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HISTORY

of the

LATE WAR

Between

Great Britain
and the

United States of America
With a retrospective view of the causes
from whence it originated
BY

DAVID THOMPSON

Republished under the auspices of :
Social Science Research Council of Canada
Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, Paris
Humanities Research Council of Canada
Toronto Public Library

S.R. Publishers Limited
Johnson Reprint Corporation
1966

PHIL:7A CE.
ALTHOUG n many books have been circulated throughout the continent of America, purporting to be histories
of the late war between Great Britain and the United
States, it must be acknowledged that none has yet appeared, in the British North American Colonies, which
could be considered as generally authentic. Whatever
other causes may have existed to which such a total
want of veracity may be ascribed, there is little
doubt but a strong desire on the part of the authors to
place every circumstance regarding that contest in a favorable point of view as respected their own country,
leaving the adverse party as far in the shade as possible, constituted the most prominent—a propensity
confessedly to which, American writers, on this topic,
have betrayed themselves uncommonly subject. It may,
therefore, be fairly presumed, that an apology for the
appearance of the following sheets would be quite superfluous.
A faithful and impartial account of the late war, with a
review of the causes from whence it originated, must be
hailed with the most exalted enthusiasm by all who can
boast the name of a Briton, and are worthy of the title. In
such a work, generations yet unborn- will trace the footsteps of their ancesters in that glorious struggle for the
salvation of their country, and emulate their virtuous example, should they ever be called upon for that purpose.
But in the following detail of the events of the war,
the present generation, the majority of whom bore so
conspicuous a part, will be enabled to review the lei
A2

vi PREFACE;

rifle glories of those fields of blood and carnage : the
widow and the fatherless will survey the transcendant
achievements of their husbands and their fathers, and, in
ecstacies of triumph, like the sun shedding forth his rndient beams after being obscured for a while by a dense
cloud, will smile through their tears. Our British
youths, too, whose minds have been endangered
by the poisoned shafts of designing malevolence which
have been every where discharged through the country,
by the many erroneous accounts of the late war with the
causes which led to it that have been hitherto published—in perusing a true statement of those events, they
will catch that patriotic flame -which glowed with an
unequalled resplendence in the bosoms of their fathers,
and animated to action that noble few who stepped forward to oppose a relentless enemy invading their hitherto
peaceful fire sides, and evinced a willingness to endure
every privation incidental to the " tented field," in defence of their King, their laws and their country.
That these momentous objects night be fully consummated, the writer has spared no expense to collect the
Most authentic materials for the work, neither has he
shrunk from any labor (however arduous,) that might
contribute thereto : official documents, periodicals and
volumes of historical matter on the subject, from both
the countries interested, which were marked for settled
integrity, have been studiously consulted ; and in addition
to all this, together with the authoi's personal knowledge
of most of the transactions detailed, he has acquired much
information on the subject from persons of unquestionable
veracity who were present on the field of action in several engagements during that struggle.

PREFACE:-

vii

As regards talent, in the execution of this work, the
writer would beg leave to say, that to such he disclaims
all pretensions. The humble sphere in which he has
moved did not probably afford any of those bright and
flowery avenues to the temple of literature to which
many more fortunate individuals have had access: his
primary aim, through the whole, has been the acquisition
of truth to lay before his readers—for this he has incessantly labored, and which he flatters himself he has so
far accomplished that a candid and generous public will
indulgently overlook every other imperfection ; he only
laments that a more competent hand had not ere, this
period, taken up the subject.
Niagara, April, 1S32.

HISTORY
OF THE

LATE WAR, &c. •Sac.
CHAPTER I.
Effect of the American Rebellion on the public Mind in
that Country--French Intrigue with America—Power
of Buonaparte—American Interposition in the Peninsular War—American Reasons for declaring War—
Propriety of the Right of Search—Extract from
the American Exposition of the Causes of the War—
Extract from the President's Message—Concurrence
of Congress by declaring War—Revocation of the
British Orders in Council—Its Effect in America—
Extract from the Prince Regent's Proclamation.
THE causes from whence originated the rebellion
which terminated in the separation of the British North
American Colonies (now the United States,) from the
mother country, had engendered such a spirit of prejudice, distrust and rancour against Great Britain, in the
minds of Americans, that for either the government or
the people of that country to judge impartially of any subsequent act of the British government, blindfolded as
was America by French policy and French intrigue,
seemed to be an exertion far beyond, their power to accomplish. While, then, Great Britain was engaged in
a war against a powerful usurper who was daily becoming more and more the scourge and terror of
the world ; when the tyranny of that despot over the
.

