Title

Chapter 5

Identifier

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page

62-103

Bibliographic Citation

A veteran of 1812 : the life of James FitzGibbon / by Mary Agnes FitzGibbon.

10168803

A veteran of 1812 : the life of James FitzGibbon / by Mary Agnes FitzGibbon.

Type

Text

extracted text

V
62

UP THE ST. LAWRENCE I3Y 13ATtAtJX.

A VETERAN OF 1812.

ledge I possess, I have acquired since I entered it.
I trust that I have so far succeeded as to have
rendered myself, at least as a regimental officer, respectable. At this point I do not wish to stop ; to
personal exertions I look principally for further success in,the army, and by qualifying myself to hold
the higrier and more important stations, I shall have
the best prospect of arriving at them, and of becoming most useful to my king and country, in whose
service I have been already so liberally rewarded.
" The duties attached to my present station employ
me so as to leave no spare time. I am anxious to
study and become proficient in the languages, mathematics, military drawing, etc., so as to qualify myself
to discharge, with honor to myself, the duties of any
situation to which I may hereafter have the good
fortune to be called.
" I have the honor to be, sir,
" Your most obedient, humble servant,
" (Signed) JAMES FITZGI13BON,

" Lieut. and Adjt. 49th Regiment.
" To COLONEL VINCENT,
" Commanding 49th Regiment.
" A true copy.
" NOAH FREER,

" Military Secretary."
This letter was forwarded to the Commander of the
Forces in Canada, with a letter from Colonel Vincent
soliciting approbation of its petition, and requesting
permission to recommend Sergeant-Major Stean for
•the adjutancy if FitzGibbon's resignation is accepted.
We can, however, find no further record or entry
of any reply to either letter.

63

CHAPTER V.
N January, 1812, immediately after the declaration of war by the United States against Great
Britain and her colonies, we find FitzGibbon
again addressing his colonel and applying for leave
to resign the adjutancy, in order that he may be given
the command of one of the companies of the 49th,
whose captain was absent on leave. This request
was granted at once. A week later FitzGibbon was
placed in the desired command by Sir George Prevost
and sent with his company to escort the first brigade
of bateaux from Montreal to Kingston.
In these days of steamboats and canals, when
heavily laden barges are towed in safety up our great
water highway, passing the rapids by the canals, the
difficulties of conveying the clumsily built, heavy
bateaux and their freight up the south bank of the
river, avoiding the rapids on the one hand and the
enemy on the other, can scarcely be realized. From
St. tegis upwards they were obliged to keep close to
the shore, and were exposed to an enamy's attack at
any moment.
Why they hugged the south shore instead of following the northern bank of the river does not appear.
FitzGibbon says distinctly that for more than a hundred miles the American shore was close on their left.

I

64

.

A WINTER DRIVE.

AVETERAN OF 1812.

Possibly the north channel was not so well known to
the boatmen as the south, or it might be that Fitz,
Gibbon, adhering to the very original idea formed on
the sand-hills of Holland, that the safest place was
dose to the enemy, took that route in preference to
the other. If Fo, the result proved its value.
FitzGibbon's enthusiasm, his readiness of resource, '
his willingness to take his share of work with his
men, while at the same time preserving his authority
over them, was long remembered.
A white-haired old man (the late M. Le Lievre,
of Three Rivers), when speaking of this expedition
ars with
to the writer in 1873, recalled the part
vivid interest : "I can remember that journey well,
although I was only a very young lad at the time.
FitzGibbon was a fine man, and a splendid soldier.
The men adored him, although he was strict. His
word was law, and they had such faith in him that I
believe if he had told any one of them to jump into
the river, he would have been obeyed. He always
knew what he was about, and his men knew it, and
had full confidence in him."
The Americans, learning that the bateaux were
coming up the St. Lawrence, fitted out an expedition
at Ogdensburg to intercept them. They landed on
Toussaint's Island, but through the timely warning
given by a man who escaped from the island and
roused the militia on the Canadian shore, the boats
were prepared to receive them. When the Americans
made the attack they met with such a warm reception
-

65

that they were obliged to abandon one of their boats,
and in spite of the fact that they brought the fire
from their gunboat to bear upon the bateaux, and
obliged them to move out of range, their own loss
was so severe that they were forced to retreat. (Appendix IV.)
4
The bateaux reached Kingston without further
molestation. Owing to the loss of the papers already
referred to, it is impossible to ascertain with accuracy
where FitzGibbon was stationed during the next foul'
months. Whether with that portion of the regiment
stationed at York, or at Fort Erie, or with the four
companies left at Kingston, or whether he was with
Brock at Queenston Heights, we have no documentary evidence, no written record, to guide us.
In January, 1813, FitzGibbon was sent from Kingston in charge of forty-five sleighs containing military
,stores for Niagara. This was an extremely arduous
undertaking, the difficulties of overcoming bad roads,
snowstorms, and the bitter cold of a Canadian winter,
being scarcely less than those which beset the river
highway from Montreal. Avoiding the trackless
forest and the softer snow beneath the trees, the
sleighs were obliged to follow the shores of the Bay
of Quinte, and after crossing the narrow stretch of
land between Prince Edward county and the mainland, known as the " Carrying Place," and along the
low shores of Brighton Bay, to face the wide sweep
of wind over Lake Ontario to York.
Upon his arrival at Niagara, he was detached with

66

A VETERAN OF 1812.

UNDAUNTED " BRITISHERS."

his company and sent to the shores of Lake Erie, to
the most distant post on the right of the army on the
Niagara frontier. The lake was frozen completely
over from shore to shore, and thus formed a firm
bridge upon which it was expected the enemy would
cross. FitzGibbon was set to watch and prevent this.
When the ice broke up in April, he was withdrawn
to the Niagara River, and posted at Frenchman's
Creek. It was from this post that FitzGibbon made
one of the daring raids for which he was afterwards
so well known. Seeing a party of the enemy on one
of the islands in the river at sunset on the 6th of
April, he crossed in a bateau with twelve men,
succeeded in reaching the island unobserved, and surprising the party, took them prisoners and brought
them back with their own boat.
That FitzGibbon was frequently employed in conveying despatches from the frontier to headquarters
at Kingston, we know, but we have no detailed record
of each occasion upon which this duty was entrusted
to him. His intimate knowledge of the roads, his
expeditious promptitude and rapid movements, as
well as the fact of his having been at so many different places, while that part of the 49th to which
he of right belonged remained at one post, makes
this more probable.
He was with his regiment on the Niagara frontier
on April the 6th, when the raid on Strawberry Island
was perpetrated., He was at York when that post
was attacked by the Americans under Chauncey and

Dearborn, and back again at Fort George when it
was taken by them on May 27th.
There is no official record extant of the strength
of the force that, after the gallant defence of Fort
George, retreated to Burlington Heights.
The situation was critical. The recent bombardment of York and its evacuation by its chief magistrates and officials ; the presence of the American
fleet under Chauncey, a fleet capable of commanding
every port on the lakes and in actual possession of
the Niagara frontier shores ; Fort George taken and
occupied by the enemy ; the British force, harassed
and wearied by previous patrol duties, followed by
defeat, and further weakened by the permission which
-almost amounted to an order given to the militia to
return to their own homes.
The American force, 3,550 strong, flushed with
victory, following up the retreat of the defeated
and well-nigh disheartened British army, made the
prospect appear gloomy indeed. Nothing but the
entire evacuation of the western peninsula seemed
possible. Against less odds York had been deserted.
There seemed nothing for it but to destroy all the
stores thila,t could not be carried away, evacuate the
Heights, and escape to Kingston, leaving the land to
the enemy. Fortunately for Canada there were a
few dauntless spirits to whom the words " defeat "
and " retreat" required many letters to spell—enough
of the ignorance of " when they were beaten" left in
the British ranks to sustain them.

