lieut.-Col. Ball, were left at Sandwich, with

MAJOR-GENERAL WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON.

GENERAL HARRISON'S REPORT

235

orders to follow me as soon as the men received their
knapsacks and blankets, which had been left on an
Island, in Lake Erie.
The unavoidable delay at Sandwich was attended with
no disadvantage to us ; General Procter had posted himself at Dolsen's, on the right bank of the River Thames,
(or Trench) 56 miles from this place,where, I was informed, he intended to fortify, and to receive me. He must
have believed, however, that I had no disposition to follow him, or that he had secured my continuance here by
the reports that were circulated, that the Indians would
attack and destroy this place, upon the advance of the
army—as he neglected the breaking up of the bridges,
until the night of the 2nd instant. On that night, our
army reached the river, which is 25 miles from Sandwich,
and is one of four streams, crossing our route, over all
of which are bridges ; and, being deep and muddy, are
unfordable for a considerable distance into the country :
the bridge, here, was found entire ; and, in the morning,
I proceeded with Johnson's regiment, to save, if possible,
the others. At the second bridge, over a branch of the
River Thames, we were fortunate enough to capture a
Lieutenant of Dragoons and I I -privates, who had been
sent by General Procter to destroy them. From the prisoners, I learned that the third bridge was broken up, and
that the enemy had no certain information of our advance;
—the bridge, having been imperfectly destroyed, was soon
repaired, and the army encamped at Drake's farm, 4
miles below Dolsen's. The River Thames, along the
bank of which our route lay, is a fine deep stream, navigable for vessels of considerable burthen ; after the passage of the bar, at its mouth, over which there is six and
a-half feet of water.
The baggage of the army was brought from Detroit in
boats, protected by three gun-boats which Commodore
Perry had furnished for the purpose, as well as to cover
the passage of the army over the Thames itself, or the
mouths of its tributary streams ; the banks being low,
and the country generally open, (prairies), as high as
Dolsen's, these vessels were well calculated for the purpose.
Above Dolsen's, however, the character of the river and
adjacent country is considerably changed ; the former,
though still deep, is very narrow, and its banks high and
woody.

GENERAL HARRISON'S REPORT

236 THE BATTLE OF MORAVIANTOWN

The Commodore and myself,therefore, agreed upon the
propriety of leaving the boats under a guard of 15o infantry ; and I determined to trust to fortune, and the bravery
of my troops, to effect the passage of the river. Below a
place called Chatham, and 4 miles above Dolsen's is the
third unfordable branch of the Thames ; the bridge over
its mouth had been taken up by the Indians, as well as
that at McGregor's mills, one mile above. Several hundred of the Indians remained to dispute our passage, and
upon the arrival of the advanced guard, commenced a
heavy fire from the opposite bank of the creek, as well as
that of the river. Believing that the whole force of the
enemy was there, I halted the army, formed in order of
battle ; and brought up our two 6-pounders, to cover the
party that were ordered to repair the bridge ; a few shot,
from those pieces, soon drove off the Indians, and enabled us, in 2 hours, to repair the bridge, and cross the
troops. Col. Johnson's mounted regiment, being upon
the right of the army,had seized the remains of the bridge
at the mills, under a heavy fire from the Indians. Our
loss upon this occasion was 2 killed, and 3 or 4 wounded
—that of the enemy was ascertained to be considerably
greater. A house, near the bridge, containing a very
considerable number of muskets, had been set on fire ;
but it was extinguished by our troops, and the arms
saved. At the first farm, above the bridge we found one
of the enemy's vessels' on fire, loaded with arms and
ordnance stores ; and learned that they were a few miles
ahead of us, still on the right bank of the river, with a
great body of the Indians. At Bowles' farm, 4 miles
from the bridge, we halted for the night ; found two
other vessels, and a large distillery, filled with ordnance
and other valuable stores, to an immense amount, in
flames ; it was impossible to put out the fire—two 24 pounders, with their carriages, were taken, and a large

quantity of ball and shell of various sizes..
=This vessel sank at the place it was burnt, in about 12 feet of
water, and its presence was forgotten. In the summer of 1900 two
fishers for sunken timber accidentally found it, and the presence
of cannon balls determined the nature of the timbers. In the early
spring of 1901 the sunken hull was raised, taken down the river to
Tecumseh Park in the city of Chatham and placed high and dry on
a fitting foundation. The gunboat is supposed to be the General
Myers that was used at the siege of Fort Meigs. About two tons
of cannon balls of various sizes, several bayonets and muskets of
American manufacture, and an Indian rifle were found in it. The
position of the two other boats that were burnt have also been
located.

