

ledge I possess, I have acquired since I entered it. I trust that I have so far succeeded as to have rendered myself, at least as a regimental officer, respectable. At this point I do not wish to stop ; to personal exertions I look principally for further success in, the army, and by qualifying myself to hold the higher and more important stations, I shall have the best prospect of arriving at them, and of becoming most useful to my king and country, in whose service I have been already so liberally rewarded.

" The duties attached to my present station employ me so as to leave no spare time. I am anxious to study and become proficient in the languages, mathematics, military drawing, etc., so as to qualify myself to discharge, with honor to myself, the duties of any situation to which I may hereafter have the good fortune to be called.

" I have the honor to be, sir,

" Your most obedient, humble servant,

" (Signed) JAMES FITZGIBBON,

" *Lieut. and Adj. 49th Regiment.*

" To COLONEL VINCENT,

" *Commanding 49th Regiment.*

" A true copy.

" NOAH FREER,

" *Military Secretary.*"

This letter was forwarded to the Commander of the Forces in Canada, with a letter from Colonel Vincent soliciting approbation of its petition, and requesting permission to recommend Sergeant-Major Stean for the adjutancy if FitzGibbon's resignation is accepted.

We can, however, find no further record or entry of any reply to either letter.

## CHAPTER V.

IN January, 1812, immediately after the declaration of war by the United States against Great Britain and her colonies, we find FitzGibbon again addressing his colonel and applying for leave to resign the adjutancy, in order that he may be given the command of one of the companies of the 49th, whose captain was absent on leave. This request was granted at once. A week later FitzGibbon was placed in the desired command by Sir George Prevost and sent with his company to escort the first brigade of bateaux from Montreal to Kingston.

In these days of steamboats and canals, when heavily laden barges are towed in safety up our great water highway, passing the rapids by the canals, the difficulties of conveying the clumsily built, heavy bateaux and their freight up the south bank of the river, avoiding the rapids on the one hand and the enemy on the other, can scarcely be realized. From St. Regis upwards they were obliged to keep close to the shore, and were exposed to an enemy's attack at any moment.

Why they hugged the south shore instead of following the northern bank of the river does not appear. FitzGibbon says distinctly that for more than a hundred miles the American shore was close on their left.

Possibly the north channel was not so well known to the boatmen as the south, or it might be that FitzGibbon, adhering to the very original idea formed on the sand-hills of Holland, that the safest place was close to the enemy, took that route in preference to the other. If so, the result proved its value.

FitzGibbon's enthusiasm, his readiness of resource, his willingness to take his share of work with his men, while at the same time preserving his authority over them, was long remembered.

A white-haired old man (the late M. Le Lievre, of Three Rivers), when speaking of this expedition to the writer in 1873, recalled the particulars with vivid interest: "I can remember that journey well, although I was only a very young lad at the time. FitzGibbon was a fine man, and a splendid soldier. The men adored him, although he was strict. His word was law, and they had such faith in him that I believe if he had told any one of them to jump into the river, he would have been obeyed. He always knew what he was about, and his men knew it, and had full confidence in him."

The Americans, learning that the bateaux were coming up the St. Lawrence, fitted out an expedition at Ogdensburg to intercept them. They landed on Toussaint's Island, but through the timely warning given by a man who escaped from the island and roused the militia on the Canadian shore, the boats were prepared to receive them. When the Americans made the attack they met with such a warm reception

that they were obliged to abandon one of their boats, and in spite of the fact that they brought the fire from their gunboat to bear upon the bateaux, and obliged them to move out of range, their own loss was so severe that they were forced to retreat. (Appendix IV.)

4 The bateaux reached Kingston without further molestation. Owing to the loss of the papers already referred to, it is impossible to ascertain with accuracy where FitzGibbon was stationed during the next few months. Whether with that portion of the regiment stationed at York, or at Fort Erie, or with the four companies left at Kingston, or whether he was with Brock at Queenston Heights, we have no documentary evidence, no written record, to guide us.

In January, 1813, FitzGibbon was sent from Kingston in charge of forty-five sleighs containing military stores for Niagara. This was an extremely arduous undertaking, the difficulties of overcoming bad roads, snowstorms, and the bitter cold of a Canadian winter, being scarcely less than those which beset the river highway from Montreal. Avoiding the trackless forest and the softer snow beneath the trees, the sleighs were obliged to follow the shores of the Bay of Quinte, and after crossing the narrow stretch of land between Prince Edward county and the mainland, known as the "Carrying Place," and along the low shores of Brighton Bay, to face the wide sweep of wind over Lake Ontario to York.

Upon his arrival at Niagara, he was detached with

his company and sent to the shores of Lake Erie, to the most distant post on the right of the army on the Niagara frontier. The lake was frozen completely over from shore to shore, and thus formed a firm bridge upon which it was expected the enemy would cross. FitzGibbon was set to watch and prevent this.

When the ice broke up in April, he was withdrawn to the Niagara River, and posted at Frenchman's Creek. It was from this post that FitzGibbon made one of the daring raids for which he was afterwards so well known. Seeing a party of the enemy on one of the islands in the river at sunset on the 6th of April, he crossed in a bateau with twelve men, succeeded in reaching the island unobserved, and surprising the party, took them prisoners and brought them back with their own boat.

That FitzGibbon was frequently employed in conveying despatches from the frontier to headquarters at Kingston, we know, but we have no detailed record of each occasion upon which this duty was entrusted to him. His intimate knowledge of the roads, his expeditious promptitude and rapid movements, as well as the fact of his having been at so many different places, while that part of the 49th to which he of right belonged remained at one post, makes this more probable.

He was with his regiment on the Niagara frontier on April the 6th, when the raid on Strawberry Island was perpetrated. He was at York when that post was attacked by the Americans under Chauncey and

Dearborn, and back again at Fort George when it was taken by them on May 27th.

There is no official record extant of the strength of the force that, after the gallant defence of Fort George, retreated to Burlington Heights.

The situation was critical. The recent bombardment of York and its evacuation by its chief magistrates and officials ; the presence of the American fleet under Chauncey, a fleet capable of commanding every port on the lakes and in actual possession of the Niagara frontier shores ; Fort George taken and occupied by the enemy ; the British force, harassed and wearied by previous patrol duties, followed by defeat, and further weakened by the permission which almost amounted to an order given to the militia to return to their own homes.