I

67

1

68

69

A VETERAN OF 1812.

A VISIT TO THE ENEMY.

Collecting all the women and children in the fort
on the Heights, and levelling all the fences on the
deserted farms on the plains below, the British prepared to make a last stand against the enemy.
Tidings being brought to the camp of the approach
of the American army, Lieut. Crowther, with a small
party, was sent out to reconnoitre, and if possible,
check the advance.
Upon reaching Red Hill, a scout brought him word
that the enemy were close on the other side of the
Big Creek. This information prompted the idea of
attempting to surprise and capture the whole force.
Concealing his party in the bush, the lieutenant
watched the enemy approach in evident ignorance of
the proximity of any ambushed foe.
All seemed to favor the successful issue of his
strategem, when the excitable Irish temperament defeated it. The Americans were scarcely within range
when one of the 49th, forgetful of orders, fired. The
enemy started, broke for shelter, and the lieutenant
seeing all was up, fired a full volley to hurry them
before withdrawing his party.*
Ascertaining that the main body of the enemy were
preparing to encamp at Stony Creek, he returned to
the Heights, and reported to General Vincent.
It was now FitzGibbon's turn. From his knowledge of the ground and the enemy's behaviour under
sudden attack, of how the unsteadiness of the few

affected the steadiness of the many, FitzGibbon felt
confident that a night attack might be made with
success. Colonel Harvey was in favor of attempting
it, and FitzGibbon volunteered to learn the exact
position and disposition of the enemy's forces, and
personally obtain all the knowledge necessary.
Disguising himself as a settler, he took a basket
of butter on his arm, and went boldly into the
American camp.
There is no doubt whatever that he made himself
very entertaining to the soldiers, to whom he sold all
his butter, getting the best price for it, or that the
purchasers believed they were obtaining much valuable information of the position, panic and numerical
inferiority of the British troops now fleeing before
their victorious arms. The disguise was so complete,
the vendor of butter so simple, that he was allowed
to traverse the entire camp, and gain considerably
more information than he appeared to give.
Fitz Gibbon returned more than ever convinced that
if General Vincent would consent to a night attack
it would be successful.
He reported the enemy camped on Mr. James
Gage's farm, on the easterly bank of a rivulet just
west of the Stony Creek, which ran through a
shallow volley some two hundred yards wide, with
steep banks twelve or fifteen feet high, their guns
planted on the edge of the bank as on a parapet
overlooking the flat. The infantry were encamped
behind them in an orchard on the north and in the

"' The Battle of Stony Creek. E. B. Biggar, Canadian Magazine,
July, 1893.

70

A VETERAN OF 1812.

fields on the south of the road, while Generals Winder
and Chandler had possession of Mr. Gage's house as
their headquarters. The luckless advance guard was
posted in the meeting-house on the west side of the
flat, a quarter of a mile from the camp."*
Upon FitzGibbon's report being received, an anxious
council of war was held, and Colonel Harvey proposed a night attack being made. It was the only
chance, the forlorn hope. The men had but ninety
rounds of ammunition remaining. Sa;i1 had been seen
on the lake. If time were allowed them to effect a
junction with the land force, disastrous, precipitate
retreat or annihilation was inevitable. The proposal
was accepted, and Colonel Harvey given the command.
Five companies .of the 8th under Major Ogilvy,
and five of the 49th under Major Plenderleath, with an
unrecorded number of militia and other corps then in
the camp—in all, a handful of seven hundred and
four rank and file—set out in the silent summer
night to strike what every soldier thought might be
a last blow for the British flag on that fair Canadian frontier.
Ascertaining that every musket was empty, even
the flints removed, that no excitable Irishman might
again betray their proximity, Harvey gave the order
to march.
Three hours passed. No sound broke the silence, no
report of cannon carried tidings to the anxious hearts'.
* J. H. Land in Report of the Wentworth Historical Society.

c

STONY CREEK.

71

upon the Heights. Meanwhile, the troops had crept
across the plains. Upon reaching the scene of Lieut.
Crowther's ambuscade the men were halted, and the
various posts of attack or vigilance assigned to the
different officers.
Stealing from the cover, the enemy's advance pickets were bayoneted in silence ere the challenge
had well passed their lips, and deploying into line the
attacking force marched up the steep bank of the
valley to the very mouth of the cannon, every man ,
knowing that any moment they might roar forth
wholesale destruction down the ranks.
FitzGibbon was one of the first men to reach the
summit of the bank, at the moment that the first
volley of the American musketry roused the sleeping
gunners, who, springing to their feet, fired the guns
just where they stood.
Heedless of the death-dealing shot, the 49th
charged, and carrying the guns at the point of the
bayonet, turned them upon the now flying enemy.
The camp was taken ; whole regiments fired but once
and fled, leaving their dead to be buried by their
enemies. The two American generals, Chandler and
Winder, were captured by the British, together with
seven other officers and 116 rank and file. The
retreat of the front ranks carried panic with it to
the rear ; the ships, instead of supporting the land
force, served only as a means of escape to the flying
soldiers, and one of the most brilliant victories of
the campaign was won by the British—a•vietory that

72

A VETERAN OF 1812.

more than compensated their arms for the loss of
York and Fort George.
FitzGibbon always said in reference to this battle,
that if the victory, had been followed by immediate
pursuit of the retreating Americans, Fort George
might have been recovered without much, if any,
loss. The advance, however, only reached Forty Mile
Creek two days later.
This suggested to FitzGibbon the idea that he
plight do good work if he had a few men under his
immediate command, detached for skirmishing duty
in advance.
To decide upon a line of conduct and to act was
one with the 'soldier. He lost no time in applying to
Lieut.-Colonel Harvey, then Deputy Aeljutant-General.
To his intense satisfaction his request was received
by Lieut.-Colonel Harvey with the words, " Most
cheerfully. I have been looking for an officer I could
send in the advance, and did not think of you. Come
to me in an hour with written details of your projected plan of operations, and I will propose you to
the general."
The general's consent obtained, the next difficulty
was to select men. Had all who volunteered and
wished to go with him been accepted, he would have
had nearly the whole regiment. But the number was
limited to fifty.
" We all wanted to go," writes an old 49th man, in
• 1862. " We knew there would be good work, fighting
and success wherever .FitzGibbon led, for though
-

