

XI

THE BATTLE OF MORAVIANTOWN

With the loss of our fleet vanished every hope of maintaining our positions against the enemy, who, already assembled in the neighborhood of Forts Sandusky and Meigs, to the number of ten thousand men, only awaited the result of the action to decide on their future movements. A vast number of boats had been collected for the purpose of transporting them across the lake, under cover of their squadron, whose recent success leaving them undisputed masters of that element, necessarily precluded all probability of effectual opposition. A council was accordingly assembled, and the various chieftains summoned to attend. After a brief exposition of the defenceless state of the garrison, the almost utter impossibility of preventing the landing of the enemy, and the alarming destitution into which the magazines of provision had fallen, General Procter proposed that the forts of Detroit and Amherstburg, together with the various public buildings, should be destroyed, and that the troops and Indians should retire on the Centre Division at Niagara. This proposal was met by the chieftains with divided sentiments ; but Tecumseh, whose gallant and impetuous spirit could ill brook the idea of retiring before his enemies, had no sooner heard the conclusion, than he arose, and, in a speech of much length, and accompanied by powerful energy and gesticulation, protested against the infamy of abandoning the position without first using every exertion for its defence. He addressed the commanding officer in the severest terms ; accused him of cowardice ; and after having compared his conduct with that of Captain Barclay, whose noble defence had inspired him with an enthusiasm surpassed

only by the regret he entertained at his failure, concluded by declaring it to be his fixed determination to remain with his warriors and defend the place himself.

" Father,—(he thundered), Listen to your children ! You see them now all before you. The war before this, our British father gave the hatchet to his red children when our old chiefs were alive. They are now all dead. In that war, our father was thrown on his back by the Americans, and our father took them by the hand without our knowledge, and we are afraid our father will do

so Summer^{te}art before last, when I came forward with my red brethren, and was ready to take up the hatchet in favor of our British father, we were told not to be in a hurry—that he had not yet determined to fight the Americans.

Listen ! When war was declared, our father stood up and gave us the tomahawk, and told us that he was now ready to strike the Americans—that he wanted our assistance ; and that he would certainly get us our lands back, which the Americans had taken from us.

Listen ! You told us at that time to bring forward our families to this place—we did so, and you promised to take care of them, and that they should want for nothing, while the men would go and fight the enemy—that we were not to trouble ourselves with the enemy's garrisons—that we knew nothing about them, and that our father would attend to that part of the business. You also told your red children that you would take good care of their garrison here, which made our hearts glad.

Listen ! When we last went to the Rapids, it is true we gave you little assistance. It is hard to fight people who live like ground-hogs.

Father—Listen ! Our fleet has gone out ; we know they have fought ; we have heard the great guns ; but know nothing of what has happened to our father with one arm. Our ships have gone one way, and we are

=The allusion here is to Captain Robert Herriott Barclay, R.N., who arrived from England in May, 1813, and after some service on Lake Ontario was assigned the command on Lake Erie about the first of July. He served with Nelson at Trafalgar, where he lost an arm. A court-martial was held upon him for the loss of the fleet on Erie, which decided that he was " fully and honorably acquitted." After returning to Great Britain he lived in Edinburgh. The inscription on his tombstone, in Greyfriar's churchyard, states that he died on the 8th of May, 1837, aged 52 years.

much astonished to 'see our father tying up everythin^g and preparing to run away the other, without letting hi^s red children know what his intentions are. You always told us to remain here and take care of our lands ; it made our hearts glad to hear that was your wish. Our great father, the king, is the head, and you represent him You always told us you would never draw your foot off British ground ; but now, father, we see you are drawing back, and we are sorry to see our father doing so without seeing the enemy. We must compare our father's conduct to a fat animal, that carries its tail upon its back, but when affrighted, it drops it between its legs and runs off.

Listen, father ! The Americans have not yet defeated us by land ; neither are we sure that they have done so by water ; we therefore wish to remain here, and fight our enemy, should they make their appearance. If they defeat us, we will then retreat with our father.

At the battle of the Rapids, last war, the Americans certainly defeated us ; and when we 'retreated to our father's fort at that place, the gates were shut against us. We were afraid that it would now be the case ; but instead of that we now see our British father preparing to march out of his garrison.

Father ! You have got the arms and ammunition which our great father sent for his red children. If you have any idea of going away, give them to us, and you may go in welcome, for us. Our lives are in the hands of the Great Spirit. We are determined to defend our lands, and if it is his will, we wish to leave our bones upon them."

No sooner had the last words of this startling speech' died away upon his lips, than the various chieftains started up to a man, and brandishing their tomahawks in the most menacing manner, vociferated their approbation of his sentiments. The scene altogether was of the most imposing character. The council room was a large, lofty building, the vaulted roof of which echoed back the wild yell of the Indians ; while the threatening attitude and

=This speech was delivered on September 18th, 1813.

In the yard of Mr. Simon Fraser, ex-mayor of Amherstburg, is preserved a large boulder upon which Tecumseh used to stand when addressing his braves.

From a special photo.

THE GREAT WEST HASTON OF THE

1813



diversified costume of these latter formed a striking contrast with the calm demeanor and military garb of the officers grouped around the walls. The most prominent feature in the picture, however, was Tecumseh Habited in a close leather dress, his athletic proportions were admirably delineated, while a large plume of white ostrich feathers, by which he was generally distinguished, overshadowing his brow, and contrasting with the darkness of his complexion and the brilliancy of his black and piercing eye, gave a singularly wild and terrific expression to his features. **It was evident that he could be terrible.** Tranquillity being at length restored, General Procter, through the medium of his interpreters, entered into a more detailed account of the motives by which he was influenced, and finally succeeded in prevailing on the warrior to assent to a second proposal, which was to retire on the Moravian village, distant nearly halfway between Amherstburg and the outposts of the Centre Division, and there await the approach of the enemy.

It having been resolved to move without loss of time, the troops were immediately employed in razing the fortifications, and committing such stores as it was found impossible to remove to the flames, kindled in the various public buildings ; and the ports of Detroit and Amherstburg for some days previous to our departure presented a scene of cruel desolation. At length, the baggage waggon and boats having been sent in advance, the troops of the latter garrison commenced their march early in the last week of September, and being joined by those of Detroit, proceeded up the mouth of the Thames, a river navigable for small craft, and separated from that of Detroit by the Lake St. Clair, into which it empties itself. Our movements were extremely dilatory ; and although the bridge near Amherstburg, already described in the early part of this narrative, had been destroyed by our rear-guard, it was speedily repaired by the American

general who, on the third day after our departure from Amherstburg, crossed the lake in boats ; and hastening to overtake us with a corps of five thousand men, ^{was} within a few leagues at the moment we approached the position where it was originally intended the little army should entrench itself.

The Moravian village, situated in a small plain, offered every facility of defence, being bounded on one flank by a thick wood, highly favorable to the operations of the Indians, and on the other, by the river Thames, while immediately in front, a deep ravine, covered with brushwood, and commanded by our guns, presented an obstacle peculiarly unfavorable to the passage of cavalry, of which, we were sufficiently informed, a large portion of the advancing columns consisted. Yet, notwithstanding the excellence of the position, from some singularly selfish motive, the project was entirely abandoned. On the evening of the 4th, the enemy had captured our boats and, with them, the guard by which they were accompanied. Lieut. Holmes, of the Provincial Dragoons, an active and enterprising officer, who, with a small detachment of men, was of great service to the army during its retreat, also fell into the hands of the enemy on this day, having been taken while in the act of swimming his horse across the Chatham river, on his return from destroying some bridges. On the 5th, at one o'clock in the afternoon, we were within two miles of the Moravian village, but in defiance of that repeated experience which should have taught us the hopelessness of combating a concealed enemy, the troops were ordered to defile into the heart of a wood, not very close it is true, yet through the interstices of which it was impossible for the view to extend itself beyond a distance of twenty paces, much less to discover objects bearing so close a resemblance to the bark and foliage of the trees and bushes as the ^{is}McGregor's Creek, which debouches into the Thames about the centre of the preseneicity of Chatham.

of the Americans ; whereas, on the contrary, the Wine glaring red of the troops formed a point of relief on which the eye could not fail to dwell. In this position we continued to remain during two hours, our left wing extending to the road, in which a solitary six pounder was posted, and the right flanked by the Indians to the number of 1,000 under Tecumseh; when the bugles of the enemy sounding at length to the attack, the engagement commenced. The result of an affair, against a body of such numerical superiority, and under such circumstances, may easily be anticipated. Closely pressed on every hand, and principally by a strong corps of mounted riflemen, the troops were finally compelled to give way, and completely hemmed in by their assailants, had no other alternative than to lay down their arms—about fifty men only, with a single officer of the regiment, (Lieut. Bullock), contriving, when all was lost, to effect their escape through the wood. General Procter, mounted on an excellent charger, and accompanied by his personal staff, sought safety in flight at the very commencement of the action, and being pursued for some hours by a detachment of mounted Kentucky riflemen, was in imminent danger of falling into their hands.