HISTORY OF

THE LATE WAR.

surrounding nations seemed to mock all resistance ;
when his armies had humbled some of the greatest monarchies, and completely blotted others from the list of
independent states ; when a general feeling of submissive
terror seemed to fill the minds of European continental
rulers at the power of his arms ; it becomes, then, no
matter of astonishment to see, by Americans, every
means of policy which Great Britain employed to ensure
her own success, in that eventful war, warped and construed into acts of aggression and tyranny against neutral nations.

War with Great Britain," it is stated, that" up to March,
1811, Great Britain had impressed from the crews of
American vessels, peaceably navigating the high seas,
not less than six thousand mariners who claimed to be
citizens of the United States, and who were denied the
opportunity of verifying their claims." And in the
same work it is further added, that " when war was
declared, the Orders in Council had been maintained
with inexorable hostility, until a thousand American
vessels with their cargoes had been seized and confiscated under the operations of these edicts "

10

At the head of the list of reasons assigned by the
American government for declaring war against Great
Britain, stood the Orders in Council regarding neutral
commerce, and the right of search as claimed and practised by Great Britain upon American vessels navigating
the high seas. True, indeed, Great Britain exercised
that right—a privilege she never yet had yielded, nor
to which her right had ever been questioned, until
America had willingly chained herself to the car-wheels
of Buonaparte ; and then, and not till then, when the
creed was faithfully taught to America by France, to
answer her own political purposes, did the shouts of
tyranny and commercial oppression resound from all the
surrounding shores of the Atlantic But for whom did
Great Britain search, when she committed this pretended act of tyranny on America ? Was it for American
citizens ? surely not, but for her own deserters, a description of people who, it is well known, on board of
American shipping, had ever found an insecure but ready
shelter. Had Great Britain once relinquished her
right to search vessels of the United States, both her army and navy, by desertion alone, would have suffered
materially.
In a work published since the late war, under the
authority of the government of the United States, entitled "An Exposition of the Causes and Character of the

11

Another reason assigned, in the work above cited,
for declaring war, was stated to be " an open violation
of the American waters and an infraction of the fundamental principles of the law of nations by the"
pretended " blockade." However, to these might justly
be added, together with a few considerations of minor
import, the idea of an additional stripe to the national
escutcheon by the Conquest of Canada.
In a message from Mr. Madison, the American president, dated June 1st, 1812, recommending immediate
war with Great Britain, as the only available means of
satisfaction to which they could now resort, for the
numerous insults and indignities which the American
flag had sustained—all other causes were but as a drop
in the bucket, compared with the Orders in Council,
both in the extent of the injustice of the measure and
in the mischief arising from them to neutral nations. It
is there stated, that " these orders were evidently framed
so as best to suit the political views and commercial
jealousies of the British Government. The consequences which would result from them to neutral nations
had never been taken into the account ; or, if contemplated or foreseen as highly prejudicial, that consideration
had no weight in the minds of those by whom they
were imposed."

12

HISTORY OF

The United States congress perfectly concurred with
the sentiments held forth in the president's message, and
followed it up, on the 18th of the same month, with an
act of that body (carried by large majorities,) declaring
war against Great Britain, &c. offensive and defensive,
in due form. On the 23d of the same month, the
British Government rescinded the Orders in Council so
bitterly complained of ; but the arrival of that repeal in
America, did not, in the slightest degree, tend to restoring
public tranquility. The genius of war, the demon of
destruction had already gone abroad, and no concession
on the part of Great Britain was sufficient to allay it.
It was stated in the public documents of the United
States, that " the Orders in Council had not been repealed because they were unjust in their principles and
highly detrimental to neutral commerce—on the contrary, the motive of their repeal was obviously selfish and
had no reference to the rights of neutral nations. America, to protect herself, and to avenge her wrongs, had
prohibited all commercial intercourse with Great Britain.
The latter power, thus deprived of her best customer,
had no longer a sufficient and regular market for her
manufactures and colonial produce ; her merchants and
manufacturers were nearly ruined ; distress and poverty
spread themselves over her territories; complaints and
petitions poured in from all quarters; and the Orders in
Council were repealed, not to render justice to America,
but to rescue a large portion of the British people from
absolute starvation." Yet, notwithstanding all this, it is
stated in the document above alluded to, that, "-if the
Orders in Council had taken place sufficiently early to
have been communicated to the United States government before they had actually declared war, the repeal
of these decrees against neutral commerce would have
arrested the resort to arms ; and that one cause of the
war being removed, the other essential cause—the practice of impressment—would have been the subject of
renewed negotiation. But the declaration of war having
announced the practice of impressmait as one of the