,

'41

4

THE " GREEN TIGERS."

impulsive he was prompt, and as brave as a lion.
Though apparently foolhardy, every man in the regiment knew that he knew what he was about, and
forgot nothing."
During the day, FitzGibbon made up the company's
accounts and transferred them to another officer ;
selected his men from the several companies himself ;
purchased a sufficient quantity of fustian to make
shell-jackets, in order that he might be able to show
fifty red-coats at one point and fifty grey-coats at
another, and three cow-bells to be used as signals in
the woods, where the bugle, whistle or even words of
command might serve only to betray their whereabouts to the enemy.
The 49th had long ere this date won for themselves
the sobriquet of the " Green Tigers from the enemy,
the name being suggested by the color of the facing
of their tunics and the fierceness of their fighting
Detachments of this regiment were generally sent to
the front of every engagement. Batteries and guns,'
whose fire was proving disastrous to the advance or
retreat of the British, had been stormed and carried
by small handfuls of men from the regiment, and
their appearance was now almost sufficient to ensure
victory, and certainly carried fear into the ranks of
the enemy.
FitzGibbon's little band well sustained the character
of the regiment. He knew each one of the men and of
what they were capable ; knew that his faith in them
was returned fourfold in their devotion to him, and
5
.

74

A VETERAN OF 1812.

in that esprit de corps so essential to the successful
career of soldier or regiment.
With Ensign Winder and forty-eight rank and
file, he successfully interrupted the communication
between Fort Erie and Fort George, then in the hands
of the enemy, and pursued and well-nigh captured
a marauding troop of licensed freebooters under a
Captain Chapin, whose warfare had been principally
directed against defenceless farms, his men burning
and destroying barns and farm produce, terrifying the
women and children, and making prisoners of the few
laborers they found in charge.
By dividing his company into three parties, and
sending them by different pathways and tracks
through the woods and ravines, FitzGibbon was able
to cover a larger area and give the impression that
he had a greater number of men under his command
_than had he kept them all together. A code of signals was arranged by which they could communicate
with each other, and, though separated, be able to act
in concert.
Each band must have had many tales to tell of
narrow escape and adventure during those days of
successful hunting of the enemy. Once when FitzGibbon and two of his men were crossing from one
rendezvous to another, they were nearly captured by
a party of ten or twelve Americans. It being impossible to retreat unseen, they concealed themselves
under an overhanging bank of earth, from which a
luxuriant growth of wild vines formed a screen, and

A BOLD STRATAGEM.

75

waited. Listening intently, FitzGibbon made signs
to his men not to move, and, turning, crept cautiously
along close to the bank to where he knew there was
a deep hole or cave. A great tree had fallen and
partially barred the entrance ; resting his hands on
the trunk, he raised himself and dropped lightly on
the other side, not, however, without having caught
a momentary glimpse of the enemy. The path they
had followed had come to all abrupt end on the top
of. the rise ; they were evidently uncertain of their
locality and had halted to consider, undecided whether
to return by the way they had come or to break a
fresh track and advance. FitzGibbon crawled along
until he was within a few yards of below where they
stood. Pausing a moment to recover his breath, he
uttered a succession of Irish yells and Indian war
cries, which, reverberating from side to side of the
cave, startled and struck terror to the hearts of the
enemy above. Believing themselves surrounded by
ambushed Indians, they decided that there was but
one path and took it, not stopping to look behind
them. FitzGibbon returned to his men, and they
went their way without further encounter with the
enemy that day.
On the 21st, FitzGibbon, by a judicious disposal of
his men through the woods and destroying the bridge
over the Chippewa by removing the planks, had
Chapin's whole troop in a corner, and would have
captured them had not 150 infantry coming from
Fort Erie been entrapped at the same time, The

76

A VETERAN OF 1812.

combined force so far outnumbered FitzGibbon's that
he deemed it advisable to draw off his men and let
the United States infantry escort their own cavalry
back to Fort George.
Later on the same day, when entering a village
through which the enemy had just passed, FitzGibbon
saw a dragoon's horse at the door of a tavern, and,
hoping to surprise and capture the rider in order that
he might obtain information of the enemy's movements and intentions, he advanced.
When within a few paces of the door, an infantry
man came out and presented his musket. FitzGibbon,
having his grey fustian jacket on over his uniform,
still advanced, saying quietly, " Stop, my friend, don't
fire." The musket dropped to the charge, while FitzGibbon went on, " I advise you to go away quickly
as there are British soldiers in the barn over there."
Then, being within reach, he sprang forward, seized
the man's musket and ordered him to surrender. Instead of obeying, the man held on firmly. The sound
of voices attracted the dragoon, who, issuing from the
door, pointed his piece at FitzGibbon's shoulder.
Lithe as a cat and of great muscular strength, FitzGibbon turned, and still retaining his hold upon the
infantry man's musket with his right hand, he caught
the one pointed at his shoulder with his left, and
brought it to the front beside the other. The man
pulled but FitzGibbon held fast. Finding he was too
strong for them, the dragoon drew FitzGibbon's own
sword with his left hand, and attempted to cut him

A BRAVE WOMAN.

77

over the head with it, but failed. He then grasped
it as a dagger and tried to stab him. But there was
help near. As he raised his arm to strike, FitzGibbon saw two small hands seize it from behind, grasp
the wrist, and the sword was wrenched from his hold
by a woman. An old man coming up at the moment,
the two Americans were made prisoners, and carried
off from within hearing of their own detachment, had
it occurred to them to call out.
It may be interesting to add that at the close of
the war, in 1816, FitzGibbon obtained from the
Government a grant of 400 acres of land for the
woman's husband, as a reward for her assistance, and
in 1837 when her son, who had joined the rebels, was
taken prisoner, and tried, and would have suffered
the penalty of death, FitzGibbon, in consideration of
certain circumstances which came out in the investigation, obtained a full pardon for the lad from Sir
George Arthur.*
On the 24th of June occurred an incident which
has been more or less correctly described, both in
poetry and prose, at various times, more than once
being spoken of as " the most brilliant episode of the
war," that known as the " affair " or battle of Beaver
Dam. We have two accounts of it, one written at
the time by a correspondent of the Montreal Gazette,
and published in the columns of the issue of that paper
of July 6th, 1813, and one written by FitzGibbon in
* An account of his case was published in the London Times, in
August, 1839.