In this affair, I had an opportunity of witnessing the zuel dexterity and despatch with which the Indians use the tomahawk and scalping knife. A Kentucky rifleman, who had been dismounted within a few yards of the spot where I stood,—and the light company, to which I was attached, touched the left flank of the Indians—was fired at by three warriors of the Delaware tribe. The unfortunate man ^{la} their several balls in his body, yet, from loss of blood, he made every exertion to save himself. Never was fear so strongly depicted ^{in the} human countenance and the man's hair (for he was uncovered) absolutely seemed to me to stand on end, as he attempted to double a large fallen tree, in order to the weapons of his enemies. The foremost of his

pursuers was a tall powerful man—a chief whom I well knew, having, only a few days before we commenced our retreat, obtained from him a saddle in exchange for a regimental coat, purchased at the sale of the effects of Lieut. Sutherland, wounded at Maguaga. When within twelve or fifteen paces of the rifleman, he raised and threw his tomahawk, and with such precision and force, that it immediately opened the skull, and extended him motionless on the earth. Laying down his rifle, he drew forth his knife, and after having removed the hatchet from the brain, proceeded to make a circular incision throughout the scalp. This done, he grasped the bloody instrument between his teeth, and placing his knees on the back of his 'victim, while at the same time he fastened his fingers in the hair, the scalp was torn off without much apparent difficulty and thrust, still bleeding, into his bosom. The warrior then arose, and after having wiped his knife on the clothes of the unhappy man, returned it to its sheath, grasping at the same time the arms he had abandoned, and hastening to rejoin his comrades. All this was the work of a few minutes.

While this brief scene was enacting, the main body of the enemy, who had by this time succeeded in breaking through our centre, and had wheeled up, in order to take the Indians in flank, moved rapidly upon us in every direction ; so that the resistance the light company had hitherto opposed, was now utterly hopeless of any successful result. Persuaded moreover, from the sudden cessation of the firing in that direction, that our centre and left (for the wood intercepted them from our view), had been overcome, we, at the suggestion and command of Lieutenant Hailes, the only officer with us, prepared to make good our retreat, but, instead of going deeper into the wood as we purposed, we mistook our way, and found ourselves unexpectedly in the road ; when, on glancing to the right, we beheld, at a distance of about five hundred yards, the main body of our men disarmed

—grouped together, and surrounded by American troops. On turning to the left, as we instinctively did, we saw a strong body of cavalry coming toward us, evidently returning from some short purpuit, and slowly walking their horses. At the head of these, and dressed like his men, in Kentucky hunting frocks, was a stout elderly officer whom we subsequently knew to be Governor Shelby, and who the moment he beheld us emerging from the wood, galloped forward and brandishing his sword over his head, cried out with stentorian lungs " Surrender surrender, it's no use resisting, all your people are taken, and you had better surrender." There was no alternative. The channel to escape had been closed by the horsemen in the wood, as well as those in the road, and a surrender was unavoidable. We accordingly moved down to join our captured comrades, as directed by Governor Shelby, yet I well recollect burying my musket in the mud, which was very deep, in order to avoid giving it up to the enemy. Perfectly also do I recollect the remark made by a tall Kentuckian as I passed by him to the group—" Well I guess now, you tarnation little Britisher, who'd calculate to see such a bit of a chap as you here ?" But I heeded not the sneer of the Kentuckian. My eye had fallen and rested upon a body of American Indians, about fifty in number, from some one of whose tomahawks, I apprehended the death-blow—I had seen their weapons too often exercised (and indeed, as has been seen, only a few minutes before) to feel anything like security. But my fear was without foundation. As I watched them more narrowly, I found that their countenances wore an expression of concern, and that, so far from seeking to injure us, they seemed rather to regret our fate. Nor is this at all unlikely, as it was well known that the greater portion of the warriors who had taken up the hatchet in favor of the United States, had been induced to do so from compulsion alone. This little anecdote, otherwise too personal per-

haps, affords another in support of the many striking evidences of the strong attachment of the Indians for the British.

The most serious loss we sustained on this occasion was that of the noble and unfortunate Tecumseh. Only a few minutes before the clang of the American bugles was heard ringing through the forest, and inspiring to action, the haughty Chieftain had passed along our line, pleased with the manner in which his left was supported, and seemingly sanguine of success. He was dressed in his usual deer skin dress, which admirably displayed his light yet sinewy figure, and in his handkerchief, rolled as a turban over his brow, was placed a handsome white ostrich feather, which had been given to him by a near relation of the writer of this narrative, and on which he was ever fond of decorating himself, either for the Hall of Council or the battle field. He pressed the hand of each officer as he passed, made some remark in Shawnee, appropriate to the occasion, which was sufficiently understood by the expressive signs accompanying them, and then passed away forever from our view. Towards the close of the engagement, he had been personally opposed to Colonel Johnson, commanding the American mounted riflemen, and having severely wounded that officer with a ball from his rifle, was in the act of springing upon him with his tomahawk, when his adversary drew a pistol from his belt, and shot him dead on the spot. It has since been denied by the Americans that the hero met his death from the hand of Colonel Johnson. **Such** was the statement on the day of the action, nor was it ever contradicted at that period. There is every reason to infer then that the merit (if any merit could attach to the destruction of all that was noble and generous in savage life), of having killed Tecumseh, rests with Colonel Johnson. The merit of having flayed the body of the fallen brave, and made razor strops of his skin, rests with his immediate followers. This too has been denied, but



Drawn by E. B. F. ...

TECUMSEH.

denial is vain. On the night of the engagement, when seated around a fire kindled in the forest, partaking, on the very battle ground, of the meat which Gen. Harrison's aids-de-camp were considerately and hospitably toasting for us on long pointed sticks, or skewers, and which, half-famished as we were, we greedily ate without the accompaniment of either salt or bread, the painful subject was discussed, and it is not less an eulogy to the memory of the high-minded Tecumseh, than a justice to that of General Harrison to add, that that officer was the first to deplore his death ; while the sentiments he expressed, when the circumstance and manner of his fall were made known, were such as to reflect credit on himself, both as a man, a Christian, and a soldier.

Doubts as to the fact of Tecumseh having fallen at all at the Moraviantown, have, in the same spirit of party which has denied to Colonel Johnson the act of having shot him, been entertained ; and it has even been asserted that the mutilated remains which were supposed to have been his, were in reality those of another Chief. Would for the honor of humanity it had been so : but this is incorrect. Several of the officers of the 41st, on being apprized of his fall, went, accompanied by some of General Harrison's Staff, to visit the spot where Tecumseh lay, and there they identified (for they knew well) in the mangled corpse before them, all that remained of the late powerful and intelligent chieftain. Of the pain with which the sight was viewed, and the deep regret with which his death was regarded, no stronger evidence can be given than in the fact that there was scarcely an officer of the captured Division who, as he reposed his head upon the rude log, affording him the only pillow that night, did not wholly lose sight of his own unfortunate position in the more lively emotion produced by the untimely fate of the lamented and noble Indian. It has ever been a source of profound regret to me that I was not present at this inspection, for although the sight of

the mutilated hero could not have failed to inflict upon my heart pain of the most poignant kind, it would have been at least a consolation to have seen the last of his remains on earth : and this not more from the reverence and honor in which I had, and have, ever held the Warrior; than from the opportunity I should now possess of bearing attestation to the fact and manner of his fall, from my own positive and personal observation. I was not, however, aware of the purposed visit until the party had returned, and made it the subject of conversation, in presence of General Harrison, as already stated. Nor was there time afforded for remedying the unintentional omission.

But the battle of the Moraviantown (if indeed battle it can be called) embracing as it does an important portion of Canadian History, and involving the honor of the British arms, is not thus briefly to be dismissed. The Right Division has been grossly vilified for its conduct on the occasion, and that vilification stands on public record. The proud—the honorable—the gratifying task of refuting the unmerited aspersion has devolved on the young, and humble, and comparatively unnoticed volunteer, who had the advantage of tracking it throughout its whole course of unceasing service, and whose lot it seems to be to have been nursed in the regiment, chiefly to become, at this distant day, the impartial chronicler of its deeds, and the vindicator of its unjustly sullied name.

First on the list of calumny stands the general order issued by Sir George Prevost—a commander whose marked imbecility and want of resolution, on more than one occasion, (reflecting the deepest disgrace on the British arms), had doubtless been ordained as a fitting punishment for his arrogant censure of the conduct of a corps, whose general excellence he was incompetent to appreciate, and whose only positive crime was that of its weakness, its physical disorganization, and its utter destitution. Here is the insulting and most uncalled for

document, and who, on perusing it, after having traced the regiment through its previous course of glory will fail to entertain a sentiment of deep indignation at its injustice ?

General Order,
Head Quarters, Montreal, Nov. 24th, 1813.