237

The army was put in motion early on the morning of
the 5th. I pushed on, in advance, with the mounted regiment, and requested Gov. Shelby to follow, as expeditiously as possible, with the infantry ; the Governor's
that of his men, enabled them to keep up with
zeal,
the cavalry ; and, by nine o'clock we were at Arnold's
mills, having taken, in the course of the morning, two
gun boats, and several batteaux, loaded with provisions
and ammunition. . A rapid, at the river at Arnold's mills,
affords the only fording to be met with for a very considerable distance; but,upon examination,it was found too deep
for the infantry. Having, however, fortunately, taken
two or three boats, and some Indian canoes, on the spot,
and obliging the horsemen to take a footman behind each,
the whole were safely crossed by 12 o'clock. Eight miles
from the crossing, we passed a farm where a part of the
British troops had encamped the night before, under the
command of Col. Warburton ; the detachment ,with General Procter, had arrived the day before, at the Moraviantown, four miles higher up. Being now certainly near
the enemy, I directed the advance of Johnson's regiment
to accelerate their march, for the purpose of procuring
intelligence ; the officer commanding it, in a short time,
sent to inform me that his progress was stopped by the
enemy, who were formed across our line of march : one
of the enemy's waggoners being also taken prisoner,from
the information received from him, and my own observation, assisted by some of my officers, I soon ascertained
enough of their position, and order of battle, to determine that, which it was proper for me to adopt.
I have the honor, herewith, to enclose you my general
order, of the 27th ult., prescribing the order of march,
and of battle, when the whole army should act together ;
but, as the number and description of the troops had been
essentially changed, since the issuing of the order, it becamee necessary to make a corresponding alteration in
theirr d
From the place where our army was last halted, to the
Moraviantown, a distance of about three and a-half miles,
the road passes through a beech forest, without any
clearing ; and, for the first two miles, near to the bank
of
the river ; at from 200 to 30o yards from the river, a
swam p
distance

extends parallel to it, throughout the whole
intermediate ground is dry, and, although

238

THE BATTLE OF MORAVIANTOWN

GENERAL HARRISON'S REPORT

the trees are tolerably thick, it is in many places clear of
underbrush ; across this strip of land, its left app uyed
upon the river, supported by artillery, placed in the
wood ; their right in the swamp, covered by the whole
of their Indian force—the British troops were drawn lip
The troops at my disposal consisted of about 120 regulars of the 27th regiment, five brigades of Kentucky v o lunteer militia infantry, under His Excellency Governor
Shelby, averaging less than 500 men ; and Col. Johnson's
regiment of mounted infantry, making, in the whole, an
aggregate of something above 3,000. No disposition of
an army opposed to an Indian force, can be safe, unless it
is secured on the flanks, and in the rear ; I had, therefore,
no difficulty in arranging the infantry, conformably to
my general order of battle. Gen. Trotter's brigade, of
500 men, formed the front line ; his right upon the road
—his left upon the swamp ; Gen. King's brigade as a
second line, 15o yards in the rear of Trotter's ; and
Chiles' brigade, as a corps of reserve, in the rear of it—
these three brigades formed the command of MajorGeneral Henry ; the whole of Gen. Desha's division, consisting of two brigades, were formed, en potence, upon the
left of Trotter.
Whilst I was engaged in forming the infantry, I had
directed Col. Johnson's regiment, which was still in front,
to be formed in two lines opposite to the enemy ; and upon the advance of the infantry, to take the ground to the
left ; and, forming upon the flank, to endeavor to turn
the right of the Indians.
A moment's reflection, however, convinced me, that
from the thickness of the woods, and swampiness of the
ground, they would be unable to do anything on horseback—and there was no time to dismount them, and
place their horses in security ; I, therefore, determined
. to refuse my left to the Indians, and to break the British
lines, at once, by a charge of the mounted infantry. The
measure was not sanctioned by anything that I had seen or
heard of, but I was fully convinced that it would succeed.
The American backwoodsmen ride better in the woods
than any other people ; a musket or rifle is no impediment
to them, being accustomed to carry them, on horseback,
from their earliest youth. I was persuaded, too, that
the enemy would be quite unprepared for the shock, and
that they could not resist it. Conformably to this idea,
.