78

A VETERAN OF 1812.

later years for the information of his grandchildren.
(The former will be found in Appendix V.).
Tupper also publishes an account in his " Life and
Correspondence of Sir Isaac Brock," which, in a footnote, he says is abridged from The Soldier's Companion or Recorder. It has also been ably dramatized
by Mrs. Curzon, a well-known Canadian authoress of
the present day.
To tell the story fairly, I must, although reluctant
to load this biography with details belonging more
exclusively to the history of the campaign and the
country, endeavor to sketch briefly the condition of
affairs upon the frontier at that time.
We must recall the evacuation of Fort George by
the British—or its capture by the Americans, to put it
either way—followed by the battle of Stony Creek,
the pursuit of the retreating Americans, and the
desultory warfare carried on between the rival armies
along the frontier. This sort of guerilla warfare
between, not only the regulars, but the volunteer
companies and straggling bands pf Indians as well,
had resulted in nothing decisive.
After their defeat at Stony Creek, and their precipitate retreat from the Forty Mile Creek, the American army were unable to undertake any offensive
measures. Their communication between Forts Erie,
Niagara and George were cut off by FitzGibbon and
his handful of the 49th men, now more dreaded than
ever as " FitzGibbon's Green 'uns."
FitzGibbon had chosen De Cou's house as his head-

'CI

I3EAVER DAM.

70

piarters, a choice which evinced an intimate knowledge of the locality as well as considerable strategic
ability. The position gave him the command of four
roads—to Queenston via St. David's, to St. Catharines
and the lake, to Colonel Bisshopp's station, and to that
most important post, Burlington Heights. The accompanying map does not give the last mentioned road,
but as Fitz Gibbon speaks of it as the chief object of
the American attack, and the later local maps place
the road to Burlington at right angles from that to St.
Catharines, it is reasonable to suppose it was there.
Personal terror of the Indians was excited in the
minds and imagination of the American soldiers by
the wild tales of their cruelties to prisoners told by
the settlers on whose lands they were quartered.
The hatred of the latter for these intruders was increased by the brutalities perpetrated by Chapin and
his men, and their love and admiration for FitzGibbon was raised almost to hero-worship by his
daring and success in checking the progress and interrupting the communication between the enemy's
posts.
This check was not satisfactory to the Americans.
Complaints being made by the authorities at Washington of the sluggishness of the generals in command,
orders were issued at headquarters that, at all hazard,
an effort must be made to dislodge or capture this
irrepressible soldier, batter down De Cou's house, and,
by securing the road to Burlington Heights, open the

80

A 'VETERAN OF

1812.

way to a successful attack upon that key to the
position.
The plan mentioned in the following letter to FitzGibbon from William Kerr, the Chief of the Indians
at Beaver Dam, and Brant's son-in-law, has, I regret
to say, been lost, and though every effort has been
made, both by myself and others interested in the
records of our country, we have not been successful
in recovering it :
" WELLINGTON SQUARE, June 4th, 1842.
" MY DEAR FITZ,—This is the birthday of our good
old King George IV., which is still celebrated by the
militia of the country in Canada West.
" I wish you to get some good hand to sketch the
accompanying little plan of the country about the
Beaver Dam—that is, to copy it, and at the same time
point out any inaccuracies you may meet with, both in
the plan and account of the morning's work. The plan
of the country I did a few days after the battle—and
the account of that morning's work you can add to, or
make alterations. But you must keep, or send to me,
the original plan and account of the battle, as, you
observe, it may be pleasing some thirty or forty years
hence to look or talk over the same, when we ride to
Owen Sound on the railroad. Mrs. Kerr is quite well.
" Thine,
" WILLIAM J KERR.
" JAS. FITZGIBBON, ESQ."
Burlington Heights in the possession of the Americans meant the probable occupation and possible
subjugation of the entire peninsula. (See map, p. 79.)

LAURA

f

LAURA SECORD.
From Lossing's " Field-Book of the War of 1812."—Copyright, 1868, by
Harper & Brothers.

stcoRD.

81

The duty of striking a preparatory blow, this surprise and capture of FitzGibbon, was entrusted to
Lieut.-Colonel Boerstler and a force of upwards of
five hundred men.
The natural confidence of success which the comparative strength of the two forces gave the Americans was eventually the cause of their defeat. At
the Beaver Dam, some of the junior officers with
Lieut.-Colonel Bcerstler were overheard discussing
his plans, and a woman undertook the difficult task
of attempting to reach and warn FitzGibbon.
The story of Laura Secord, her loyalty, bravery,
and perseverance under great difficulties, has been
told more than once, yet I must repeat it once again.
James Secord, formerly an officer in the Lincoln militia,
had been wounded at Queenston Heights. Too crippled for further service, he had 'settled on a grant of
land in the Niagara district, in that part of the
peninsula at the time in the hands of the Americans.
A couple of their officers coining into Secord's house
I demand food, had stayed long enough, and talked
;mid enough, to allow his young wife to learn the
danger threatening FitzGibbon and his handful of
brave men. Her husband was incapable by reason
of his lameness, but she could be fleet of foot and
strong in purpose. From the moment she obtained
her husband's consent to go, until she reached FitzGibbon, her courage never failed.
Putting everything in order, even setting the
breakfast table ready, that the appearance of her

83

A VETERAN OF 1812.

COURAGEOUS PERSEVERANCE.

presence might deceive any chance visitor to the
house, and learning the particulars of the best route
to follow, so as to avoid the enemy's pickets as much
as possible, she set out at the earliest peep of dawn.
Clad only in a short flannel skirt and cotton jacket,
without shoes or stockings, her milking stool in one
hand, her pail in the other, she drove one of the cows
close to the American lines. While ostensibly making
every effort to stay the animal's progress, she at
the same time gave it a sly prod to keep it moving.
Accosted by the picket, who questioned her anxiety
to milk the cow so early, and chaffed her for her
apparent inability to overtake it, laughing at her
fruitless efforts to bring the creature to a stand, Laura
merely grumbled at it for being " contrary." The
scantiness of the woman's clothing, and her wellsimulated wrath at the animal's antics, quite deceived
the man, who let her pass without further protest.
The moment she was out of his sight, Laura Secord
drove the cow on more quickly, following the course
of a small ravine which concealed her from both
sight and hearing. A mile away, she hid the pail
and stool under the bushes, first milking the cow
sufficiently to prevent her returning too soon to the
clearing. She then set out on her long tramp through
the woods.
The 23rd of June, the morning was hot and close,
and through the lower lands the flies were plentiful.
The underbrush in the forest was tangled and dense,
making the tree-clad slopes more difficult to climb

The fear of encountering outlying pickets, or wandering bands of marauding, Americans, who would
stay or question her, led, lyef to avoid even the slightly
marked tracks, and took her a long way round. Her
first stopping place was the mill on the little stream
not far from St. David's. Her friends there, a widow
and a lad, endeavored to dissuade her from attempting to reach FitzGibbon, and added much to the
terrors of the way by exaggerated descriptions of
the fierceness and cruelties of the Indians, who then
infested the woods. But Laura had set out with a
definite object, and she meant to accomplish it at all
risks. She knew the enemy was to march the next
day, and she must reach De Cou's, where FitzGibbon
was, before them. The last half of her journey was
even more trying than the first. She knew nothing
of the way ; there were so many paths and "blazed "
tracks through the woods, that she several times took
a wrong one. When almost despairing of reaching
her destination, she came to an opening in the forest
and at the same time encountered a party of the
dreaded Indians.
One, who appeared to be their chief, sprang to his
feet and accosted her. Terrified, she was at first unable to speak, but reassured by the obedience of the
others to a sign from their chief, she soon recovered
sufficiently to try and explain by signs that she
wished to be taken to FitzGibbon. Reiterating the
name and pointing to the knife in the chief's belt,
she at last made him understand that many " Big

82

.

a

Ii

84

A VETERAN OF 1812.