THE LATE WAR.

13

principal causes, peace could only be the result of an express abandonment of that practice."
In opposition to the reasons assigned by the American
4overnment, it was stated in a speech of the Prince
Regent of Great Britain, bearing date the 9th day of
Ianuary, 1813, a few months after the declaration of
war, that " the real origin of the contest was to be found
n that spirit which had long unhappily actuated the coun..:ils of the United States : their marked partiality in palliating and assisting the aggressive tyranny of France ; their
systematic endeavor to influence the people against the
defensive measures of Great Britain, and their unworthy
desertion of the cause of other neutral nations. *

I. is through the prevalence of such councils that America
has been associated with France, and committed in war
against Great Britain. And under what conduct, on the
part of France, has the government of the United States
tints lent itself to the enemy ? The contemptuous violation of the treaty of the year 1800, between France
and the United States ; the treacherous seizure of all
American vessels and cargoes, in every harbor subject to
the control of the French arms ; the tyrannical principles
of the Berlin and Milan decrees, and the confiscations
under them ; the subsequent confiscations under the
Rambuoillet decree antedated or concealed to render it
more effectual ; the French commercial regulations,
which rendered the traffic of the United States with
France almost illusory ; the burning of the merchant
ships at sea, long after the alleged repeal of the French
decrees—all these acts of violence, on the part of France,
produced, from the government of the United States,
only such complaints as end in acquiescence and submission, or are accompanied by suggestions for enabling
France to give the semblance of legal form to her usurpations, by converting them into municipal regulations
This disposition of the government of the United States;
this complete subserviency to the ruler. of France ; this

14

ru mmy or

hostile temper towards Great Britain—are evident in
almost every page of the official correspondence of the
American with the French government, and form the
real cause of the present war between America and Great
Britain." Such might be said to form the prominent
features of the discordant views taken by the two governments, as regarded the conduct of each other, and from
which source emanated the incessant acrimony and recrimination that so strongly marked their diplomatic
relations for a number of years, and ultimately involved
the two nations in a most unnatural war.
But before we enter into details, it may not be improper in this place to take an impartial retrospect of the
causes which led to an even t so much lamented by
the enlightened men of both countries, that we may be
the better enabled to decide upon the justice of those
pretensions held out by the executive of each nation,
and to those who have been accustomed to hear only the
one side of the qugation it will be especially inStructive

TIlE LATE WAR.

15

CHAPTER H.
Oanciliatury Disposition of the British Government towards America—Reasons fur the same—An uncommonly
hOstile Dispusitionmanifesied by the American Government towards Great Britain—Reasons for the same—
Grand commercial Treaty between Great Britain and
France, before the Revohtion—Commercial Treaty
completely overthrown on the Accession of BuonaparteThe unrivalled commercial Greatness of Great Britain,
cause of bitter nortif...:ation :9 France.*
IT seems to be a g.meral opinion that the Americans,
whether right or w rong on the principles of public law
ou which they so obstinately insisted, (a point which
shall be afterwards examined,) Might have brought
matters to an amicable arrangement, without any material
sacrifice even of the doubtful maxims for which they
contended ; for never wai the spirit of conciliation carried farther than by the British government in its
intercourse with the ministers of the United States.