239

I directed the regiment to be drawn up in close column
with its right at the distance of 5o yards upon the road,
(that it might be, in some measure, protected by the
trees, from the artillery), its left upon the swamp, and to
charge at full speed, as soon as the enemy delivered their
fire. The few regular troops of the 27th Regiment, under
the command of their Colonel (Paul), occupied, in columns of sections of four, the small space between the
road and the river, for the purpose of seizing the enemy's
artillery ; and some ro or 12 friendly Indians were directed to move under the bank. The crotchet formed by
the front line, and General Desha's division, was an important point ; at that place the venerable Governor of
Kentucky was posted, who at the age of 66, preserves all
the vigor of youth—the ardent zeal, which distinguished
him in the revolutionary war—and the undaunted bravery
which he manifested at King's Mountain. With my
aids-de-camp, the acting assistant Adjutant-General
Capt. Buttler; my gallant friend, Corn. Perry, who did me
the honor to serve as my volunteer aid-de-camp, and
Brig.-Gen. Cass, who, having no command, tendered me
his assistance—I placed myself at the head of the front
line of infantry, to direct the movements of the cavalry,
and give them the necessary support. The army had
moved on, in this order, but a short distance, when the
mounted men received the fire of the British line, and
were ordered to charge : the horses in the front of the
column, recoiled from the fire ; another was given by the
enemy, and our column, at length getting in motion,
broke through the enemy with irresistible force. In one
minute the contest, in front, was over. The British
officers, seeing no hopes of reducing their disordered
ranks to order, and our mounted men wheeling upon
them, and pouring in a destructive fire, immediately surrendered. It is certain that three only, of our troops,
were wounded in this charge. Upon the left, however,
the contest was more severe with • the Indians : Col.
Johnson, who commanded on that flank of his regiment,
received a most galling fire from them, which was re,' turned with great effect. The Indians, still further to
the right, advanced, and fell in with our front line of Infantry, near its junction with Desha's division, and, for
a moment, made an impression upon it. His Excellency,
Gov. Shelby, however, brought up a regiment to its sup-

240

THE BATTLE OF MORAVIANTOWN

port ; and the enemy, receiving a severe fire in front, and
a part of Johnson's regiment having gained their rear,
retreated with precipitation. Their loss was very considerable in the action, and many were killed in their retreat.
I can give no satisfactory information of the number of
Indians that were in the action ; but they must have been
considerably upwards of one thousand. From the documents in my possession (Gen. Procter's official letters,
all of which were taken), and from the information of respectable inhabitants of this territory, the Indians, kept
in pay by the British, were much more numerous than
has been generally supposed. In a letter to Gen. De
Rottenburg, of the 27th ulto. Gen. Procter speaks of
having prevailed upon most of the Indians to accompany
him ; of these, it is certain that 5o or 6o Wyandot warriors
abandoned him.
The number of our troops was certainly greater than
that of the enemy ; but when it is recollected that they
had chosen a position, that effectually secured their
flank, which it was impossible for us to turn ; and that
we could not present to them a line more extended than
their own, it will not be considered arrogant to claim, for
my troops, the palm of superior bravery.
In communicating to the Presidefrt, through you, sir,
my opinion of the conduct of the officers, who served
under my command, I am at a loss now to mention that
of Gov. Shelby, being convinced that no eulogium of
mine can reach his merits ; the Governor of an independent state—greatly my superior in years, in experience,
and in military character—he placed himself under my
command ; and was not more remarkable for his zeal and
activity, than for the promptitude and cheerfulness with
which he obeyed my orders.
The Major-Generals, Henry and Desha, and the Brigadiers, Allen, Caldwell, King, Chiles, and Trotter, all of
the Kentucky volunteers, manifested great zeal and activity.
Of Governor Shelby's staff, his Adjutant-General
Colonel Walker, rendered great service, as did his aidsde-camp, Gen. Adair, and Majors Barry and Crittenden.
The military skill of the former was of great service to us,
and the activity of the two latter gentlemen could not be
surpassed. Illness deprived me of the talents of my
,

,

ISAAC SHELBY.
First Governor of Kentucky.