His Excellency the Commander of the Forces has received an Official report from Major-General Procter of the affair which took place on the 5th October, near the Moravian village, and he has in vain sought in it, for grounds to palliate the report made to His Excellency by Staff Adjutant Reiffenstein, upon which the General Order of the 18th October was founded—on the contrary that statement remains confirmed in all the principal events which marked that disgraceful day ; the precipitancy with which the Staff Adjutant retreated from the field of action, prevented his ascertaining the loss sustained by the division on that occasion ; it also led him most grossly to exaggerate the enemy's force, and to misrepresent the conduct of the Indian Warriors who instead of retreating towards Machedash, as he had stated, gallantly maintained the conflict, under their brave Chief Tecumseh, and in their turn harassed the American Army on its retreat to Detroit.

The subjoined return states the loss the Right Division has sustained in the action of the fleet on Lake Erie on the 10th Sept., and in the affair of the 5th October near the Moravian village. In the latter but very few appear to have been rescued by an honorable death, from the ignominy of passing under the American yoke, nor are there many whose wounds plead in mitigation of this reproach. The Right Division appears to have been encumbered with an unmanageable load of unnecessary, and forbidden private baggage—while the requisite arrangements for the expeditious, and certain conveyance of the ammunition, and provisions, the sole objects worthy of consideration, appear to have been totally neglected, as well as all those ordinary measures resorted to by officers of intelligence, to retard and impede the advance of a pursuing enemy. The result affords but too fatal a proof of this unjustifiable neglect. The Right Division had quitted Sandwich in its retreat on the 26th September, having had ample time, for every previous arrangement,

to facilitate and secure that movement ; on the 2nd October following, the enemy pursued by the same route, and on the 4th succeeded in capturing all the,, tores of the division, and on the following day attacked and defeated it almost without a struggle.

With heart-felt pride and satisfaction the Commander of the Forces had lavished on the Right Division of this army, that tribute of praise which was so justly due to its former gallantry and steady discipline. It is with poignant grief and mortification thlt he now beholds its well-earned laurels tarnished, and its conduct calls loudly for reproach and censure.

The Commander of the Forces appeals to the genuine feelings of the British soldier from whom he neither conceals the extent of the loss the army has suffered, nor the far more to be lamented injury it has sustained in its wounded honor, confident that but one sentiment will animate every breast, and that zealous to wash out the stain, which by a most extraordinary and unaccountable infatuation, has fallen on a formerly deserving portion of the army, all will vie to emulate the glorious achievements recently performed, by a small but highly spirited and well-disciplined division, led by officers possessed of enterprise, intelligence, and gallantry, nobly evincing what British soldiers can perform, when susceptible of no fear, but that of failing in the discharge of their duty.

His Excellency considers it an act of justice, to exonerate most honorably from this censure the brave soldiers who were serving as marines on board the squadron on Lake Erie, the Commander of the Forces having received the official report of Capt. Barclay of the action which took place on Lake Erie on the 10th September when that gallant officer, from circumstances of imperious necessity was compelled to seek the superior force of the enemy, and to maintain an arduous and long-contested action under circumstances of accumulating ill fortune.

Captain Barclay represents, that the wind, which was favorable early in the day, suddenly changed, giving the enemy the weather-gage, and that this important advantage was, shortly after the commencement of the engagement, heightened by the fall of Captain Finnis, the commander of the Queen Charlotte. In the death of that intrepid and intelligent officer, Capt. Barclay laments the loss of his main support. The fall of Capt. Finnis was

soon followed by that of Lieut. Stokoe, whose country was deprived of his services at this very critical period leaving the command of the Queen Charlotte to Provincial Lieutenant Irvine, who conducted himself with great courage, was too limited in experience to supply the place of such an officer as Capt. Finnis, and in consequence this vessel proved of far less assistance than might

expected.

The action commenced at about a quarter before 12 o'clock, and continued with great fury until half-past 2, when the American Commodore quitted his ship, which struck shortly after, to that commanded by Capt. Barclay (the Detroit.) Hitherto the determined valor displayed by the British squadron, had surmounted every disadvantage, and the day was in our favor ; but the contest had arrived at that period when valor alone was unavailing—the Detroit and Queen Charlotte were perfect wrecks, and required the utmost skill of seamanship, while the commanders and second officers, of every vessel, were either killed or wounded : not more than fifty British seamen were dispersed in the crews of the squadron, and of these a great proportion had fallen in the conflict.

The American Commodore made a gallant, and but too successful an effort to regain the day. His second largest vessel, the Niagara, had suffered little, and his numerous gun-boats which had proved the greatest source of annoyance during the action, were all uninjured.

Lieutenant Garland, First Lieutenant of the Detroit, being mortally wounded, previous to the wounds of Captain Barclay obliging him to quit the deck, it fell to the lot of Lieutenant Inglis, to whose intrepidity and conduct the highest praise is given, to surrender His Majesty's Ship, when all further resistance had become unavailing. The enemy, by having the weather-gage, were enabled to choose their distance and thereby avail themselves of the great advantage they derived in a superiority of heavy long guns, but Captain Barclay attributes the result of the day, to the unprecedented fall of every Commander, and second in command, and the very small number of able seamen left in the squadron, at a moment when the judgment of the officer, and skilful exertions of the sailor were most immediately called for.

To the British seamen, Captain Barclay bestows the highest praise—that *they behaved like British seamen.* From

the officers and soldiers of the regular force serving as marines, Captain Barclay experienced every support within their power, and states that their conduct has e

Deprived of the palm of victory, when almost within his grasp, by an overwhelming force which the enemy possessed in reserve, aided by an accumulation of unfortunate circumstances, Captain Barclay and his brave crew have, by their gallant daring, and self-devotion to their country's cause, rescued its honor and their own, even in defeat.

EDWARD BAYNES,

Adjutant-General.

Return of the Right Division of the Army of Upper Canada :

Detachment serving as marines on board the squadron in action on loth September, 1813.

Killed—I lieutenant, i sergeant, 2I rank and file.

Wounded-3 sergeants, 46 rank and file.

Prisoners-2 lieutenants, i asst. surgeon, 4 sergeants, 4 drummers, 167 rank and file.

Killed, wounded, and missing in the retreat and in the action of the 5th October, 1813 :

i inspecting field officer, i dep. asst. qr.-master-general, i fort adjutant, r hospital mate, i lieutenant-col., 6 captains, 12 lieutenants, 3 ensigns, I paymaster, I asst. surgeon, 34 sergeants, 13 drummers, 559 rank and file, 46 horses.

Assembled at Ancaster on the 17th October, 1813 :

I major-general, i major of brigade, i aid-de-camp, staff adjutant, 3 captains, 5 lieutenants, 2 ensigns, I adjutant, i quarter-master, 2 asst. surgeons, 15 sergeants, 9 drummers, 204 rank and file, 53 horses.

Total strength of the Right Division on the loth September, 1813:

i major-general, i inspecting field officer, i major of brigade, i dep. asst. q.m. gen., i aid-de-camp, i staff adjutant, i fort adjutant, i hospital mate, i lieutenant-colonel, 9 captains, 20 lieutenants, 5 ensigns, i paymaster, i adjutant, i quarter-master, 4 assistant surgeons, 57 sergeants, 26 drummers, 997 rank and file, 99 horses.

Killed—Lieut. Garden, Royal Newfoundland Regt.

EDWARD BAYNES,

Adjutant-General.

Well timed indeed, and with a befitting grace does the insulting censure, contained in the opening of the above order, emanate from the man who had previously made a descent upon Sackett's Harbor, with a view of destroying the enemy's naval and military works, and who at the very moment of accomplishment of the object of the expedition, and when the Americans were retreating, turned and fled with precipitation to his boats, presenting to the troops, who were unwilling sharers in his disgrace, the monstrous yet ludicrous anomaly of two hostile armies fleeing from each other at the same time. Well does it become the leader who, at Plattsburg, covered the British army with shame, and himself with enduring infamy, by retiring at the head of 15,000 men—chiefly the flower of the Duke of Wellington's army—before a force of Americans not exceeding as many hundreds ; and this even at the moment when the commander of these latter was preparing to surrender his trust without a struggle. Well does it proceed from him, who through timidity and vacillation alone, at an earlier period of the war, entered into a disgraceful armistice with the enemy at the very moment when General Brock was preparing to follow up his successes on the western frontier, by sweeping the whole southern border of the St. Lawrence. Happily was it devised by the authority to whose culpable inattention and neglect alone was owing the loss of the gallant Barclay's fleet, and the consequent helplessness of that very Right Division he has hesitated not to condemn for a disaster attributable to himself alone. Nay, well and most consistently does the sting issue from the Commander of the Forces, who, on the occasion of the capture of Detroit, and the victory obtained at the River Raisin, ordered royal salutes to be fired in honor of conquests which had been achieved principally by the 41st Regiment, and whose remarks, even on the occasion of their unavoidable repulse at Sandusky, convey rather a compliment than dispraise.