Knives" * were coming. With an expressive " Ugh"
of satisfaction and intelligence, the Indian turned,
and led the way through the beaver meadows to
De Cou's.
" Thus," wrote FitzGibbon, " did a young, delicate
woman brave the terrors of the forest in a time of
such desultory warfare that the dangers were increased
tenfold, to do her duty to her country, and by timely
warning save much bloodshed and disaster." t
*Michigans, " Big Knives," the Indian name for Americans.
t The following paper was signed by FitzGibbon :
" I do hereby certify that Mrs. Secord, wife of James Secord, of
Chippewa, Esq., did, in the month of June, 1813, walk from her
house, near the village of St. David's, to De Cou's house in Thorold
by a circuitous route of about twenty miles, partly through the
woods, to acquaint me that the enemy intended to attempt, by
surprise, to capture a detachment of the 49th Regiment, then under
my command, she having obtained such knowledge from good
authority, as the event proved. Mrs. Secord was a person of
slight and delicate frame, and made the effort in weather excessively warm, and I dreaded at the time that she must suffer in
health in consequence of fatigue and anxiety, she having been
exposed to danger from the enemy, through whose lines of communication she had to pass. The attempt was made on my detachment by the enemy ; and his detachment, consisting of upwards
of 500 men and a field-piece and 50 dragoons, were captured in
consequence.
" I write this certificate in a moment of much hurry and from
memory, and it is therefore thus brief.
"(Signed) JAMES

FITZGIBBON,

" Formerly Lieutenant 49th Regiment."
[Given by Auchinlech, page 175, but Mrs. Secord possesses the
original, December 1863.—" War of 1812," Coffin, page 146.]

INDIAN TACTICS.

85

Sending her to a farm beyond De Cou's to be
cared for, where, as she graphically expressed it, she
" slept right off," FitzGibbon repeated her tidings to
the chief, and remained on guard himself all night.
In the meantime the American detachment had
•
lain over at Queenston, and in the early morning of
the 24th continued their march to Beaver Dam.
They had not gone far before they came upon
Kerr and his Indians, in number between two and
three hundred, chiefly Mohawks and Caughnawagas
from the Grand River and the St. Lawrence. Kerr
aiO young Brant saw at once that their force was too
small to oppose the American advance, so resorted to
Indian tactics to retard and harass the enemy. They
threw themselves upon the rear and flank of the
enemy, and opened a desultory fire. The Americans,
throwing out sharpshooters in reply, still advanced.
The track was narrow and rough, the forest on
either side forming a safe shelter for the Indians, who
were neither to be shaken of nor repulsed. Their
yells, echoing their rifles, rang on the national conscience, and the many sensational stories told of their
savage treatment of prisoners had the usual effect on
nerve and brain.
About 7 o'clock, FitzGibbon heaikl firing in the direction of Queenston. Taking 'a cornet of dragoons,
who happened to be at De Cou's, with him, he sallied
out to reconnoitre, and soon discovered the enemy.
They had retired from the road and taken up a

position on a rising ground in the centre of a field

86

87 _

A VETERAN OF 1812.

A BOLD SUMMONS.

of wheat. The firing had nearly ceased, the Indians
having to creep through the standing corn to get
within range, and the guns of the Americans replying only to the spot where the smoke was seen to
rise from the concealed rifle.
The Americans being about fourteen miles from
Fort George and several of their men lying killed on
the road before him, FitzGibbon suspected that they
probably believed themselves in desperate circumstances. He sent the cornet back to bring up his
men. Addressing a few animated words to them, he
then led them at the double across the open in front
of the American position, about 150 yards distant,
to the wood between it and Fort George, as if to cut
off their retreat, so disposing his men as to give the
appearance of greater numbers.
A discharge of grape from the enemy's guns passed
through his ranks and cut up the turf, but did no
further damage. The desired ground was occupied
without losing a man.
Upon discovery of the enemy, FitzGibbon had sent
a despatch to Colonel De Haren, who was in command
of a detachment of about two hundred men, as he
believed about a mile from his own post, but who
he afterwards learned had retreated to a distance
of seven miles. While anxiously expecting the arrival
of De Haren, FitzGibbon heard that the enemy were
expecting reinforcements. The Indians were dropping off, and fearing to lose such a prize, he determined to " come the old soldier over them and

demand their instant surrender." Tying a white
handkerchief to his sword he advanced. His bugler
sounded the " Cease firing," which to his surprise and
satisfaction the Indians obeyed.
An American officer advanced to meet him, also
bearing a flag.
FitzGibbon informed him that it was principally
from a desire to avoid unnecessary bloodshed that
he demanded the surrender of the American force to
the British now opposing their advance, and wished
the officer to recommend the necessity of such
action strongly to the general in command. Colonel
Bcerstler's reply to this was, " That he was not
accustomed to surrender to any army-, he had not
even seen."
Upon this, FitzGibbon represented that " if such
was his (Colonel Bcerstler's) determination, he would
request his (FitzGibbon's) superior officer to grant
permission for any officer Colonel Bcerstler might
depute for the duty, to inspect the British force, and
see for himself the advisability of not risking a battle
or the rancor of the Indians."
FitzGibbon then retired, ostensibly to obtain this
permission. Upon reaching his men he found that
Captain Hall, of Chippewa, with about twenty
dragoons, had joined them, he having been attracted
by the firing. Requesting Captain Hall to represent
the mythical " superior officer," " receive the request
and refuse it," Fitz Gibbon returned to the American
officer who awaited the reply. Colonel Boustler

88

89

A VETERAN OF 1812.

AN UNWELCOME ARRIVAL.

then requested to be given until sundown to consider
and decide. To this FitzGibbon replied promptly in
the negative, " I cannot possibly grant such a request.
I could not control the Indians for such a length of
time," and taking out his watch, he added, " I cannot
give your general more than five minutes in which
to decide whether to surrender or not."
During the negotiations which followed concerning
the conditions of surrender, FitzGibbon heard the
name of Colonel Chapin constantly repeated. While
delighted at the success of his strategem, FitzGibbon
endeavored to keep all appearance of satisfaction out
of his manner. When the condition that " the volunteers and militiamen should be allowed to return to
the United States on parole," was advanced by Capt.
McDowell, the officer who acted for Colonel Bcerstler,
FitzGibbon asked if the volunteers mentioned were
not Chapin and his mounted men. Upon receiving
an answer in the affirmative, he said : " The conduct
of that person and his troop has been so bad among
our country people, plundering their houses and otherwise behaving ill, that I do not think him deserving
of the honors of war." Pausing a moment as if to
consider, he added : " But as I am aware that the
Americans accuse us of stimulating the Indians to
destroy you, whereas we have ever used our best
endeavor, and almost always successfully, to protect
you, therefore, rather than give you cause to think
so upon this occasion, I agree to that condition as well
as the others."