GENERAL HARRISON' S REPORT

241

Adjutant-General Colonel Gaines, who was left at Sandwich. His duties were, however, ably performed by the
acting assistant Adjutant-General, Captain Buttler. My
aids-de-camp, Lieutenant O'Fallon and Captain Todd, of
the line and my volunteer aids John Speed Smith and
John Chambers, Esquires, have rendered me the most important services from the opening of the campaign. I
have already stated that General Cass and Commodore
Perry assisted me in forming the troops for the action.
The former is an officer of the highest merit, and the
appearance of the brave Commodore cheered and animated
every breast.
•■
It would be useless, sir, after stating the circumstances
of the action, to pass encomiums upon Col. Johnson and
his regiment. Veterans could not have manifested more
firmness. The Colonel's numerous wounds prove that he
was in the post of danger. Lieut.-Col. James Johnson,
and the Majors Payne and Thompson, were• equally active, though more fortunate. Maj. Wood, of the
engineers, already distinguished, by his conduct at
Fort Meigs, attended the army with two 6-pounders ;
having no use for them in the action, he joined in
the pursuit of the enemy ; and, with Major Payne of the
mounted regiment, two of my aids-de-camp, Todd and
Chambers, and three privates, continued it for several
miles after the rest of the troops had halted, and made
many prisoners.
I left the army before an of,-iafreturn of the prisoners,
or that of the killed and wounded, was made out ; it was,
however, ascertained that the former amounted to 6oi
regulars, including 25 officers. Our loss is seven killed
and 22 wounded, five of which have since died. Of the
British troops, 12 killed and 22 wounded ; the Indians
suffered most-33 of them having been found upon the
ground, besides those killed on the retreat.
On the day of the action, six pieces of brass artillery
were taken, and 2 iron 24 pounders the day before ;several others were discovered in the river, and can be
easily procured. Of the brass pieces, 3 are the trophies
of our revolutionary war, that were taken at Saratoga
and York, and surrendered by Gen. Hull. The number
of small arms, taken by us, and destroyed by the enemy,
must amount to upwards of 5,000 ; most of them had
been ours, and taken by the enemy at the surrender of

242

BATTLE OF MORAVIANTOWN

Detroit, at the River Raisin, and at Col. Dudley's defeat.
I believe that the enemy retain no other military troph y
of their victories, than the standard of the 4th regiment
they were not magnanimous enough to bring that of the
41st regiment into the field, or it would have been taken.
You have been informed, sir, of the conduct of the troops
under my command in action ; it gives me great pleasure
to inform you that they merit, also, the approbation of
their country, for their conduct in submitting to the
greatest privations with the utmost cheerfulness.
The infantry were entirely without tents ; and, for
several days, the whole army subsisted upon fresh beef,
without bread or'salt.
I have the honor, &c.,
William H. Harrison.
Hon. J. Armstrong, Sec. War.
P.S.—Gen. Procter escaped by the fleetness of his
horse, escorted by 40 dragoons, and a number of mounted
Indians.
On the 22nd Septinber, Harrison's army rendezvoused at

'Put-in Bay Island, an +, on the evening of the 25th took up a position on the Middle Sister Island, about twenty miles from
Amherstburg. A storm delayed them here till the 27th, when
they again embarked and landed near Bar Point, about three
miles from the Fort at Amherstburg. Harrison, it is said, made
an attempt to land in Colchester township, but was prevented from
doing so by John Naudee, the Chippeway chief and his Indians.
On the 27th, Amherstburg was in their possession, but the army
encamped that night on the farm now owned by Edward Honor,
where their temporary earthwork fortifications may still be seen.
There is a tradition that some horses of the American officers were
stampeded and captured by the Canadians and Indians. Among
them was a fine Arab stallion, that was hidden by one Drouillard
until the war was over. Many of the horses in the vicinity show
the Arab strain, and tradition points to this horse as their progenitor. If the above has any fact as a basis, the horses must
have been captured about the 1st October near Sandwich, as
Harrison had no horses until Col. Johnson's mounted corps crossed
the Detroit at that town. On the 28th, the invading army passed
the Canard and encamped two miles beyond it, and at 2 o'clock
the next day entered Sandwich. On the 2nd October everything was ready for the pursuit, which was continued as outlined
in the despatches given.
Harrison had as one of his guides Matthew Dolsen, who, with a
wife and five children, lived near Chatham in 1812. At the
beginning of the war he was drafted into the militia, but deserted
to Hull, and after the capture of Detroit escaped and joined
Harrison's army. Meanwhile his wife and family enjoyed the
eat ,
protection of the Canadian Government until after Procter's defeat,
when they moved to Detroit.

2.:rioN301411261110tigieiA
From the original daguerreotype in possession of G. Mills McClurg. Toronto.

JOHN NAUDEE.
( OSHAWAHNAB)
Second in command of the Indians at the Battle of Moraviantown.