The American force, 3,550 strong, flushed with victory, following up the retreat of the defeated and well-nigh disheartened British army, made the prospect appear gloomy indeed. **Nothing but the entire evacuation of the western peninsula seemed possible.** Against less odds York had been deserted. There seemed nothing for it but to destroy all the stores that could not be carried away, evacuate the Heights, and escape to Kingston, leaving the land to the enemy. Fortunately for Canada there were a few dauntless spirits to whom the words " defeat " and " retreat " required many letters to spell—enough of the ignorance of " when they were beaten " left in the British ranks to sustain them.

Collecting all the women and children in the fort on the Heights, and levelling all the fences on the deserted farms on the plains below, the British prepared to make a last stand against the enemy.

Tidings being brought to the camp of the approach of the American army, Lieut. Crowther, with a small party, was sent out to reconnoitre, and if possible, check the advance.

Upon reaching Red Hill, a scout brought him word that the enemy were close on the other side of the Big Creek. This information prompted the idea of attempting to surprise and capture the whole force. Concealing his party in the bush, the lieutenant watched the enemy approach in evident ignorance of the proximity of any ambushed foe.

All seemed to favor the successful issue of his stratagem, when the excitable Irish temperament defeated it. The Americans were scarcely within range when one of the 49th, forgetful of orders, fired. The enemy started, broke for shelter, and the lieutenant seeing all was up, fired a full volley to hurry them before withdrawing his party.\*

Ascertaining that the main body of the enemy were preparing to encamp at Stony Creek, he returned to the Heights, and reported to General Vincent.

It was now FitzGibbon's turn. From his knowledge of the ground and the enemy's behaviour under sudden attack, of how the unsteadiness of the few

\* The Battle of Stony Creek. E. B. Biggar, *Canadian Magazine*, July, 1893.

affected the steadiness of the many, FitzGibbon felt confident that a night attack might be made with success. Colonel Harvey was in favor of attempting it, and FitzGibbon volunteered to learn the exact position and disposition of the enemy's forces, and personally obtain all the knowledge necessary.

Disguising himself as a settler, he took a basket of butter on his arm, and went boldly into the American camp.

There is no doubt whatever that he made himself very entertaining to the soldiers, to whom he sold all his butter, getting the best price for it, or that the purchasers believed they were obtaining much valuable information of the position, panic and numerical inferiority of the British troops now fleeing before their victorious arms. The disguise was so complete, the vendor of butter so simple, that he was allowed to traverse the entire camp, and gain considerably more information than he appeared to give.

Fitz Gibbon returned more than ever convinced that if General Vincent would consent to a night attack it would be successful.

He reported the enemy camped on Mr. James Gage's farm, on the easterly bank of a rivulet just west of the Stony Creek, which ran through a shallow valley some two hundred yards wide, with steep banks twelve or fifteen feet high, their guns planted on the edge of the bank as on a parapet overlooking the flat. The infantry were encamped behind them in an orchard on the north and in the

fields on the south of the road, while Generals Winder and Chandler had possession of Mr. Gage's house as their headquarters. The luckless advance guard was posted in the meeting-house on the west side of the flat, a quarter of a mile from the camp."\*

Upon FitzGibbon's report being received, an anxious council of war was held, and Colonel Harvey proposed a night attack being made. It was the only chance, the forlorn hope. The men had but ninety rounds of ammunition remaining. Sa;il had been seen on the lake. If time were allowed them to effect a junction with the land force, disastrous, precipitate retreat or annihilation was inevitable. The proposal was accepted, and Colonel Harvey given the command.

Five companies .of the 8th under Major Ogilvy, and five of the 49th under Major Plenderleath, with an unrecorded number of militia and other corps then in the camp—in all, a handful of seven hundred and four rank and file—set out in the silent summer night to strike what every soldier thought might be a last blow for the British flag on that fair Canadian frontier.

Ascertaining that every musket was empty, even the flints removed, that no excitable Irishman might again betray their proximity, Harvey gave the order to march.

Three hours passed. No sound broke the silence, no report of cannon carried tidings to the anxious hearts'.

---

\* J. H. Land in Report of the Wentworth Historical Society.



upon the Heights. Meanwhile, the troops had crept across the plains. Upon reaching the scene of Lieut. Crowther's ambushade the men were halted, and the various posts of attack or vigilance assigned to the different officers.

Stealing from the cover, the enemy's advance pickets were bayoneted in silence ere the challenge had well passed their lips, and deploying into line the attacking force marched up the steep bank of the valley to the very mouth of the cannon, every man, knowing that any moment they might roar forth wholesale destruction down the ranks.

FitzGibbon was one of the first men to reach the summit of the bank, at the moment that the first volley of the American musketry roused the sleeping gunners, who, springing to their feet, fired the guns just where they stood.

Heedless of the death-dealing shot, the 49th charged, and carrying the guns at the point of the bayonet, turned them upon the now flying enemy. The camp was taken ; whole regiments fired but once and fled, leaving their dead to be buried by their enemies. The two American generals, Chandler and Winder, were captured by the British, together with seven other officers and 116 rank and file. **The** retreat of the front ranks carried panic with it to the rear ; the ships, instead of supporting the land force, served only as a means of escape to the flying soldiers, and one of the most brilliant victories of the campaign was won by the British—a victory that

more than compensated their arms for the loss of York and Fort George.

FitzGibbon always said in reference to this battle, that if the victory, had been followed by immediate pursuit of the retreating Americans, Fort George might have been recovered without much, if any, loss. The advance, however, only reached Forty Mile Creek two days later.

This suggested to FitzGibbon the idea that he might do good work if he had a few men under his immediate command, detached for skirmishing duty in advance.

To decide upon a line of conduct and to act was one with the 'soldier. He lost no time in applying to Lieut.-Colonel Harvey, then Deputy Adjutant-General.

To his intense satisfaction his request was received by Lieut.-Colonel Harvey with the words, " Most cheerfully. I have been looking for an officer I could send in the advance, and did not think of you. Come to me in an hour with written details of your projected plan of operations, and I will propose you to the general."


The general's consent obtained, the next difficulty was to select men. Had all who volunteered and wished to go with him been accepted, he would have had nearly the whole regiment. But the number was limited to fifty.

" We all wanted to go," writes an old 49th man, in 1862. " We knew there would be good work, fighting and success wherever FitzGibbon led, for though



41

4



## THE " GREEN TIGERS."

impulsive he was prompt, and as brave as a lion. Though apparently foolhardy, every man in the regiment knew that he knew what he was about, and forgot nothing."