" Then, sir," replied Captain McDowell, " if you will
send an officer to superintend the details of the surrender, we will be ready to receive you, and we shall
depend upon you as a British officer to protect our
men from the Indians."
" can only give you this assurance," he replied ;
"the Indiang' must take my life before they shall
attack you."
FitzGibbon went at once to the chiefs, and repeat- .
ing his promise made to the American officer to thein
in French, begged of them to do nothing to interfere
with its fulfilment. They agreed at once, shaking
hands with FitzGibbon in token of their faith. At
this moment, most unexpectedly, Major De Haren
appeared, galloping into the open and accompanied
by a colonel of militia.
" I would have given all I ever possessed," says
FitzGibbon, " that they had been twenty miles distant, fearing that they would rob me of at least some
of the credit of the capture. It became important
to let Major De Haren know what had been already
done, and I requested him to stop and hear it from
me, but he most cavalierly replied, ' You need not be
alarmed, Mr. FitzGibbon, you shall have all the credit
for this affair which you deserve.'
" I desire merely, sir, to make known to you what
`has been done, that you may proceed accordingly ; '
ibeurt
nott st op his horse,
hoo C na rdd Colonel
rs
t o m ee
, see ing
forward
meet
introduced them to eachd
other, and then Major De
6

90

A VETERAN OF 1812.

Haren began offering certain conditions to Colonel
Bcerstler, upon which he would accept his surrender.
" In an instant I saw myself on the point of being
robbed of my prize, and stepping quickly to the head
of Major De Haren's horse, on the near side, and laying my left arm and elbow on its neck and my head
upon my arm, my face towards Major De Haren so
that my voice might reach his ear only, I said in a
low but most imperative tone, Not another word, sir ;
not another word ; these men are my prisoners.' Then
stepping back, I asked in a loud, firm voice, Shall I
proceed to disarm the American troops ? ' And he
could not help answering, You may.'
" The American troops fell in at once in answer to
my command, and Major Taylor, Colonel Bcerstler's
second in command, asked me how I would have the
men formed, in file or in column
" 'In file, if you please,' I replied, for I wished to
keep their ranks broken as much as possible, and
dreaded every moment that Major De Haren, in conversation with Colonel Bcerstler, would, by some
blunder, ruin all. The moment, therefore, that I saw
eight or ten files formed, I gave the order, 'American
troops, Right face—Quick march,' that I might drive
Colonel Bcerstler and Major De Haren before me, and
prevent their conversing together further during the
crisis.
" As we approached near where our men were
formed, I stepped up to Major De Haren and asked,
Shall the American troops ground their arms here ?'

A BOMBASTIC SPEECH.

91

' No,' he answered in a harsh tone, let them march
through between our men and ground their arms on
the other side.'
" Filled with indignation at this great folly, I
thought, almost audibly, What, sir, and when they
see our handful of men, will they ground their arms
at your bidding ? ' but said, in an impressive tone,
' Do you think it prudent to march them through
with arms in their hands in the presence of the
Indians ? '
" Before he could reply, Colonel Boerstler, holding
out his hand, exclaimed, For God's sake, sir, do what
this officer bids you " Do so,' said De Haren.
" ' Americans, Halt !=Front !—Ground your arms :'
" The order was obeyed promptly. Then the Indians sprang forward from their hiding-places and
ran towards the prisoners, who in terror began to
seize their arms again. The moment was critical. I
sprang upon a stump of a tree and shouted, 'Americans, don't touch your arms Not a hair of your head
shall be hurt,' adding, 'Remember, I am here'—a bombastic speech, but I knew I could rely on the promise
given me by the chiefs. The Americans stood still,
and the Indians went among them, taking possession
of such articles of arms and accoutrements as pleased
them, especially the pistols of the dragoons, but in all
other respects with perfect forbearance and propriety.
" After the arms were grounded, and the prisoners
saw that the Indians were so orderly, I ordered,
Right face—Quick march and marched them away

92 A VETERAN OF 1812.
from their arms. All being now safe, I mounted my
horse and rode forward to Major De Haren, and asked
him if he had any special order for me. For the first
time that day he spoke civilly to me, and requested '
me to ride on and join Colonel Bcerstler and his
friend, Dr. Young, and conduct them to De Cou's
house."
The kindly intercourse between FitzGibbon and the
men he had so recently captured, during this memorable ride, and until they were sent on to Quebec, has
been attributed to the fact that he revealed himself to
them as a Mason. There is, however, no mention of
this among FitzGibbon's papers, and, knowing the
man from his life and the nobility of his nature, I am
much more inclined to believe it due to the natural
courtesy with which a true soldier and gentleman
would treat a fallen foe. FitzGibbon made them feel
that they were more the victims of circumstance than
responsible for defeat.
The following are the articles of ctwitulation made
between Captain McDowell, on the part of Lieut.Colonel Bcerstler of the United States Army, and
Lieutenant FitzGibbon, although signed by Major De
Haren, of His Britannic Majesty's Canadian Regiment,
on the part of Lieut.-Colonel Bisshopp, commanding
the advance of the British, respecting the surrender
of the force under the command of Lieut.-Colonel
Bcerstler. It is taken from the original document,
now in the Canadian Archives.

ARTICLES OF CAPITULATION.
" First. That Lieut.-Colonel Bcerstler and the force
under his command shall surrender prisoners of war.
" Second. That the officers shall retain their horses,
arms and baggage.
" Third. That the non-commissioned officers and
soldiers shall lay down their arms at the head of the
British column and become prisoners of war.
" Fourth. That the militia and the volunteers with
Lieut.-Colonel Bcerstler shall be permitted to return
to the United States on parole.
" ANDW. MCDOWELL,

" Captain of the U. S. Light Artillery.
" Acceded to.
" C. G. B(ERSTLER,

" Lieut.-Colonel comd'g detach't U.S. Army.
" B. W. DE HAREN,
" Major Canadian Regiment."
The number captured were 25 officers and 519
non-commissioned officers and men, of whom 50 were
dragoons, including 30 mounted militiamen ; also one
12-pounder, one 6-pounder, two ammunition cars, and
the colors of the 14th Regiment United States army.
The Indians killed and wounded 56 men. Colonel
Bcerstler was also wounded.
FitzGibbon's force consisted of 46 muskets, a cornet
of dragoons, and his own cool effrontery, his reinforcement a captain of the dragoons (Provincial),
a sergeant, corporal and 12 dragoons—" the first of
our .dragoons ever seen in that quarter, and their
arrival had an excellent effect upon the negotiations."
(dA,Ecsetoeu.)
nt sent at his request to the late Sir Augustus

A 'VETERAN OF 1812

OFFICIAL DESPATCHES.