That Sir George Prevost had been induced to issue this order, on the gross misrepresentation of General Procter, who, in order to shield himself from the consequences of his incapacity, scrupled not to sacrifice the reputation of the regiment, which had so often repaired, by their valor, what his marked inefficiency had endangered, there can be no question. It is only necessary to refer to an earlier memorandum on the subject to be fully satisfied of the fact. But this does not the more exonerate Sir George, whose duty it was, before publishing a document, the tendency of which was to cast odium on a corps which he himself admits to have previously won his warmest admiration, to possess himself of the true facts of the action ; nor, by any exercise of undue severity, to have provoked commentaries on his own conduct of a far more humiliating character. But posterity will judge of the Right Division, not by the sweeping and unfounded denunciations of an angry and misjudging Governor, but by its universally admitted gallantry on all former occasions.

Who on looking over the state of the 41st Regiment, which ostentatiously appears at the close of the General Order, would not infer that, in the action of the Moravian town, they mustered at least 1,000 men, including non-commissioned officers ? Even General Harrison, in his most voluminous despatch, enumerates the prisoners taken by him in such a way as to create the impression that his (admitted) force of 3,000 had been opposed by 600 British regulars, present in action. This is not worthy of General Harrison, who must have known that our actual force in the field was, according to the state of the adjutant of the regiment—the original of which is before me at this moment—t lieutenant-colonel, 6 captains, 9 lieutenants, 3 ensigns, 3 staff, 26 sergeants, 18 corporals, 4 drummers, and 297 rank and file—and these divided into two open, and irregular lines. The remainder of the 600, captured by General Harrison, many of them sick and wounded

wen, had been taken, without a possibility of opposition, in the boats conveying stores, during the early morning of the action, and on the preceding day. Yet the American general seriously claims the palm of "superior bravery" for his force of 3,000 men, opposed in their native woods (wherein he himself admits in his despatch they "can ride better than any other people") to not as many hundreds, and these almost wholly unaccustomed to them. It is impossible to entertain a feeling of disrespect for General Harrison, but there is something so absurd in this remark, that the reader cannot forbear a smile. Nor can it be pretended that the Indians are to be considered as having formed any portion of our force during the first advance of the enemy, for General Harrison has distinctly stated that he formed his assailing columns in such manner as to direct them wholly upon the 41st, leaving the Indians unmolested, until he should be enabled to break through our feeble and extended line, and then turn their position. This plan was acted upon. What then was there in this defeat to justify Sir George Prevost, in the sweeping and splenetic denunciation cast upon a corps who had done so much for the country, and had only now been overcome through the incompetency of their chief ? But let us turn to General Procter.

That officer has stated in his specious defence before the court-martial which tried him for general misconduct in the retreat, that he had drawn up his men in a position the most favorable for a successful stand against the enemy's cavalry, and that he had expected a result which the want of

the subject ? Who, with him, will aver that

the river on and his that he was justified in the selection, not two miles in his rear, were numerous houses in the row of men, a wood on his right flank, and s left, while immediately in front ran a

ravine difficult of access by cavalry, and capable of being swept by his guns, which, singularly enough, had already been stationed there without the slightest use or service in the battle planned by him to be waged. On what does General Procter ground his claim to be considered as competent to decide upon the success which ought to attend his military movements? Is it on his dispositions at the River Raisin, where, instead of attacking an unprepared enemy sword in hand, he absurdly and unaccountably apprized them of their danger, giving them ample opportunity to arm and cripple his own force, in such a manner as to render victory for a period doubtful? Is it on his arrangements at the Miami, where he suffered an important line of batteries to be left without the support of even a single company? Is it on his attack upon Sandusky, where he ordered his men to storm before any breach had been effected, without a fascine or scaling ladder, and with axes so blunt that he might have been suspected of treason in suffering them to be placed in the hands of the unfortunate men who perished while fruitlessly wielding them? Yet this man, whose brows the 41st Regiment covered in these several instances with glory, when they rather should have been bowed to the earth in shame, turns upon his gallant supporters in the moment of their misfortune, and, in his base attempt to redeem his own blighted military reputation, scruples not to charge them with misconduct in the field. Where was this misconduct? In what did it consist? It has been seen that 3,000 men, 1,500 of whom were mounted riflemen, dashed through the front line, composed of something less than 200 men, receiving the only two volleys there was time to pour in before they had completely surrounded them. Was it possible to make a more lengthened defence against an enemy who thus overwhelmed them *en masse*? The true matter for surprise is, not that the force yielded so soon, but that it had ever made a stand at all; for the strong conviction on the mind of

every officer and man present, was that General Procter was making a wanton sacrifice of their lives, for the sole purpose of covering the departure of his family and personal effects from the Moraviantown; and that it was for this reason also that he had drawn them up in the heart of a wood, in preference to occupying a position which all had been previously informed was susceptible of the best defence against the expected cavalry.


I have said that only two volleys were fired by the men before they were overwhelmed by the American force. This was I believe the case on the centre and left, upon which the main attack of the enemy was directed. On the right, and near Tecumseh's flank, where the horsemen opposed to us were less numerous, the action was of at least twenty minutes' duration, and in this time much desultory firing took place. The instance I have already given of the shooting, tomahawking, and scalping of an American rifleman, who had been dismounted in the action, is an evidence that the engagement was not so speedily brought to a close as General Procter sought to make it appear. But I will relate another fact in corroboration. Only a few minutes before this scene was enacted before our eyes, a mounted rifleman was in the act of taking aim at one of the light company, who was moving quickly at the time, and whom therefore he could not conveniently cover. My attention was called to this man by Lieut. Hailes (since commanding the 28th Regiment), who was near me at the time, and who suggested that I should fire at him. I raised my musket, supporting it against a tree, and before the American, who was still following his object with his eye and weapon, could find what he deemed a favorable moment for discharging it, I fired, when his rifle tumbled from his shoulder to the ground, and he sank over his horse's side.

Now if, as General Procter states, the line " had discharged their pieces without orders, had given way, and dispersed in a manner to preclude all hope of their

being again formed," there could have been no time for these two deliberate actions. When a few minutes afterwards, we, from a consciousness of having been cut off from our main body, attempted a retreat, we were not so sorely pressed as to have failed in our object, had we taken the proper direction. We had continued firing to the close, and it was only on emerging from the wood into the road, and beholding our captured comrades, that we found resistance to be hopeless. Including Lieut. Hailes we were then about twenty in number.

I have already stated that General Procter was without the confidence of his army. This is strictly correct. So far from their having the slightest knowledge of the object of his movements, or of his intentions, not even his second in command was consulted on any one occasion during the retreat. As for the expression of surprise, contained in the defence, that Dover had not been fortified it is perfectly 'ridiculous. Independently of its peculiar unfitness for that purpose, no such instructions had ever been left with Colonel Warburton, who, when repeatedly asked by the officers of the Division what was purposed to be done, or to what tended General Procter's unaccountable conduct, could only shrug his shoulders, and in a manner indicative of mingled mortification and contempt, reply that they knew as much of the matter as he did. How, indeed, and under what direction was Dover to be fortified, when, as General Procter himself admits, he had taken with him to the Moraviantown the only officer of Engineers (Captain Dixon) who was attached to the Division ?

Such was the general feeling of distrust, produced by General Procter's continued absence from, and in advance of the army, at a moment when the enemy were known to be near us, and when the second in command was left wholly in the dark, as to the course it was expected of him to pursue, that serious intentions were formed of depriving that officer of his authority, and investing



Colonel Warburton with it. This indeed was only not done, because it was assumed that any disaster which might, in consequence of the extraordinary delay and want of military capacity hitherto manifested in its conduct, occur to the Division, would be gladly seized hold of by the General, with a view to exonerate himself from the heavy responsibility he was already so fearfully incurring. Of the sentiments entertained by all, a tolerably correct estimate may be formed from the following memorandum at the time by an officer of the regiment.

" 3rd Oct., Dolsen's. A report of the Americans being within two or three miles of us. Our dragoons fell in with their advanced guard. The General at Moraviantown, 26 miles from Dolsen's or Dover. Marched from this place 2 miles; halted and formed on the bank of the river in expectation of the enemy every instant. Marched a few miles further and halted for the night. Col. Warburton did not appear to know how to act/ the General not having left any directions, but he decided on falling in with the wishes of the Indians.

4th Oct. This morning the Indians thought it advisable to proceed at once to Moraviantown. We accordingly marched: at dusk the rear guard halted at Richardson's; the remainder proceeded about a mile farther, within five miles of Moraviantown.

5th Oct. This day we proceeded towards Moraviantown, and when within a mile and a half of it, were halted and marched back a few paces, when we halted a second time: no person appeared to have any idea of what was going to be done. A report came in of the Americans being within a very short distance of us, and that they had taken all our boats, in which was most of our baggage and the whole of the ammunition, except what the men had in their pouches. After having halted for nearly an hour, we were suddenly ordered to form in the midst of a very thick wood apparently without any previous arrangement and in such a manner that the Grenadiers were nearly in the centre of the line, and the light company towards the right—a second order came for the Grenadiers and No. 1 company to march to the rear as a reserve, which was done. The men were formed at extended order, and the enemy, it was said,

were strong in cavalry and mounted riflemen. N.B. No brushwood to prevent the cavalry acting. About four o'clock the enemy attacked us, and succeeded in driving us from our ground. The company I commanded had not received their provisions for the two last days, until the very moment before we received the order to march : the consequence was that those men who had time to do so, cut off a slice of the raw beef and ate it uncooked. The rest had none at all.