During the day, FitzGibbon made up the company's accounts and transferred them to another officer ; selected his men from the several companies himself ; purchased a sufficient quantity of fustian to make shell-jackets, in order that he might be able to show fifty red-coats at one point and fifty grey-coats at another, and three cow-bells to be used as signals in the woods, where the bugle, whistle or even words of command might serve only to betray their whereabouts to the enemy.

The 49th had long ere this date won for themselves the sobriquet of the " Green Tigers from the enemy, the name being suggested by the color of the facing of their tunics and the fierceness of their fighting Detachments of this regiment were generally sent to the front of every engagement. Batteries and guns, whose fire was proving disastrous to the advance or retreat of the British, had been stormed and carried by small handfuls of men from the regiment, and their appearance was now almost sufficient to ensure victory, and certainly carried fear into the ranks of the enemy.

FitzGibbon's little band well sustained the character of the regiment. He knew each one of the men and of what they were capable ; knew that his faith in them was returned fourfold in their devotion to him, and



in that *esprit de corps* so essential to the successful career of soldier or regiment.

With Ensign Winder and forty-eight rank and file, he successfully interrupted the communication between Fort Erie and Fort George, then in the hands of the enemy, and pursued and well-nigh captured a marauding troop of licensed freebooters under a Captain Chapin, whose warfare had been principally directed against defenceless farms, his men burning and destroying barns and farm produce, terrifying the women and children, and making prisoners of the few laborers they found in charge.

By dividing his company into three parties, and sending them by different pathways and tracks through the woods and ravines, FitzGibbon was able to cover a larger area and give the impression that he had a greater number of men under his command than had he kept them all together. A code of signals was arranged by which they could communicate with each other, and, though separated, be able to act in concert.

Each band must have had many tales to tell of narrow escape and adventure during those days of successful hunting of the enemy. Once when FitzGibbon and two of his men were crossing from one rendezvous to another, they were nearly captured by a party of ten or twelve Americans. It being impossible to retreat unseen, they concealed themselves under an overhanging bank of earth, from which a luxuriant growth of wild vines formed a screen, and

waited. Listening intently, FitzGibbon made signs to his men not to move, and, turning, crept cautiously along close to the bank to where he knew there was a deep hole or cave. A great tree had fallen and partially barred the entrance ; resting his hands on the trunk, he raised himself and dropped lightly on the other side, not, however, without having caught a momentary glimpse of the enemy. The path they had followed had come to all abrupt end on the top of the rise ; they were evidently uncertain of their locality and had halted to consider, undecided whether to return by the way they had come or to break a fresh track and advance. FitzGibbon crawled along until he was within a few yards of below where they stood. Pausing a moment to recover his breath, he uttered a succession of Irish yells and Indian war cries, which, reverberating from side to side of the cave, startled and struck terror to the hearts of the enemy above. Believing themselves surrounded by ambushed Indians, they decided that there was but one path and took it, not stopping to look behind them. FitzGibbon returned to his men, and they went their way without further encounter with the enemy that day.

On the 21st, FitzGibbon, by a judicious disposal of his men through the woods and destroying the bridge over the Chippewa by removing the planks, had Chapin's whole troop in a corner, and would have captured them had not 150 infantry coming from Fort Erie been entrapped at the same time, The

combined force so far outnumbered FitzGibbon's that he deemed it advisable to draw off his men and let the United States infantry escort their own cavalry back to Fort George.

Later on the same day, when entering a village through which the enemy had just passed, FitzGibbon saw a dragoon's horse at the door of a tavern, and, hoping to surprise and capture the rider in order that he might obtain information of the enemy's movements and intentions, he advanced.

When within a few paces of the door, an infantry man came out and presented his musket. FitzGibbon, having his grey fustian jacket on over his uniform, still advanced, saying quietly, " Stop, my friend, don't fire." The musket dropped to the charge, while FitzGibbon went on, " I advise you to go away quickly as there are British soldiers in the barn over there." Then, being within reach, he sprang forward, seized the man's musket and ordered him to surrender. Instead of obeying, the man held on firmly. The sound of voices attracted the dragoon, who, issuing from the door, pointed his piece at FitzGibbon's shoulder. Lithe as a cat and of great muscular strength, FitzGibbon turned, and still retaining his hold upon the infantry man's musket with his right hand, he caught the one pointed at his shoulder with his left, and brought it to the front beside the other. The man pulled but FitzGibbon held fast. Finding he was too strong for them, the dragoon drew FitzGibbon's own sword with his left hand, and attempted to cut him

over the head with it, but failed. He then grasped it as a dagger and tried to stab him. But there was help near. As he raised his arm to strike, FitzGibbon saw two small hands seize it from behind, grasp the wrist, and the sword was wrenched from his hold by a woman. An old man coming up at the moment, the two Americans were made prisoners, and carried off from within hearing of their own detachment, had it occurred to them to call out.

It may be interesting to add that at the close of the war, in 1816, FitzGibbon obtained from the Government a grant of 400 acres of land for the woman's husband, as a reward for her assistance, and in 1837 when her son, who had joined the rebels, was taken prisoner, and tried, and would have suffered the penalty of death, FitzGibbon, in consideration of certain circumstances which came out in the investigation, obtained a full pardon for the lad from Sir George Arthur.\*

On the 24th of June occurred an incident which has been more or less correctly described, both in poetry and prose, at various times, more than once being spoken of as " the most brilliant episode of the war," that known as the " affair " or battle of Beaver Dam. We have two accounts of it, one written at the time by a correspondent of the Montreal *Gazette*, and published in the columns of the issue of that paper of July 6th, 1813, and one written by FitzGibbon in

---

\* An account of his case was published in the *London Times*, in August, 1839.

later years for the information of his grandchildren. (The former will be found in Appendix V.).


Tupper also publishes an account in his "Life and Correspondence of Sir Isaac Brock," which, in a footnote, he says is abridged from *The Soldier's Companion or Recorder*. It has also been ably dramatized by Mrs. Curzon, a well-known Canadian authoress of the present day.

To tell the story fairly, I must, although reluctant to load this biography with details belonging more exclusively to the history of the campaign and the country, endeavor to sketch briefly the condition of affairs upon the frontier at that time.