" His Royal Highness the Prince Regent was
graciously pleased to bestow a company upon me for
this service, and the commander of the forces, Sir
George Prevost, wrote with his own hand a letter of
thanks to me for it." (Ibid.)
Lest we should be accused of too highly coloring
the account, which undoubtedly reads more like a
chapter in a novel than sober history, we give an
account taken from an American writer, who made
the best of it from a national point of view :
" After the disaster of Winder and Chandler at
Forty Mile Creek, Colonel Bcerstler was pushed forward with six hundred men of all arms, dragoons,
artillery and infantry, to dislodge a strong picket
posted in a stone house about two miles beyond a
hilly pass, called the Beaver Dam, seventeen miles
from Fort George.
" Arriving at the Beaver Dam, Colonel Bcerstler
was surprised by a large body of Indians under the
conduct of young Brant and Captain William J. Kerr,
numbering about 450 warriors. The battle was maintained for about three hours, the Indians, of course,
fighting after their own .fashion, in concealment, having apparently surrounded Colonel Bcerstler in the
woods.
" Indeed the enemy must have conducted the battle
with considerable adroitness, for Colonel Bcerstler,
galled on all sides, dared neither advance nor retreat,
while the result of every observation was a conviction
that he was surrounded by far superior numbers.

" At length, Lieut. FitzGibbon of the 49th (enemy's)
Regiment arriving on the ground with forty-six rank
and file, sent a flag of truce to Colonel Bcerstler
demanding a surrender. After some parleying, the
British lieutenant magnifying the number of their
troops and pretending to conduct the negotiations in
the name of Major De Haren, not forgetting a few
occasional suggestions touching the horrors of the
Indian massacre, Colonel Boerstler, having neither
reserve to sustain him nor demonstration to favor
him, surrendered his detachment as prisoners of war.
This battle occurred on the 24th of June, and was a
brilliant affair for young Brant, since it was fought
by Indians alone, not a single cartridge being expended by the regular troops of the enemy."*
In a private letter from William Kerr (who was
Brant's brother-in-law) to Lieutenant FitzGibbon, he
gives the number of " the Indians as 250, who were
actually retreating when Colonel Bcerstler surrendered to your handful of men."
The following are the official despatches in which
the notice of the event was conveyed to headquarters :

94

" TOWNSHIP OF SOUTH, June 24th, 1813.
" SIR,—At De Cou's this morning, about seven
o'clock, I received information that about 1,000 of the
enemy with two guns were advancing towards me
from St. David's. I soon after heard firing of cannon
and musketry, and in consequence rode in advance
"" Life of Brant," by William I. Thom,

1838. Dearborn & Co.

96

A VETERAN OF ItM.

two miles on the St. David's road. I discovered by
the firing that the enemy was moving for the road on
the mountain. I sent off Cornet McKenzie to order
out my detachment of the 49th, consisting of a subaltern and forty-six rank and file, and closed upon
the enemy to reconnoitre.
" I discovered him on the mountain road and took
up a position on an eminence to the right of it. My
men arrived and pushed on in his front to cut off his
retreat, under a fire from his guns, which, however,
did no execution. After examining his position, I
found it difficult to approach him, there being no
wood in front or on the flanks to cover the Indians,
and his force (apparently 600) I could not approach. I
was here informed that he expected reinforcements.
I therefore decided upon summoning him to surrender.
" After the exchange of several propositions between Colonel Bcerstler and myself in the name of
Lieut.-Colonel De Haren, Lieut.-Colonel Bcerstler
agreed to surrender on the terms stated in the
articles of capitulation. On my return to my men to
send an officer to superintend the details of the
surrender—you arrived.
" I have the honor to be, etc.,
" (Signed) J. FITZGIBBON,

LIEUT.-COLONEL

BISSHOPP'S

LETTER. 97

" And here I will state what I believe caused Major
De Haren to conduct himself so strangely towards me
as he did, namely, his having retreated from the scene
of action instead of advancing as I had done ; and,
afterwards witnessing my success, he felt how the
two proceedings might be contrasted, and he hoped
thus to give a turn to the passing circumstances which
might change their appearance more in his favor than
the real facts would do. Other proceedings were
afterwards resorted to to rob me entirely of what was
clue to me on this occasion ; but I decline. to state
them from tenderness to the memory of the officers
concerned, who are long since dead. I was, however,
afforded an opportunity soon after to plead my cause
before Major-General Vincent, Sir James Yeo and
Lieut.-Colonel Harvey, and justice was in part done
to me in a private letter 6 Sir George Prevost, for
the letter of Lieut.-Colonel Bisshopp to Major-General
Vincent, afterwards published, wholly wronged me."
Lieut.-Colonel Bisshopp's letter to Brigadier-General
Vincent, now in the Canadian Archives, is as follows :

" Lieutenant 49th Regiment."
The soldier left his brother soldier to continue the
account, knowing well that if fairly told the credit due
would be given to him. Whether the misstatement
in Lieut.-Colonel Bisshopp's despatch to BrigadierGeneral Vincent was due to him or to Major De Haren,
we cannot now ascertain. All that we can find in
reference to it in FitzGibbon's papers is the following :

"BEAVER DAM, June 24th, 1813.
"Si a, —I have the honor to inform you that the
troops you have done me the honor to place under
any command, have succeeded this day in taking
prisoners a detachment of the United States army
under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Bcerstler.
this affair the Indian warriors, under the command of
Captain Kerr, were the only force actually engaged.
To them great merit is due, and to them I feel par-

98

A VETERAN OF ISO.

titularly obliged for their gallant conduct on this
occasion.
"On the appearance of the detachment of the 49th
Regiment under Lieut. FitzGibbon, the Light Company of the 8th King's Regiment, the two flank
companies of the 104th under Major De Haren, and
the Provincial Cavalry under Captain Hall, the whole
surrendered to His Majesty's troops. To the conduct
of Lieut. FitzGibbon of the 49th Regiment, through
whose address the capitulation was entered into, may
be attributed the surrender of the American army.
"To Major De Haren, for his speedy movement to
the point of attack and execution of the arrangements
I had previously made with him, I am very much
obliged.
" I have the honor to • enclose the capitulation
entered into between Colonel Bcerstler and myself,
and a return of prisoners taken, inclusive of wounded,
not yet ascertained I lose no time in forwarding my
Staff-Adjutant, Lieut. Barnard, to communicate to you
this intelligence. He has been particularly active
and useful to me on all occasions. I take this opportunity of mentioning him to you, and beg the favor
of you to recommend him to His Excellency Sir
George Prevost, as an active and promising young
officer.
",I have the honor to be, Sir,
"Your most obedient servant,
" CECIL BISSHOPP,

"Lieut.-Colonel Commanding Troops in Advance.
" BRIGADIER-GENERAL VINCENT,

" Commandiny Centre Division."