Mem.--While at Dolsen's was told by G— e that a council of war was going to assemble immediately, in order to decide whether or not the command should be taken from the G. The day before the action Captain Muir remarked to me that the G. ought to be hanged for being away, and that Col. W. ought to be hanged for not assuming the command. A few moments before the action Captain D. said it was downright murder if we attempted to make a stand where we were—Colonel Elliott told me that the day the G. went to the Moraviantown, the Prophet (Tecumseh's brother) asked him, Col. Elliott, where the G. was going, and on being informed remarked that he had a great mind to take the epaulettes off his shoulders, for he was not worthy to wear them."

General Procter furthermore asserts in his defence, that his original intention was to fortify a position on the Thames, for the two-fold purpose of protecting the Centre Division, and conciliating the Indians. I am, not prepared, at this distant day, to state with exactness what was the original proposal made to the Indians in the celebrated council, but my strong impression has ever been (and I was present during the whole of the debate) that it was only in consequence of the deep and unconcealed indignation, manifested by Tecumseh and many of the inferior Chiefs, on his intimating the necessity which existed for a retreat upon the Centre Division, that he was *compelled* to yield to the will of the Indians, and to name the Moraviantown as the understood termination of his proposed march. Even this proposal was received by Tecumseh with mingled regret and disdain, for he was desirous of meeting the Americans at the moment of their

landing, and trying the chances of battle before incurring the odium of a retreat ; but on the inexpediency of defending a fortress which had been wholly deprived of its heavy guns for the purpose of arming the fleet, being further discussed and pointed out to him, he finally assented, and in a second short speech, which does not appear to have been placed on record, consented to retire as far as the Moraviantown, declaring however, at the same time, that at that place he was fully determined to conquer or lay down his life. Had the retreat been commenced from that moment, and the Moraviantown fortified, as it ought to have been, no matter how imperfectly, none of the subsequent disasters would have occurred.

It is insincere in General Procter to state that his march was delayed in order to afford the Indians time to remove their effects, and cross the Detroit river. Those who understand the manners and active habits of the red-men of the forest must be aware that twenty-four hours were quite sufficient with them for any purpose of the sort ; neither is there less absurdity in the assertion that it was necessary to linger on the road, in order to enable them to overtake us. The Indians could march, in a single day, more than we did in five, and even if they had not overtaken us, it was our object to be in position to cover them, if pursued by the enemy, and to be enabled to oppose to these latter something like a respectable attitude of defence. All this might, and should, have been done, and in can the onus of neglect fall, if not on General Procter ?

There are yet two points in the defence to which it is essential to advert. General Procter very gravely complains that the gun placed in the road on the left of the line, in the affair of the Moraviantown, and on which he so much depended, had been deserted "without an effort." What will be thought of the general conduct of the retreat, when it is known that there was not a single pound of ammunition for the gun, it having by some un-

fortunate accident been left behind, on resuming our march in the morning ! It is true General Procter cannot be held individually responsible for this omission, but had the only officer of artillery, attached to the Division, been where he ought to have been—in the action—instead of posting himself, by the direction of his Chief, with the reserve guns at the Moraviantown, his sagacity and forethought would have prevented this difficulty. That there was fault with those who had immediate charge of the field-piece there can be no question, but it is unjust to the last degree that such fault should be visited by a general condemnation of the conduct of the troops engaged. Yet even had the gun been supplied with ammunition the result must have been nearly the same. One discharge might have temporarily checked the advance of the enemy upon the road, but as this was open only a few hundred yards in front, the range commatiied was necessarily so limited, that the American cavalry might have dashed in upon it, before the Artillery men could have time to load and fire again ; moreover there was the certainty of its being turned through the wood. General Procter alludes to twenty Provincial Dragoons of Lieut. Holmes' command (that officer then, it has been seen, a prisoner with the enemy), as having been posted by him in support of the gun, and confesses disappointment that they had not maintained their trust. What could be expected from so mere a handful of men against the masses that were opposed to them? And how absurd to suppose that they could have offered the slightest resistance.

Again, General Procter adverts to an attempt made by him to rally the broken line, and in a manner to show that his prosecutors had admitted such attempt, although they denied its efficacy. How this admission (if made), was wrung from them, it is difficult to understand, unless that it had been made inadvertently. General Procter had stationed himself in rear of the second line, and he made no attempt, at any one period of the brief action,

to pass it. When the first line retreated upon the second, and the latter opened its fire upon the advancing cavalry, he fled precipitately, accompanied by the whole of his personal staff, leaving the Division to maintain the unequal conflict in the best manner they could. This has been asserted by an officer who was near him during the withdrawal of the

Of the impression created by the cruel and ungenerous order, issued by Sir George Prevost on this occasion, a tolerable estimate may be formed from the following communication, addressed to Lieut. Bullock by Major Friend, then in command of the 2nd Battalion of the regiment. In the reply will be found so full an explanation that beyond it, it will not be necessary to pursue the subject.

Barton Heights, 30th Nov., 1813.

Sir,—I request you will, with as little delay as the nature of the report will admit, furnish me with every circumstance within your knowledge, and that you may have heard from undoubted authority, relative to the late unfortunate affair that took place between General Harrison's army and the 1st Battalion 41st Regiment at Moraviantown on the 5th October last, for the purpose of transmitting it to Lieut.-Gen. Champagne. As you are the senior and only officer of the regiment who has escaped from the field, that was in the ranks, it is highly incumbent on you to state most minutely the nature of the ground on which the regiment were formed for action, the manner in which it was formed, the number then of the regiment actually in the field, the number of the enemy opposed to you, and of what they consisted, and what resistance was made by the regiment previous to its defeat—if it had received provisions regularly, was complete in ammunition, and could have got supplies when required, and in short every circumstance that happened from the commencement of the retreat from Amherstburg relative to the regiment. You cannot be too particular in your statement, as I am sorry to say there are reports afloat disgraceful in the extreme to the regiment, and every individual with it that day. I think it but proper to inform you that I saw Major-General

Procter's official report which highly censures the conduct of the regiment, and in which he says, that he never went into action more confident of success,

I have the honor to be, kkc_
Your very obed't. linable serv't.

Richard Friend,
Major Cornug. 4.[St Reg.

Lieut. Bullock,
41st Regiment.

Cross Roads, Barton Heights,
Mh Dec., 1813,

Sir,—The following report is made, in compliance with your orders to me in a letter dated 30th Nov. last, in which you request I would furnish you with every circumstance within my knowledge, and what I may have heard from undoubted authority, relative to the late unfortunate affair which took place between the American army under Gen. Harrison, and the 1st Eat, 4r51 Regt. near Moraviantown, on the 5th October last. the nature of the ground on which it was formed, the 'lumberer men of the Regt, actually in the field, the number of the enemy in the field opposed to it of what they consisted, and what resistance was made by the Regiment previous to its defeat ; if it had received provisions regularly, was complete in ammunition, and could have got stipplies when required, and in short every circumstance that happened from the commencement Of the retreat from Amherstburg relative to the Regiment. As a platoon officer I cannot positively say whether the whole regiment was complete with ammunition or not, but thus I can say. that a number of the "nen clan escaped from the enemy that day, were not complete before the action commenced ; and this I am inclined to believe was the case with many of those killed or taken, and in the event of expending the ammunition in their pouches they could not have received a fresh supply, she whole of the spare ammunition being taken by the enemy some hours before the action, which circumstance was known to many of the regiment. I now proceed to give every other information required in your letter, as correctly as my rank, and situation on various occasions, enabled me to observe.

The force under Major Gen. Procter consisting of the 1st Bat. 41st Regiment, a few of the moth Vetervat^s.