We must recall the evacuation of Fort George by the British—or its capture by the Americans, to put it either way—followed by the battle of Stony Creek, the pursuit of the retreating Americans, and the desultory warfare carried on between the rival armies along the frontier. This sort of guerilla warfare between, not only the regulars, but the volunteer companies and straggling bands of Indians as well, had resulted in nothing decisive.

After their defeat at Stony Creek, and their precipitate retreat from the Forty Mile Creek, the American army were unable to undertake any offensive measures. Their communication between Forts Erie, Niagara and George were cut off by FitzGibbon and his handful of the 49th men, now more dreaded than ever as "FitzGibbon's Green 'uns."

FitzGibbon had chosen De Cou's house as his head-



piarters, a choice which evinced an intimate knowledge of the locality as well as considerable strategic ability. The position gave him the command of four roads—to Queenston via St. David's, to St. Catharines and the lake, to Colonel Bisshopp's station, and to that most important post, Burlington Heights. The accompanying map does not give the last mentioned road, but as Fitz Gibbon speaks of it as the chief object of the American attack, and the later local maps place the road to Burlington at right angles from that to St. Catharines, it is reasonable to suppose it was there.

Personal terror of the Indians was excited in the minds and imagination of the American soldiers by the wild tales of their cruelties to prisoners told by the settlers on whose lands they were quartered. The hatred of the latter for these intruders was increased by the brutalities perpetrated by Chapin and his men, and their love and admiration for Fitz-Gibbon was raised almost to hero-worship by his daring and success in checking the progress and interrupting the communication between the enemy's posts.

This check was not satisfactory to the Americans. Complaints being made by the authorities at Washington of the sluggishness of the generals in command, orders were issued at headquarters that, at all hazard, **an** effort must be made to dislodge or capture this irrepressible soldier, batter down De Cou's house, and, by securing the road to Burlington Heights, open the

way to a successful attack upon that key to the position.

The plan mentioned in the following letter to Fitz-Gibbon from William Kerr, the Chief of the Indians at Beaver Dam, and Brant's son-in-law, has, I regret to say, been lost, and though every effort has been made, both by myself and others interested in the records of our country, we have not been successful in recovering it :

" WELLINGTON SQUARE, *June* 4th, 1842.

" MY DEAR FITZ,—This is the birthday of our good old King George IV., which is still celebrated by the militia of the country in Canada West.

" I wish you to get some good hand to sketch the accompanying little plan of the country about the Beaver Dam—that is, to copy it, and at the same time point out any inaccuracies you may meet with, both in the plan and account of the morning's work. The plan of the country I did a few days after the battle—and the account of that morning's work you can add to, or make alterations. But you must keep, or send to me, the original plan and account of the battle, as, you observe, it may be pleasing some thirty or forty years hence to look or talk over the same, when we ride to Owen Sound on the railroad. Mrs. Kerr is quite well.

" Thine,

" WILLIAM J KERR.

" JAS. FITZGIBBON, ESQ."

Burlington Heights in the possession of the Americans meant the probable occupation and possible subjugation of the entire peninsula. (See map, p. 79.)

The duty of striking a preparatory blow, this surprise and capture of FitzGibbon, was entrusted to Lieut.-Colonel Boerstler and a force of upwards of five hundred men.

The natural confidence of success which the comparative strength of the two forces gave the Americans was eventually the cause of their defeat. At the Beaver Dam, some of the junior officers with Lieut.-Colonel Boerstler were overheard discussing his plans, and a woman undertook the difficult task of attempting to reach and warn FitzGibbon.

The story of Laura Secord, her loyalty, bravery, and perseverance under great difficulties, has been told more than once, yet I must repeat it once again. James Secord, formerly an officer in the Lincoln militia, had been wounded at Queenston Heights. Too crippled for further service, he had 'settled on a grant of land in the Niagara district, in that part of the peninsula at the time in the hands of the Americans. A couple of their officers coming into Secord's house

I demand food, had stayed long enough, and talked ;mid enough, to allow his young wife to learn the danger threatening FitzGibbon and his handful of brave men. Her husband was incapable by reason of his lameness, but she could be fleet of foot and strong in purpose. From the moment she obtained her husband's consent to go, until she reached FitzGibbon, her courage never failed.

Putting everything in order, even setting the breakfast table ready, that the appearance of her



LAURA SECORD.

From Lossing's "Field-Book of the War of 1812."—Copyright, 1868, by Harper & Brothers.

presence might deceive any chance visitor to the house, and learning the particulars of the best route to follow, so as to avoid the enemy's pickets as much as possible, she set out at the earliest peep of dawn. Clad only in a short flannel skirt and cotton jacket, without shoes or stockings, her milking stool in one hand, her pail in the other, she drove one of the cows close to the American lines. While ostensibly making every effort to stay the animal's progress, she at the same time gave it a sly prod to keep it moving. Accosted by the picket, who questioned her anxiety to milk the cow so early, and chaffed her for her apparent inability to overtake it, laughing at her fruitless efforts to bring the creature to a stand, Laura merely grumbled at it for being "contrary." The scantiness of the woman's clothing, and her well-simulated wrath at the animal's antics, quite deceived the man, who let her pass without further protest.

The moment she was out of his sight, Laura Secord drove the cow on more quickly, following the course of a small ravine which concealed her from both sight and hearing. A mile away, she hid the pail and stool under the bushes, first milking the cow sufficiently to prevent her returning too soon to the clearing. She then set out on her long tramp through the woods.

The 23rd of June, the morning was hot and close, and through the lower lands the flies were plentiful. The underbrush in the forest was tangled and dense, making the tree-clad slopes more difficult to climb

The fear of encountering outlying pickets, or wandering bands of marauding Americans, who would stay or question her, led, lyef to avoid even the slightly marked tracks, and took her a long way round. Her first stopping place was the mill on the little stream not far from St. David's. Her friends there, a widow and a lad, endeavored to dissuade her from attempting to reach FitzGibbon, and added much to the terrors of the way by exaggerated descriptions of the fierceness and cruelties of the Indians, who then infested the woods. But Laura had set out with a definite object, and she meant to accomplish it at all risks. She knew the enemy was to march the next day, and she must reach De Cou's, where FitzGibbon was, before them. The last half of her journey was even more trying than the first. She knew nothing of the way ; there were so many paths and "blazed " tracks through the woods, that she several times took a wrong one. When almost despairing of reaching her destination, she came to an opening in the forest and at the same time encountered a party of the dreaded Indians.