A WRONG IMPRESSION.

99

Tennyson's lines,
" A lie that is all a lie can be met and fought with
outright,
But a lie that is half a truth is a harder matter
to fight,"

,

might be applied here. The fact of including the
forces under De Haren with the small detachment
under FitzGibbon's immediate command in his report
to the General, leaves (and certainly did make on that
officer's mind) the impression that the combined forces
were present when the negotiations between Colonel
Bcerstler and the British were entered into—not, as
was actually the case, that they arrived after the
American general had surrendered at discretion to
FitzGibbon. It will also be remembered that De Haren
reached the scene accompanied only by a colonel of
militia, having in his anxiety outridden his detachment. In fact, FitzGibbon's fear lest his captives
should discover the smallness of his force, is but
another proof that De Haren's had not yet come up.
The situation was aptly described by the late Judge
Jarvis, of Brockville, who was with FitzGibbon at
Beaver Dam: "And when the Yankees did surrender,
we all wondered what mischief he (FitzGibbon)
would do with them." That the " active and promising young officer " must, however, have let something
of the truth out, General Vincent's letter with which
he forwarded Lieut.-Colonel Bisshopp's, suggests :

100

A VETERAN OF 1812.

COLONEL BCERSTLER'S LETTER.

June 25th, 1813.
• have the honor of transmitting to Your
"
Excellency a report I received from Lieut.-Colonel
Bisshopp commanding the troops in advance, of the
success of a skirmish with a strong detachment of
cavalry and infantry, advancing with two field-pieces.
" In the vigilance of Lieut.-Colonel Bisshopp, I feel
much indebted, and leg leave to refer Your Excellency
to his report of the conduct of the officers and men
under his command, which is. deserving every commendation. I cannot but particularize that of Lieut.
FitzGibbon, 49th . Regiment, commanding a small
reconnoitring party co-operating with the Indians,
through whose address in entering into the capitulation, Your Excellency will perceive by Lieut.-Colonel
Bisshopp's report, that the surrender of the American
detachment is to be attributed. I beg leave to recommend this officer to Your Excellency's protection.
" I have the honor to be, Sir,
" Your obedient, humble servant,
" FORTY MILE CREEK,

OFFICERS NAMES AND RANK.
'

Lieut. Kerney, 14th Regt.
Lt.-Col. Bcerstler, 14th Regt.
Marshall,
9
Major Taylor, 20th Regt.
Waring,
9
Capt. McDowell, Lt. Artillery.
Mudd,
,,
Macha•nie, 6th Regt.
Murdock,
9
9 McKenzie, 14th 9
Goodwin,
tt
,r
9
Cummins,
Clarke, • ,P
9
9
,,
Fleming,
Robinson, 9
,,
Reach, 23rd Regt.
Randall,
9
9
Lieut. Norris, Lt. Artillery.
Cornet Bird, Dragoons.
Shell, 6th Regt.
Surgeon Young, 14th Regt.
Saunders, 14th Regt.
Arnell,
9
J. HARVEY,
(Copy.)
•

Deputy Adjutant-Getzera l.

The history is not complete without a copy of
Lieut.-Colonel Bcerstler's letter to General Dearborn,
the original of which is in the Canadian Archives :
" TWENTY MILE CREEK, June 25th, 1813.
"
am permitted to state the misfortune
which has befallen myself and detachment entrusted
to my care. We proceeded yesterday until near the
Beaver Dam, when we were attacked by a large
force of Indians, who were reinforced by regulars
under Colonel De Haren, while other reinforcements
marched in the direction of our rear. The action
lasted three hours and ten minutes, during which
time we drove them somr distance into the wood, but
finding our men not equal to that mode of fighting,
I changed my position twice during the engagement
to get more open ground ; but such was the position
that the enemy's balls reached us from every direction,
while he was concealed. Our ammunition being nearly
expended, surrounded on all sides, seventeen miles to
retreat, where my force would have constantly
diminished, especially after spending our ammunition

" JOHN VINCENT,

" Brigadier-General."
RETURN OF AMERICAN PRISONERS TAKEN NEAR FORT GEORGE,
JUNE

24TH, 1813.

0
CORPS.

0

'1

Light Dragoons ...........................
Light Artillery ...........................
6th Regiment Infantry ...........
14th
20th
23rd
Total .............................

I 1
8 11

6 13

C

1

• •

19

2

• •

31

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102

A VETERAN OF 1812.

EFFECT OF THE CAPTURE.

while the enemy was gathering in from various outposts ; myself, Captain Macharnie, Lieut. Randall,
and Lieut. Marshall wounded, I saw that in the exhausted state the men were in, that far the greater
part, if any, could never reach Fort George, therefore
was compelle 1 to capitulate. The officers under my
command will state what may be requisite as to my
conduct.

not dared to send a patrol more than one mile from
Fort George in any direction."
General De Rottenburg, who had recently been
appointed to the command of the Niagara frontier,
also speaks of the effect upon the enemy of the
capture of the American general. After lamenting
the failure of Sir James Yeo's expedition on the lake,
and the consequent impossibility of his attempting
to attack Fort George, which, in consequence of the
panic the Americans were thrown into by the capture
of Beerstler,- and the cutting off of all communication
between the garrison and their supplies, or from
reinforcements from the land and riverside, had been
an easy prey, he adds :
" I have secured the position at Burlington Bay
against a coup-de-m%in. That glory hold I must
retire to ultimately and maintain myself there until
the navy will be enabled to meet the fleet on Lake
Ontario. Had Sir James had time to spare to cooperate with the army, Fort George would have
Fallen, but I do not now possess the means of attacking them on both sides of the river. Lieut. FitzGibbon is a deserving and enterprising officer, and I shall
forward your letter to him."
Unfortunately the private letter to FitzGibbon
from Sir George Prevost was among the papers the
loss of which has given us so much to regret.

[Then follows the same detail of prisoners abridged
from the one given above.]
"You will find enclosed articles of capitulation. I
have the honor to be
" Your distressed humble servant,
" C. G. BCERSTLER,

•

Lieut.-Colonel 14th.
" MAJOR-GEN. DEARBORN.
" I presume my destination will be Quebec. I beg
I may be exchanged as soon as possible."

In the following extract from a letter dated June
28th, 1813, and signed, James J. Fulton, A.D.C., the
effect of the capture is mentioned. After reverting
to information and maps already sent to him (Sir
George Prevost), relative to the position of the forces .
on the frontier, he adds : " When the western Indians
arrive, which we hope will be this evening, the whole,
amounting to about five hundred, will be sent to the
Four Mile Creek. This movement will totally cut
off any supplies that the enemy might receive from
this side .of the water. Indeed, from anything we
learn since Colonel Bcerstler's disaster, they have
,

103