{ about t8 or 2cil some Artillery. and a body of Indians retreated front Amhersiburg on— Sept, last to Sandwich, from whence *Ige* retired on the 27th of the same month to the River Thames. the banks of which, at a place caⁿed Chatham t5.1 miles front Sandwich. and 7o from Antherstburg) Gen. Procter had promised the Indians to fo^rtify, with a view to await the enemy. On this retreat commanded the grenadier company. We arrived within three miles of Chatham. at a place called Dolsen's on the 1st Oct. On the 3rd GUI]. Procter was at Moravⁱantown, 26 miles from US, 011 the road lending to the head of Lake Ontario; when information was received that the enemy was within 4 or ,5 miles of us, and we retired 1 ,4 a mile by order of Lieut.-Col. Warburton, second in command, and formed oft the bank of the river in expectation of an attack. At the expiration of half an hoar we retired to Chatham, The Indians were encamped on the opposite hank of the river, and on our arrival, sent to say to me, that we should not proceed beyond the ground we then occupied—that Gen. Procter had promised them to await the enemy on that ground and fight them ; and had also promised to erect fortifications there. After endeavoring to reason with them, Lieut. Cal. Warburton was compelled to remain there for the night, and informed the Indians, through Col. Elliott of the Indian Department, that whatever had been promised br Gen. Procter should he fulfilled, as far as he (Lieut.-Col. Warburton) had it in his power. I was then ordered on picquet with the Grenadier company, and at the same tune received such particular instructions from Lieut. Cols, Wiu.hurton and Evans. that I have no doubt they expected the enem³. that night. Capt. Chambers of the Qr.-Mr.-Gen. Department, accompanied me a tid pointed out the ground my picquet was to occupy, which was one mile and a half in advluice, towards the enemy. Early next morning the picquet was called in. On arilving at C11'1111011, where the rest of the regiment had passed the tight, provisions were issued ; the meal was raw, and before it could he divided, we were ordered to march. in consequence of the approach of the enemy. We retired 11/1 miles whensire were joined by Gen. Procter, on the 4th of Oct. We returned front Moraviantown. We marched all day. the roads were excessively bad; about eight o'clock evening Capt. Muir's Company was halted at

Procter's official report which highly censures the conduct of the regiment, and in which he says, that he never went into action more confident of success.

I have the honor to be, &c.

Your very obed't. humble serv' t.

Richard Friend,

Major Commg. 41st Regt.

Lieut. Bullock,
41st Regiment.

Cross Roads, Barton Heights,
6th Dec., 1813.

Sir,—The following report is made, in compliance with your orders to me in a letter dated 30th Nov. last, in which you request I would furnish you with every circumstance within my knowledge, and what I may have heard from undoubted authority, relative to the late unfortunate affair which took place between the American army under Gen. Harrison, and the 1st Bat. 41st Regt. near Moraviantown, on the 5th October last, the nature of the ground on which it was formed, the number of men of the Regt. actually in the field, the number of the enemy in the field opposed to it, of what they consisted, and what resistance was made by the Regiment previous to its defeat ; if it had received provisions regularly, was complete in ammunition, and could have got supplies when required, and in short every circumstance that happened from the commencement of the retreat from Amherstburg relative to the Regiment. As a platoon officer I cannot positively say whether the whole regiment was complete with ammunition or not, but this I can say, that a number of the men who escaped from the enemy that day, were not complete before the action commenced ; and this I am inclined to believe was the case with many of those killed or taken, and in the event of expending the ammunition in their pouches they could not have received a fresh supply, the whole of the spare ammunition being taken by the enemy some hours before the action, which circumstance was known to many of the regiment. I now proceed to give every other information required in your letter, as correctly as my rank, and situation on various occasions, enabled me to observe.

The force under Major Gen. Procter consisting of the 1st Bat. 41st Regiment, a few of the 10th Veterans

'about 18 or 20) some Artillery, and a body of Indians retreated from Amherstburg on-- Sept. last to Sandwich, from whence we retired on the 27th of the same month to the River Thames, the banks of which, at a place called Chatham (54 miles from Sandwich, and 70 from Amherstburg) Gen. Procter had promised the Indians to fortify, with a view to await the enemy. On this retreat I commanded the grenadier company. We arrived within three miles of Chatham, at a place called Dolsen's on the 1st Oct. On the 3rd Gen. Procter was at Moraviantown, 26 miles from us, on the road leading to the head of Lake Ontario; when information was received that the enemy was within 4 or 5 miles of us, and we retired ^{IA} a mile by order of Lieut.-Col. Warburton, second in command, and formed on the bank of the river in expectation of an attack. At the expiration of half an hour we retired to Chatham. The Indians were encamped on the opposite bank of the river, and on our arrival, sent to say to me, that we should not proceed beyond the ground we then occupied—that Gen. Procter had promised them to await the enemy on that ground and fight them ; and had also promised to erect fortifications there. After endeavoring to reason with them, Lieut.-Col. Warburton was compelled to remain there for the night, and informed the Indians, through Col. Elliott of the Indian Department, that whatever had been promised by Gen. Procter should be fulfilled, as far as he (Lieut.-Col. Warburton) had it in his power. I was then ordered on picquet with the Grenadier company, and at the same time received such particular instructions from Lieut.-Cols. Warburton and Evans, that I have no doubt they expected the enemy that night. Capt. Chambers of the Qr. -Mr. -Gen. Department, accompanied me and pointed out the ground my picquet was to occupy, which was one mile and a half in advance, towards the enemy. Early next morning the picquet was called in. On arriving at Chatham, where the rest of the regiment had passed the night, provisions were issued ; the meat was raw, and before it could be divided, we were ordered to march, in consequence of the approach of the enemy. We retired about 6 miles when we were joined by Gen. Procter, on his return from Moraviantown. We marched all day, the roads were excessively bad; about eight o'clock in the evening Capt. Muir's Company was halted at

Richardson's, six miles from Moraviantown, and the Grenadier company was left with it, to support in the event of an attack ; the remainder proceeded on, the advance being at a house called Shearman's, one mile from where the rear guard had halted. At daybreak next morning (the 5th) the rear guard and Grenadier company moved to Shearman's, where the whole regiment collected. At this place, after having halted some time, a few head of cattle were shot, but before the meat could be divided, the enemy were reported to be close at hand, and we were ordered to march. We proceeded to Moraviantown, and when within 1/4 miles of it, were ordered to halt. After halting about 5 minutes, we were ordered to face to the right about, and advanced towards the enemy in files, at which the men were in great spirits. Having advanced about 50 or 60 paces we were halted a second time, at which the men appeared dissatisfied, and overhearing some of those nearest to me express themselves to the following effect, " that they were ready and willing to fight for their knapsacks : wished to meet the enemy, but did not like to be knocked about in that manner, doing neither one thing nor the other," I immediately checked them, and they were silent. About this time several of the Regiment came up without arms or accoutrements, who had escaped from boats cut off by the enemy's cavalry. From these men we learnt that the enemy was within a mile of us, and had a large force of cavalry. We had halted about half an hour, when the Indian alarm was given that the enemy was advancing : most of our men were sitting on the logs and fallen trees by the side of the road. On the alarm being given we were suddenly ordered to form across the road. From the suddenness of the order, apparently without any previous arrangement, the manner in which we were situated when it was given, the way in which it was given, which was " form up across the road," and from the nature of the ground, the formation was made in the greatest confusion ; so much so, that the Grenadier company was nearly in the centre of the line and the Light company on the right. A second order, as sudden as the first, was given for the Grenadiers and No. 1 to march to the rear and form a reserve. The Grenadiers and part of Capt. Muir's company accordingly formed a second line, about 200 yards in rear of the first, under command of Lieut.-Col. War-

burton the left of it about 8 or to yards to the left of the road, and extending to the right into the woods, formed at extended order, the men placing themselves behind trees, and consequently much separated. The 1st line I could not distinguish, but from what I have been informed by Lt. Gardiner, 41st Regt., commanding a six-pounder, it was formed in the following manner—a six-pounder was placed in the road, having a range of 50 yards, the 41st Regt. drawn up on its right, extending in the wood ; on each side of the limber of the 6-pounder were some of the Canadian Light Dragoons. From the men of the Regiment, who escaped from that line, I understand they were not formed at regular extended order, but in clusters and in confusion. To the left of the road in which the 6-pounder was placed, and parallel to it, ran the River Thames. To the right and left of the road was a remarkably thick forest, and on the right, where we were formed, free from brushwood for several hundred yards, and where cavalry could act to advantage. My position at this time, (being on the right of the 2nd line) and the thickness of the forest precluded me from noticing the manner in which the enemy attacked the 1st line. The attack commenced about two hours after the order was given to form up across the road. I heard a heavy firing of musketry, and shortly after saw our dragoons retreating together with the limber of the 6-pounder—placed on the left of the 1st line. About a minute afterwards I observed that line retreating in confusion, followed closely by the enemy's cavalry, who were galloping down the road. That portion of the 1st line which had escaped the enemy's cavalry, retreated behind the 2nd line, which stood fast, and fired an irregular volley obliquing to the right and left, which appeared to check the enemy. The line having commenced firing, my attention was directed to that part of the enemy moving down directly in my front. Hearing the fire slacken, I turned towards the line and found myself remaining with 3 non-commissioned officers of the Grenadier company. The enemy's cavalry had advanced so close, before the reserve could commence firing, from the number of trees, that before a third round could be fired they broke through the left, and the rest not being formed in a manner to repel were compelled to retreat. The number of the Regiment actually in the field were one Lieut.-Col., 6

captains, 9 lieutenants, 3 ensigns, 3 staff, 26 sergeants, 18 corporals, 4 drummers, 297 rank and file. In what manner the rest of the Regiment was distributed you will be made acquainted with by the enclosed state signed by the Adjutant of the Regiment. The number of Indians we had in the field was 800. The number of the enemy I cannot positively affirm, but from the information obtained from individuals of the regiment taken prisoners on that day, and who afterwards escaped, the number could not have been less than 6,000 ; of which 1,200 or 1,500 were cavalry and mounted riflemen. The number of our dragoons did not exceed 20. Our loss on this occasion was 3 sergeants, and 9 rank and file killed, and 36 wounded, that of the enemy 15 killed, and from 40 to 50 wounded. Having been thus far particular in stating everything to which I was an eye witness, and which has come to my knowledge, I beg leave to remark that, from the well-known character of the Regiment, any observations emanating from those whose interest it is to cast a direct or indirect reflection upon its conduct, cannot be received with too much distrust.