One, who appeared to be their chief, sprang to his feet and accosted her. Terrified, she was at first unable to speak, but reassured by the obedience of the others to a sign from their chief, she soon recovered sufficiently to try and explain by signs that she wished to be taken to FitzGibbon. Reiterating the name and pointing to the knife in the chief's belt, she at last made him understand that many " Big



a

ii

Knives" \* were coming. With an expressive " Ugh" of satisfaction and intelligence, the Indian turned, and led the way through the beaver meadows to De Cou's.

" Thus," wrote FitzGibbon, " did a young, delicate woman brave the terrors of the forest in a time of such desultory warfare that the dangers were increased tenfold, to do her duty to her country, and by timely warning save much bloodshed and disaster." t

---

\*Michigans, " Big Knives," the Indian name for Americans.

t The following paper was signed by FitzGibbon :

" I do hereby certify that Mrs. Secord, wife of James Secord, of Chippewa, Esq., did, in the month of June, 1813, walk from her house, near the village of St. David's, to De Cou's house in Thorold by a circuitous route of about twenty miles, partly through the woods, to acquaint me that the enemy intended to attempt, by surprise, to capture a detachment of the 49th Regiment, then under my command, she having obtained such knowledge from good authority, as the event proved. Mrs. Secord was a person of slight and delicate frame, and made the effort in weather excessively warm, and I dreaded at the time that she must suffer in health in consequence of fatigue and anxiety, she having been exposed to danger from the enemy, through whose lines of communication she had to pass. The attempt was made on my detachment by the enemy ; and his detachment, consisting of upwards of 500 men and a field-piece and 50 dragoons, were captured in consequence.

" I write this certificate in a moment of much hurry and from memory, and it is therefore thus brief.

"(Signed) JAMES FITZGIBBON,  
" Formerly Lieutenant 49th Regiment."

[Given by Auchinlech, page 175, but Mrs. Secord possesses the original, December 1863.—" War of 1812," Coffin, page 146.]

DE COU'S HOUSE, NEAR BEAVER DAM.





Sending her to a farm beyond De Cou's to be cared for, where, as she graphically expressed it, she "slept right off," FitzGibbon repeated her tidings to the chief, and remained on guard himself all night.

In the meantime the American detachment had lain over at Queenston, and in the early morning of the 24th continued their march to Beaver Dam.

They had not gone far before they came upon Kerr and his Indians, in number between two and three hundred, chiefly Mohawks and Caughnawagas from the Grand River and the St. Lawrence. Kerr and young Brant saw at once that their force was too small to oppose the American advance, so resorted to Indian tactics to retard and harass the enemy. They threw themselves upon the rear and flank of the enemy, and opened a desultory fire. The Americans, throwing out sharpshooters in reply, still advanced.

The track was narrow and rough, the forest on either side forming a safe shelter for the Indians, who were neither to be shaken of nor repulsed. Their yells, echoing their rifles, rang on the national conscience, and the many sensational stories told of their savage treatment of prisoners had the usual effect on nerve and brain.

About 7 o'clock, FitzGibbon heard firing in the direction of Queenston. Taking a cornet of dragoons, who happened to be at De Cou's, with him, he sallied out to reconnoitre, and soon discovered the enemy. They had retired from the road and taken up a position on a rising ground in the centre of a field

of wheat. The firing had nearly ceased, the Indians having to creep through the standing corn to get within range, and the guns of the Americans replying only to the spot where the smoke was seen to rise from the concealed rifle.

The Americans being about fourteen miles from Fort George and several of their men lying killed on the road before him, FitzGibbon suspected that they probably believed themselves in desperate circumstances. He sent the cornet back to bring up his men. Addressing a few animated words to them, he then led them at the double across the open in front of the American position, about 150 yards distant, to the wood between it and Fort George, as if to cut off their retreat, so disposing his men as to give the appearance of greater numbers.

A discharge of grape from the enemy's guns passed through his ranks and cut up the turf, but did no further damage. The desired ground was occupied without losing a man.

Upon discovery of the enemy, FitzGibbon had sent a despatch to Colonel De Haren, who was in command of a detachment of about two hundred men, as he believed about a mile from his own post, but who he afterwards learned had retreated to a distance of seven miles. While anxiously expecting the arrival of De Haren, FitzGibbon heard that the enemy were expecting reinforcements. The Indians were dropping off, and fearing to lose such a prize, he determined to "come the old soldier over them and

demand their instant surrender." Tying a white handkerchief to his sword he advanced. His bugler sounded the "Cease firing," which to his surprise and satisfaction the Indians obeyed.

An American officer advanced to meet him, also bearing a flag.

FitzGibbon informed him that it was principally from a desire to avoid unnecessary bloodshed that he demanded the surrender of the American force to the British now opposing their advance, and wished the officer to recommend the necessity of such action strongly to the general in command. Colonel Bcerstler's reply to this was, "That he was not accustomed to surrender to any army-, he had not even seen."

Upon this, FitzGibbon represented that "if such was his (Colonel Bcerstler's) determination, he would request his (FitzGibbon's) superior officer to grant permission for any officer Colonel Bcerstler might depute for the duty, to inspect the British force, and see for himself the advisability of not risking a battle or the rancor of the Indians."

FitzGibbon then retired, ostensibly to obtain this permission. Upon reaching his men he found that Captain Hall, of Chippewa, with about twenty dragoons, had joined them, he having been attracted by the firing. Requesting Captain Hall to represent the mythical "superior officer," "receive the request and refuse it," Fitz Gibbon returned to the American officer who awaited the reply. Colonel Boustler

then requested to be given until sundown to consider and decide. To this FitzGibbon replied promptly in the negative, " I cannot possibly grant such a request. I could not control the Indians for such a length of time," and taking out his watch, he added, " I cannot give your general more than five minutes in which to decide whether to surrender or not."

During the negotiations which followed concerning the conditions of surrender, FitzGibbon heard the name of Colonel Chapin constantly repeated. While delighted at the success of his strategem, FitzGibbon endeavored to keep all appearance of satisfaction out of his manner. When the condition that " the volunteers and militiamen should be allowed to return to the United States on parole," was advanced by Capt. McDowell, the officer who acted for Colonel Bcerstler, FitzGibbon asked if the volunteers mentioned were not Chapin and his mounted men. Upon receiving an answer in the affirmative, he said : " The conduct of that person and his troop has been so bad among our country people, plundering their houses and otherwise behaving ill, that I do not think him deserving of the honors of war." Pausing a moment as if to consider, he added : " But as I am aware that the Americans accuse us of stimulating the Indians to destroy you, whereas we have ever used our best endeavor, and almost always successfully, to protect you, therefore, rather than give you cause to think so upon this occasion, I agree to that condition as well as the others."

" Then, sir," replied Captain McDowell, " if you will send an officer to superintend the details of the surrender, we will be ready to receive you, and we shall depend upon you as a British officer to protect our men from the Indians."

" can only give you this assurance," he replied ; "the Indiang' must take my life before they shall attack you."

FitzGibbon went at once to the chiefs, and repeating his promise made to the American officer to them in French, begged of them to do nothing to interfere with its fulfilment. They agreed at once, shaking hands with FitzGibbon in token of their faith. At this moment, most unexpectedly, Major De Haren appeared, galloping into the open and accompanied by a colonel of militia.

" I would have given all I ever possessed," says FitzGibbon, " that they had been twenty miles distant, fearing that they would rob me of at least some of the credit of the capture. It became important to let Major De Haren know what had been already done, and I requested him to stop and hear it from me, but he most cavalierly replied, ' You need not be alarmed, Mr. FitzGibbon, you shall have all the credit for this affair which you deserve.'

" I desire merely, sir, to make known to you what has been done, that you may proceed accordingly ; '   
 ibeurt not st op his horse, and Colonel rs  
 , see ing forward meet  
 introduced them to each other, and then Major De

Haren began offering certain conditions to Colonel Bcerstler, upon which he would accept his surrender.

" In an instant I saw myself on the point of being robbed of my prize, and stepping quickly to the head of Major De Haren's horse, on the near side, and laying my left arm and elbow on its neck and my head upon my arm, my face towards Major De Haren so that my voice might reach his ear only, I said in a low but most imperative tone, Not another word, sir ; not another word ; these men are my prisoners.' Then stepping back, I asked in a loud, firm voice, Shall I proceed to disarm the American troops ? ' And he could not help answering, You may.'

" The American troops fell in at once in answer to my command, and Major Taylor, Colonel Bcerstler's second in command, asked me how I would have the men formed, in file or in column

" 'In file, if you please,' I replied, for I wished to keep their ranks broken as much as possible, and dreaded every moment that Major De Haren, in conversation with Colonel Bcerstler, would, by some blunder, ruin all. The moment, therefore, that I saw eight or ten files formed, I gave the order, 'American troops, Right face—Quick march,' that I might drive Colonel Bcerstler and Major De Haren before me, and prevent their conversing together further during the crisis.

" As we approached near where our men were formed, I stepped up to Major De Haren and asked, Shall the American troops ground their arms here ?'

' No,' he answered in a harsh tone, let them march through between our men and ground their arms on the other side.'

" Filled with indignation at this great folly, I thought, almost audibly, What, sir, and when they see our handful of men, will they ground their arms at your bidding ? ' but said, in an impressive tone, ' Do you think it prudent to march them through with arms in their hands in the presence of the Indians ?'

" Before he could reply, Colonel Boerstler, holding out his hand, exclaimed, For God's sake, sir, do what this officer bids you " Do so,' said De Haren.

" ' Americans, Halt !=Front !=—Ground your arms :'

" The order was obeyed promptly. Then the Indians sprang forward from their hiding-places and ran towards the prisoners, who in terror began to seize their arms again. The moment was critical. I sprang upon a stump of a tree and shouted, 'Americans, don't touch your arms Not a hair of your head shall be hurt,' adding, 'Remember, I am here'—a bombastic speech, but I knew I could rely on the promise given me by the chiefs. The Americans stood still, and the Indians went among them, taking possession of such articles of arms and accoutrements as pleased them, especially the pistols of the dragoons, but in all other respects with perfect forbearance and propriety.

" After the arms were grounded, and the prisoners saw that the Indians were so orderly, I ordered, Right face—Quick march and marched them away

from their arms. All being now safe, I mounted my horse and rode forward to Major De Haren, and asked him if he had any special order for me. For the first time that day he spoke civilly to me, and requested me to ride on and join Colonel Bcerstler and his friend, Dr. Young, and conduct them to De Cou's house."

The kindly intercourse between FitzGibbon and the men he had so recently captured, during this memorable ride, and until they were sent on to Quebec, has been attributed to the fact that he revealed himself to them as a Mason. There is, however, no mention of this among FitzGibbon's papers, and, knowing the man from his life and the nobility of his nature, I am much more inclined to believe it due to the natural courtesy with which a true soldier and gentleman would treat a fallen foe. FitzGibbon made them feel that they were more the victims of circumstance than responsible for defeat.

The following are the articles of capitulation made between Captain McDowell, on the part of Lieut.-Colonel Bcerstler of the United States Army, and Lieutenant FitzGibbon, although signed by Major De Haren, of His Britannic Majesty's Canadian Regiment, on the part of Lieut.-Colonel Bisshopp, commanding the advance of the British, respecting the surrender of the force under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Bcerstler. It is taken from the original document, now in the Canadian Archives.

## ARTICLES OF CAPITULATION.

" First. That Lieut.-Colonel Bcerstler and the force under his command shall surrender prisoners of war.

" Second. That the officers shall retain their horses, arms and baggage.

" Third. That the non-commissioned officers and soldiers shall lay down their arms at the head of the British column and become prisoners of war.

" Fourth. That the militia and the volunteers with Lieut.-Colonel Bcerstler shall be permitted to return to the United States on parole.

" ANDW. MCDOWELL,

" *Captain of the U. S. Light Artillery.*

" Acceded to.

" C. G. B(ERSTLER),

" *Lieut.-Colonel comd'g detach't U.S. Army.*

" B. W. DE HAREN,

" *Major Canadian Regiment.*"

The number captured were 25 officers and 519 non-commissioned officers and men, of whom 50 were dragoons, including 30 mounted militiamen ; also one 12-pounder, one 6-pounder, two ammunition cars, and the colors of the 14th Regiment United States army.

The Indians killed and wounded 56 men. Colonel Bcerstler was also wounded.

FitzGibbon's force consisted of 46 muskets, a cornet of dragoons, and his own cool effrontery, his reinforcement a captain of the dragoons (Provincial), a sergeant, corporal and 12 dragoons—" the first of our dragoons ever seen in that quarter, and their arrival had an excellent effect upon the negotiations."