I have the honor to be, sir,
 Major Friend, Your very obed't humble serv' t, &c.
 Comm'g 2nd Batt. Richard Bullock,
 41st Regiment. Lieut. 41st Grenadiers.

The following is the American General's very prolix account of the affair of the Moraviantown.

Copy of a letter from Maj.-General Harrison, to the Secretary of War, dated

Head-Quarters, Detroit, Oct. 9th, 1813.

SIR,---In my last letter from Sandwich, of the 30th ult., I (lid myself the honor to inform you, that I was preparing to pursue the enemy the following day. From various causes, however, I was unable to put the troops in motion until the morning of the 2nd instant; and then to take with me only about 140 of the regular troops, Johnson's mounted regiment, and such of Gov. Shelby's volunteers as were fit for a rapid march ; the whole amounting to about 3,500 men. To Gen. McArthur, (with about 700 effectives), the protection of this place, and the sick was committed. Gen. Cass's brigade, and the corps of Lieut.-Col. Ball, were left at Sandwich, with



MAJOR-GENERAL WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON.

orders to follow me as soon as the men received their knapsacks and blankets, which had been left on an Island, in Lake Erie.

The unavoidable delay at Sandwich was attended with no disadvantage to us ; General Procter had posted himself at Dolsen's, on the right bank of the River Thames, (or Trench) 56 miles from this place, where, I was informed, he intended to fortify, and to receive me. **He must** have believed, however, that I had no disposition to follow him, or that he had secured my continuance here by the reports that were circulated, that the Indians would attack and destroy this place, upon the advance of the army—as he neglected the breaking up of the bridges, until the night of the 2nd instant. **On that night**, our army reached the river, which is 25 miles from Sandwich, and is one of four streams, crossing our route, over all of which are bridges ; and, being deep and muddy, are unfordable for a considerable distance into the country : the bridge, here, was found entire ; and, in the morning, I proceeded with Johnson's regiment, to save, if possible, the others. At the second bridge, over a branch of the River Thames, we were fortunate enough to capture a Lieutenant of Dragoons and 11 -privates, who had been sent by General Procter to destroy them. From the prisoners, I learned that the third bridge was broken up, and that the enemy had no certain information of our advance ;—the bridge, having been imperfectly destroyed, was soon repaired, and the army encamped at Drake's farm, 4 miles below Dolsen's. The River Thames, along the bank of which our route lay, is a fine deep stream, navigable for vessels of considerable burthen ; after the passage of the bar, at its mouth, over which there is six and a-half feet of water.

The baggage of the army was brought from Detroit in boats, protected by three gun-boats which Commodore Perry had furnished for the purpose, as well as to cover the passage of the army over the Thames itself, or the mouths of its tributary streams ; the banks being low, and the country generally open, (prairies), as high as Dolsen's, these vessels were well calculated for the purpose. Above Dolsen's, however, the character of the river and adjacent country is considerably changed ; the former, though still deep, is very narrow, and its banks high and woody.

The Commodore and myself, therefore, agreed upon the propriety of leaving the boats under a guard of 150 infantry ; and I determined to trust to fortune, and the bravery of my troops, to effect the passage of the river. Below a place called Chatham, and 4 miles above Dolsen's is the third unfordable branch of the Thames ; the bridge over its mouth had been taken up by the Indians, as well as that at McGregor's mills, one mile above. Several hundred of the Indians remained to dispute our passage, and upon the arrival of the advanced guard, commenced a heavy fire from the opposite bank of the creek, as well as that of the river. Believing that the whole force of the enemy was there, I halted the army, formed in order of battle ; and brought up our two 6-pounders, to cover the party that were ordered to repair the bridge ; a few shot, from those pieces, soon drove off the Indians, and enabled us, in 2 hours, to repair the bridge, and cross the troops. Col. Johnson's mounted regiment, being upon the right of the army, had seized the remains of the bridge at the mills, under a heavy fire from the Indians. **Our** loss upon this occasion was 2 killed, and 3 or 4 wounded—that of the enemy was ascertained to be considerably greater. A house, near the bridge, containing a very considerable number of muskets, had been set on fire ; but it was extinguished by our troops, and the arms saved. At the first farm, above the bridge we found one of the enemy's vessels' on fire, loaded with arms and ordnance stores ; and learned that they were a few miles ahead of us, still on the right bank of the river, with a great body of the Indians. At Bowles' farm, 4 miles from the bridge, we halted for the night ; found two other vessels, and a large distillery, filled with ordnance and other valuable stores, to an immense amount, in flames ; it was impossible to put out the fire—two 24 pounders, with their carriages, were taken, and a large quantity of ball and shell of various sizes.

=This vessel sank at the place it was burnt, in about 12 feet of water, and its presence was forgotten. In the summer of 1900 two fishers for sunken timber accidentally found it, and the presence of cannon balls determined the nature of the timbers. In the early spring of 1901 the sunken hull was raised, taken down the river to Tecumseh Park in the city of Chatham and placed high and dry on a fitting foundation. The gunboat is supposed to be the General Myers that was used at the siege of Fort Meigs. About two tons of cannon balls of various sizes, several bayonets and muskets of American manufacture, and an Indian rifle were found in it. The position of the two other boats that were burnt have also been located.

The army **was put in motion early on the morning of the 5th. I pushed on, in advance, with the mounted regiment, and requested Gov. Shelby to follow, as expeditiously as possible, with the infantry ; the Governor's zeal, that of his men, enabled them to keep up with the cavalry ; and, by nine o'clock we were at Arnold's mills, having taken, in the course of the morning, two gun boats, and several batteaux, loaded with provisions and ammunition.** A rapid, at the river at Arnold's mills, affords the only fording to be met with for a very considerable distance; but, upon examination, it was found too deep for the infantry. Having, however, fortunately, taken two or three boats, and some Indian canoes, on the spot, and obliging the horsemen to take a footman behind each, the whole were safely crossed by 12 o'clock. Eight miles from the crossing, we passed a farm where a part of the British troops had encamped the night before, under the command of Col. Warburton ; the detachment, with General Procter, had arrived the day before, at the Moravian-town, four miles higher up. Being now certainly near the enemy, I directed the advance of Johnson's regiment to accelerate their march, for the purpose of procuring intelligence ; the officer commanding it, in a short time, sent to inform me that his progress was stopped by the enemy, who were formed across our line of march : **one** of the enemy's waggoners being also taken prisoner, from the information received from him, and my own observation, assisted by some of my officers, I soon ascertained enough of their position, and order of battle, to determine that, which it was proper for me to adopt.

I have the honor, herewith, to enclose you my general order, of the 27th ult., prescribing the order of march, and of battle, when the whole army should act together ; but, as the number and description of the troops had been essentially changed, since the issuing of the order, it became necessary to make a corresponding alteration in their d

From the place where our army was last halted, to the Moravian-town, a distance of about three and a-half miles, the road passes through a beech forest, without any clearing ; and, for the first two miles, near to the bank of the river ; at from 200 to 300 yards from the river, a ^{swamp} **extends parallel to it, throughout the whole distance intermediate ground is dry, and, although**

the trees are tolerably thick, it is in many places clear of underbrush ; across this strip of land, its left *appuyed* upon the river, supported by artillery, placed in the wood ; their right in the swamp, covered by the whole of their Indian force—the British troops were drawn up

The troops at my disposal consisted of about 120 regulars of the 27th regiment, five brigades of Kentucky volunteer militia infantry, under His Excellency Governor Shelby, averaging less than 500 men ; and Col. Johnson's regiment of mounted infantry, making, in the whole, an aggregate of something above 3,000. No disposition of an army opposed to an Indian force, can be safe, unless it is secured on the flanks, and in the rear ; I had, therefore, no difficulty in arranging the infantry, conformably to my general order of battle. Gen. Trotter's brigade, of 500 men, formed the front line ; his right upon the road—his left upon the swamp ; Gen. King's brigade as a second line, 150 yards in the rear of Trotter's ; and Chiles' brigade, as a corps of reserve, in the rear of it—these three brigades formed the command of Major-General Henry ; the whole of Gen. Desha's division, consisting of two brigades, were formed, *en potence*, upon the left of Trotter.

Whilst I was engaged in forming the infantry, I had directed Col. Johnson's regiment, which was still in front, to be formed in two lines opposite to the enemy ; and upon the advance of the infantry, to take the ground to the left ; and, forming upon the flank, to endeavor to turn the right of the Indians.