(Assequ) sent at his request to the late Sir Augustus

" His Royal Highness the Prince Regent was graciously pleased to bestow a company upon me for this service, and the commander of the forces, Sir George Prevost, wrote with his own hand a letter of thanks to me for it." (*Ibid.*)

Lest we should be accused of too highly coloring the account, which undoubtedly reads more like a chapter in a novel than sober history, we give an account taken from an American writer, who made the best of it from a national point of view :

" After the disaster of Winder and Chandler at Forty Mile Creek, Colonel Bcerstler was pushed forward with six hundred men of all arms, dragoons, artillery and infantry, to dislodge a strong picket posted in a stone house about two miles beyond a hilly pass, called the Beaver Dam, seventeen miles from Fort George.

" Arriving at the Beaver Dam, Colonel Bcerstler was surprised by a large body of Indians under the conduct of young Brant and Captain William J. Kerr, numbering about 450 warriors. The battle was maintained for about three hours, the Indians, of course, fighting after their own fashion, in concealment, having apparently surrounded Colonel Bcerstler in the woods.

" Indeed the enemy must have conducted the battle with considerable adroitness, for Colonel Bcerstler, galled on all sides, dared neither advance nor retreat, while the result of every observation was a conviction that he was surrounded by far superior numbers.

" At length, Lieut. FitzGibbon of the 49th (enemy's) Regiment arriving on the ground with forty-six rank and file, sent a flag of truce to Colonel Bcerstler demanding a surrender. After some parleying, the British lieutenant magnifying the number of their troops and pretending to conduct the negotiations in the name of Major De Haren, not forgetting a few occasional suggestions touching the horrors of the Indian massacre, Colonel Boerstler, having neither reserve to sustain him nor demonstration to favor him, surrendered his detachment as prisoners of war. This battle occurred on the 24th of June, and was a brilliant affair for young Brant, since it was fought by Indians alone, not a single cartridge being expended by the regular troops of the enemy."\*

In a private letter from William Kerr (who was Brant's brother-in-law) to Lieutenant FitzGibbon, he gives the number of " the Indians as 250, who were actually retreating when Colonel Bcerstler surrendered to your handful of men."

The following are the official despatches in which the notice of the event was conveyed to headquarters :

" TOWNSHIP OF SOUTH, *June* 24th, 1813.

" SIR,—At De Cou's this morning, about seven o'clock, I received information that about 1,000 of the enemy with two guns were advancing towards me from St. David's. I soon after heard firing of cannon and musketry, and in consequence rode in advance

---

"" Life of Brant," by William I. Thom, 1838. Dearborn & Co.

two miles on the St. David's road. I discovered by the firing that the enemy was moving for the road on the mountain. I sent off Cornet McKenzie to order out my detachment of the 49th, consisting of a subaltern and forty-six rank and file, and closed upon the enemy to reconnoitre.

" I discovered him on the mountain road and took up a position on an eminence to the right of it. My men arrived and pushed on in his front to cut off his retreat, under a fire from his guns, which, however, did no execution. After examining his position, I found it difficult to approach him, there being no wood in front or on the flanks to cover the Indians, and his force (apparently 600) I could not approach. I was here informed that he expected reinforcements. I therefore decided upon summoning him to surrender.

" After the exchange of several propositions between Colonel Bcerstler and myself in the name of Lieut.-Colonel De Haren, Lieut.-Colonel Bcerstler agreed to surrender on the terms stated in the articles of capitulation. On my return to my men to send an officer to superintend the details of the surrender—you arrived.

" I have the honor to be, etc.,

" (Signed) J. FITZGIBBON,

" *Lieutenant 49th Regiment.*"

The soldier left his brother soldier to continue the account, knowing well that if fairly told the credit due would be given to him. Whether the misstatement in Lieut.-Colonel Bisshopp's despatch to Brigadier-General Vincent was due to him or to Major De Haren, we cannot now ascertain. All that we can find in reference to it in FitzGibbon's papers is the following :

" And here I will state what I believe caused Major De Haren to conduct himself so strangely towards me as he did, namely, his having retreated from the scene of action instead of advancing as I had done ; and, afterwards witnessing my success, he felt how the two proceedings might be contrasted, and he hoped thus to give a turn to the passing circumstances which might change their appearance more in his favor than the real facts would do. Other proceedings were afterwards resorted to to rob me entirely of what was due to me on this occasion ; but I decline. to state them from tenderness to the memory of the officers concerned, who are long since dead. I was, however, afforded an opportunity soon after to plead my cause before Major-General Vincent, Sir James Yeo and Lieut.-Colonel Harvey, and justice was in part done to me in a private letter of Sir George Prevost, for the letter of Lieut.-Colonel Bisshopp to Major-General Vincent, afterwards published, wholly wronged me."

Lieut.-Colonel Bisshopp's letter to Brigadier-General Vincent, now in the Canadian Archives, is as follows :

"BEAVER DAM, *June* 24th, 1813.

"Si a,—I have the honor to inform you that the troops you have done me the honor to place under any command, have succeeded this day in taking prisoners a detachment of the United States army under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Bcerstler. In this affair the Indian warriors, under the command of Captain Kerr, were the only force actually engaged. To them great merit is due, and to them I feel par-

titularly obliged for their gallant conduct on this occasion.

"On the appearance of the detachment of the 49th Regiment under Lieut. FitzGibbon, the Light Company of the 8th King's Regiment, the two flank companies of the 104th under Major De Haren, and the Provincial Cavalry under Captain Hall, the whole surrendered to His Majesty's troops. To the conduct of Lieut. FitzGibbon of the 49th Regiment, through whose address the capitulation was entered into, may be attributed the surrender of the American army.

"To Major De Haren, for his speedy movement to the point of attack and execution of the arrangements I had previously made with him, I am very much obliged.

"I have the honor to • enclose the capitulation entered into between Colonel Bcerstler and myself, and a return of prisoners taken, inclusive of wounded, not yet ascertained I lose no time in forwarding my Staff-Adjutant, Lieut. Barnard, to communicate to you this intelligence. He has been particularly active and useful to me on all occasions. I take this opportunity of mentioning him to you, and beg the favor of you to recommend him to His Excellency Sir George Prevost, as an active and promising young officer.