A moment's reflection, however, convinced me, that from the thickness of the woods, and swampiness of the ground, they would be unable to do anything on horseback—and there was no time to dismount them, and place their horses in security ; I, therefore, determined to refuse my left to the Indians, and to break the British lines, at once, by a charge of the mounted infantry. The measure was not sanctioned by anything that I had seen or heard of, but I was fully convinced that it would succeed. The American backwoodsmen ride better in the woods than any other people ; a musket or rifle is no impediment to them, being accustomed to carry them, on horseback, from their earliest youth. I was persuaded, too, that the enemy would be quite unprepared for the shock, and that they could not resist it. Conformably to this idea,

I directed the regiment to be drawn up in close column with its right at the distance of 50 yards upon the road, (that it might be, in some measure, protected by the trees, from the artillery), its left upon the swamp, and to charge at full speed, as soon as the enemy delivered their fire. The few regular troops of the 27th Regiment, under the command of their Colonel (Paul), occupied, in columns of sections of four, the small space between the road and the river, for the purpose of seizing the enemy's artillery ; and some 10 or 12 friendly Indians were directed to move under the bank. The *crotchet* formed by the front line, and General Desha's division, was an important point ; at that place the venerable Governor of Kentucky was posted, who at the age of 66, preserves all the vigor of youth—the ardent zeal, which distinguished him in the revolutionary war—and the undaunted bravery which he manifested at King's Mountain. With my aids-de-camp, the acting assistant Adjutant-General Capt. Buttler; my gallant friend, Corn. Perry, who did me the honor to serve as my volunteer aid-de-camp, and Brig.-Gen. Cass, who, having no command, tendered me his assistance—I placed myself at the head of the front line of infantry, to direct the movements of the cavalry, and give them the necessary support. The army had moved on, in this order, but a short distance, when the mounted men received the fire of the British line, and were ordered to charge : the horses in the front of the column, recoiled from the fire ; another was given by the enemy, and our column, at length getting in motion, broke through the enemy with irresistible force. In one minute the contest, in front, was over. The British officers, seeing no hopes of reducing their disordered ranks to order, and our mounted men wheeling upon them, and pouring in a destructive fire, immediately surrendered. It is certain that three only, of our troops, were wounded in this charge. Upon the left, however, the contest was more severe with the Indians : Col. Johnson, who commanded on that flank of his regiment, received a most galling fire from them, which was returned with great effect. The Indians, still further to the right, advanced, and fell in with our front line of Infantry, near its junction with Desha's division, and, for a moment, made an impression upon it. His Excellency, Gov. Shelby, however, brought up a regiment to its sup-

port ; and the enemy, receiving a severe fire in front, and a part of Johnson's regiment having gained their rear, retreated with precipitation. Their loss was very considerable in the action, and many were killed in their retreat.


I can give no satisfactory information of the number of Indians that were in the action ; but they must have been considerably upwards of one thousand. From the documents in my possession (Gen. Procter's official letters, all of which were taken), and from the information of respectable inhabitants of this territory, the Indians, kept in pay by the British, were much more numerous than has been generally supposed. In a letter to Gen. De Rottenburg, of the 27th ulto. Gen. Procter speaks of having prevailed upon most of the Indians to accompany him ; of these, it is certain that 50 or 60 Wyandot warriors abandoned him.

The number of our troops was certainly greater than that of the enemy ; but when it is recollected that they had chosen a position, that effectually secured their flank, which it was impossible for us to turn ; and that we could not present to them a line more extended than their own, it will not be considered arrogant to claim, for my troops, the palm of superior bravery.

In communicating to the President, through you, sir, my opinion of the conduct of the officers, who served under my command, I am at a loss now to mention that of Gov. Shelby, being convinced that no eulogium of mine can reach his merits ; the Governor of an independent state—greatly my superior in years, in experience, and in military character—he placed himself under my command ; and was not more remarkable for his zeal and activity, than for the promptitude and cheerfulness with which he obeyed my orders.

The Major-Generals, Henry and Desha, and the Brigadiers, Allen, Caldwell, King, Chiles, and Trotter, all of the Kentucky volunteers, manifested great zeal and activity.

Of Governor Shelby's staff, his Adjutant-General Colonel Walker, rendered great service, as did his aide-de-camp, Gen. Adair, and Majors Barry and Crittenden. The military skill of the former was of great service to us, and the activity of the two latter gentlemen could not be surpassed. Illness deprived me of the talents of my



ISAAC SHELBY.

First Governor of Kentucky.

Adjutant-General Colonel Gaines, who was left at Sand-
 wich. His duties were, however, ably performed by the
 acting assistant Adjutant-General, Captain Buttler. My
 aids-de-camp, Lieutenant O'Fallon and Captain Todd, of
 the line and my volunteer aids John Speed Smith and
 John Chambers, Esquires, have rendered me the most im-
 portant services from the opening of the campaign. I
 have already stated that General Cass and Commodore
 Perry assisted me in forming the troops for the action.
 The former is an officer of the highest merit, and the
 appearance of the brave Commodore cheered and animated
 every breast.

It would be useless, sir, after stating the circumstances
 of the action, to pass encomiums upon Col. Johnson and
 his regiment. Veterans could not have manifested more
 firmness. The Colonel's numerous wounds prove that he
 was in the post of danger. Lieut.-Col. James Johnson,
 and the Majors Payne and Thompson, were equally ac-
 tive, though more fortunate. Maj. Wood, of the
 engineers, already distinguished, by his conduct at
 Fort Meigs, attended the army with two 6-pounders ;
 having no use for them in the action, he joined in
 the pursuit of the enemy ; and, with Major Payne of the
 mounted regiment, two of my aids-de-camp, Todd and
 Chambers, and three privates, continued it for several
 miles after the rest of the troops had halted, and made
 many prisoners.

I left the army before an of-fiafreturn of the prisoners,
 or that of the killed and wounded, was made out ; it was,
 however, ascertained that the former amounted to 60i
 regulars, including 25 officers. Our loss is seven killed
 and 22 wounded, five of which have since died. Of the
 British troops, 12 killed and 22 wounded ; the Indians
 suffered most-33 of them having been found upon the
 ground, besides those killed on the retreat.

On the day of the action, six pieces of brass artillery
 were taken, and 2 iron 24 pounders the day before ;-
 several others were discovered in the river, and can be
 easily procured. Of the brass pieces, 3 are the trophies
 of our revolutionary war, that were taken at Saratoga
 and York, and surrendered by Gen. Hull. The number
 of small arms, taken by us, and destroyed by the enemy,
 must amount to upwards of 5,000 ; most of them had
 been ours, and taken by the enemy at the surrender of

Detroit, at the River Raisin, and at Col. Dudley's defeat. I believe that the enemy retain no other military trophy of their victories, than the standard of the 4th regiment^y they were not magnanimous enough to bring that of the 41st regiment into the field, or it would have been taken. You have been informed, sir, of the conduct of the troops under my command in action ; it gives me great pleasure to inform you that they merit, also, the approbation of their country, for their conduct in submitting to the greatest privations with the utmost cheerfulness.

The infantry were entirely without tents ; and, for several days, the whole army subsisted upon fresh beef, without bread or salt.

I have the honor, &c.,

William H. Harrison.

Hon. J. Armstrong, Sec. War.

P.S.—Gen. Procter escaped by the fleetness of his horse, escorted by 40 dragoons, and a number of mounted Indians.

On the 22nd September, Harrison's army rendezvoused at Put-in Bay Island, and, on the evening of the 25th took up a position on the Middle Sister Island, about twenty miles from Amherstburg. A storm delayed them here till the 27th, when they again embarked and landed near Bar Point, about three miles from the Fort at Amherstburg. Harrison, it is said, made an attempt to land in Colchester township, but was prevented from doing so by John Naudee, the Chippeway chief and his Indians. On the 27th, Amherstburg was in their possession, but the army encamped that night on the farm now owned by Edward Honor, where their temporary earthwork fortifications may still be seen. There is a tradition that some horses of the American officers were stampeded and captured by the Canadians and Indians. Among them was a fine Arab stallion, that was hidden by one Drouillard until the war was over. Many of the horses in the vicinity show the Arab strain, and tradition points to this horse as their progenitor. If the above has any fact as a basis, the horses must have been captured about the 1st October near Sandwich,⁴⁵ as Harrison had no horses until Col. Johnson's mounted corps crossed the Detroit at that town. On the 28th, the invading army passed the Canard and encamped two miles beyond it, and at 2 o'clock the next day entered Sandwich. On the 2nd October everything was ready for the pursuit, which was continued as outlined in the despatches given.

Harrison had as one of his guides Matthew Dolsen, who, with a wife and five children, lived near Chatham in 1812. At the beginning of the war he was drafted into the militia, but deserted to Hull, and after the capture of Detroit escaped and joined Harrison's army. Meanwhile his wife and family enjoyed the protection of the Canadian Government until after Procter's defeat, when they moved to Detroit.



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From the original daguerreotype in possession of G. Mills McClurg, Toronto.

JOHN NAUDEE.

(OSHAWAHNAB)

Second in command of the Indians at the Battle of Moraviantown.