"I have the honor to be, Sir,

"Your most obedient servant,

" CECIL BISSHOPP,

*"Lieut.-Colonel Commanding Troops in Advance.*

" BRIGADIER-GENERAL VINCENT,

*" Commandiny Centre Division."*

Tennyson's lines,

" A lie that is all a lie can be met and fought with  
outright,  
But a lie that is half a truth is a harder matter  
to fight,"

might be applied here. The fact of including the forces under De Haren with the small detachment under FitzGibbon's immediate command in his report to the General, leaves (and certainly did make on that officer's mind) the impression that the combined forces were present when the negotiations between Colonel Bcerstler and the British were entered into—not, as was actually the case, that they arrived *after* the American general had surrendered at discretion to FitzGibbon. It will also be remembered that De Haren reached the scene accompanied only by a colonel of militia, having in his anxiety outridden his detachment. In fact, FitzGibbon's fear lest his captives should discover the smallness of his force, is but another proof that De Haren's had not yet come up. The situation was aptly described by the late Judge Jarvis, of Brockville, who was with FitzGibbon at Beaver Dam: "And when the Yankees *did* surrender, we all wondered what mischief he (FitzGibbon) would do with them." That the " active and promising young officer " must, however, have let something of the truth out, General Vincent's letter with which he forwarded Lieut.-Colonel Bisschopp's, suggests :



" FORTY MILE CREEK, *June 25th, 1813.*

" .have the honor of transmitting to Your Excellency a report I received from Lieut.-Colonel Bisshopp commanding the troops in advance, of the success of a skirmish with a strong detachment of cavalry and infantry, advancing with two field-pieces.

" In the vigilance of Lieut.-Colonel Bisshopp, I feel much indebted, and leg leave to refer Your Excellency to his report of the conduct of the officers and men under his command, which is. deserving every commendation. I cannot but particularize that of Lieut. FitzGibbon, 49th . Regiment, commanding a small reconnoitring party co-operating with the Indians, through whose address in entering into the capitulation, Your Excellency will perceive by Lieut.-Colonel Bisshopp's report, that the surrender of the American detachment is to be attributed. I beg leave to recommend this officer to Your Excellency's protection.

" I have the honor to be, Sir,

" Your obedient, humble servant,

" JOHN VINCENT,

" *Brigadier-General.*"

RETURN OF AMERICAN PRISONERS TAKEN NEAR FORT GEORGE,  
*JUNE 24TH, 1813.*

CORPS.	0				0	g	c
Light Dragoons .....					1	1	.. 19
Light Artillery .....						2	.. 31
6th Regiment Infantry .....		1	1			3	54
14th		8	11		1	15	.. 301
20th						..	
23rd		1				4	2 57
Total .....	r	6	13	1	1	25	2 462

OFFICERS NAMES AND RANK.

Lt.-Col. Bcerstler, 14th Regt.	Lieut. Kerney, 14th Regt.
Major Taylor, 20th Regt.	9 Marshall,
Capt. McDowell, Lt. Artillery.	9 Waring,
Machanie, 6th Regt.	.. Mudd,
9 McKenzie, 14th 9	9 Murdock,
Cummins, 9 ..	.. Goodwin,
Fleming, 9 ..	9 Clarke, • ,P
Reach, 23rd Regt.	.. Robinson, 9
Lieut. Norris, Lt. Artillery.	9 Randall, 9
Shell, 6th Regt.	Cornet Bird, Dragoons.
.Saunders, 14th Regt.	Surgeon Young, 14th Regt.
Arnell, 9	

(Copy.)

J. HARVEY,

*Deputy Adjutant-Getzeral.*

The history is not complete without a copy of Lieut.-Colonel Bcerstler's letter to General Dearborn, the original of which is in the Canadian Archives :

" TWENTY MILE CREEK, *June 25th, 1813.*

" am permitted to state the misfortune which has befallen myself and detachment entrusted to my care. We proceeded yesterday until near the Beaver Dam, when we were attacked by a large force of Indians, who were reinforced by regulars under Colonel De Haren, while other reinforcements marched in the direction of our rear. The action lasted three hours and ten minutes, during which time we drove them some distance into the wood, but finding our men not equal to that mode of fighting, I changed my position twice during the engagement to get more open ground ; but such was the position that the enemy's balls reached us from every direction, while he was concealed. Our ammunition being nearly expended, surrounded on all sides, seventeen miles to retreat, where my force would have constantly diminished, especially after spending our ammunition

while the enemy was gathering in from various outposts ; myself, Captain Macharnie, Lieut. Randall, and Lieut. Marshall wounded, I saw that in the exhausted state the men were in, that far the greater part, if any, could never reach Fort George, therefore was compelled to capitulate. The officers under my command will state what may be requisite as to my conduct.

[Then follows the same detail of prisoners abridged from the one given above.]

"You will find enclosed articles of capitulation. I have the honor to be

" Your distressed humble servant,

" C. G. BICERSTLER,

*Lieut.-Colonel 14th.*

" MAJOR-GEN. DEARBORN.

" I presume my destination will be Quebec. I beg I may be exchanged as soon as possible."

In the following extract from a letter dated June 28th, 1813, and signed, James J. Fulton, A.D.C., the effect of the capture is mentioned. After reverting to information and maps already sent to him (Sir George Prevost), relative to the position of the forces on the frontier, he adds : " When the western Indians arrive, which we hope will be this evening, the whole, amounting to about five hundred, will be sent to the Four Mile Creek. This movement will totally cut off any supplies that the enemy might receive from this side of the water. Indeed, from anything we learn since Colonel Bicerstler's disaster, they have

not dared to send a patrol more than one mile from Fort George in any direction."

General De Rottenburg, who had recently been appointed to the command of the Niagara frontier, also speaks of the effect upon the enemy of the capture of the American general. After lamenting the failure of Sir James Yeo's expedition on the lake, and the consequent impossibility of his attempting to attack Fort George, which, in consequence of the panic the Americans were thrown into by the capture of Bicerstler, - and the cutting off of all communication between the garrison and their supplies, or from reinforcements from the land and riverside, had been an easy prey, he adds :

" I have secured the position at Burlington Bay against a *coup-de-main*. That glory hold I must retire to ultimately and maintain myself there until the navy will be enabled to meet the fleet on Lake Ontario. Had Sir James had time to spare to cooperate with the army, Fort George would have fallen, but I do not now possess the means of attacking them on both sides of the river. Lieut. FitzGibbon is a deserving and enterprising officer, and I shall forward your letter to him."

Unfortunately the private letter to FitzGibbon from Sir George Prevost was among the papers the loss of which has given us so much to regret.