England bad many obvious reasons for endeavoring to
avert the calamities of an American war at this period :
she was engaged in a very arduous contest in Europe ;
she had the most numerous and formidable enemies to
contend with ; she had the interests of her commerce to
maintain, which are always dependent, in some degree,
On a friendly contr.:et:on with America ; and she had,
In order to preclude the necessity of referring to notes for
the authorities from whence the following, on the events of the
war, has been chiefly collected, which in such a work (especially)
is eminently calculated to confuse an ordinary reader ; it. is conceived most proper in this place to state, that amongst the British
and American periodicals and other publications of the day in
which theoccurrencet noticed transpired, the Annual Register,
Niles' Weekly Register, &e
&c. have largely contributed
their portion.

16

HISTORY OF

moreover a natural and generous aversion to conquer, before she could bring herself to draw the sword against a
people connected with her by a resemblance of language, laws and institutions. These were motives sufficiently powerful to have restrained English ministers,
even if they had not been otherwise remarkable for
madness and forbearance. Had the principles of international law, which were invariably- advanced by the
Americans, been as sound as an impartial examination
of them may perhaps sliew that they were unreasonable,
still it would have been in the power of America, had
she sincerely desired peace, to have preserved it by an
honorable compromise on those points which bad created
the greatest difference of opinion, or almost by any thing
short of an absolute surrender of the rights and honour
of Great Britain, which it was rather too much in any
people to expect. But if there be any one point hi recent history which even the arts of faction cannot involve
in doubt, it is this : that the government of America was
not sincerely desirous of peace with Great Britain ; that
it took all possible means to disturb the moderation and
provoke the anger of the British ministers ; and that
upon all occasions it betrayed symptoms of the most unaccountable partiality to the despotism of France ; those
who studied the history of American affairs for three or
four years immediately preceding the declaration of war
against Great Britain, are well aware of the grounds on
which this opinion is formed ; and a very singular inquiry
thus suggests itself, how it should have happened, that
the only republican government in the world, should, at
the greatest crisis of affairs, have combined with the most
odious of despotisms against a country which had always
been recognised as an illustrious model of practical freedom, and which was, at this very moment, engaged in a
grand effort to vindicate the independence of nations.
In attempting to account for this singular political
phenomenon, something undoubtedly must be allowed
for the yet unextinguished spirit of animosity produced

THE LATE WAR.

17

by our unfortunate colonial war. It may probably be
supposed that such antiquated prejudices had long ere
the period at which the war commenced, become the
exclusive property of the vulgar ; and must have given
way in the minds of enlightened men, to considerations
more recent in point of time, and more important in their
practical influence on American affairs. It is an undeniable fact however, that the government of the United
States is, to a more than ordinary degree, under the discipline and control of the rabble ; and if indeed there be
any truth in tile common speculation as to the motives of
their hostility towards Great Britain, it must be very far
gone in vulgar absurdity. National prejudices so discriminating and so mischievous, are every where but in
America confined to the lowest order of men ; they have
long been banished out of the more respectable circles
even of private life, and could never find their way into
the councils of a great European state, without devoting
it to the supreme and unsparing contempt, and ridicule
of its neighbors.
With the narrow contracted prejudices of the American democracy, other causes undoubtedly conspired to
accelerate a rupture with England. The commercial
system, that miserable tissue of blunders, which had so
long and so effectually kept down the growing prosperity
of Europe, had been wisely exploded by the most enlightened European nations before the revolution of France.
The enlarged views and superior talents of those political
philosophers who diffused a radiance round the close of
the last century, had completely triumphed over every
obstacle which ignorance and prejudice could oppose ; and England and France at last discovered that
they had a mutual interest in the commercial greatness
of each other. They did more than this ; they reduced
their principles to practice, and embodied them in a
treaty, which, if not unexceptionable in all respects, was
at least, a great step towards the triumph of genuine philosophy over the errors and absurdities of the old political
B2

18

HISTORY OF

school. The French revolution, however, deranged all
the plans of enlightened men ; it engendered a rancour
and animosity between the nations more violent and
pernicious than the ancient jealousies of the commercial
system, and terminated at last in a despotism, which
threw France and her dependencies far back in the scale
of improvement.
The commercial system was revived by the new French
government, with a barberous and destructive fury,
which had never been contemplated at any former period ; the refined and generous principles which so
many eminent men had contributed to establish, were
forgotten ; their works were neglected or proscribed ; the
progress of human improvement was arrested, all seemed
about to be sacrificed to the rude genius of an overwhelming despotism. As a truce with that crafty and
despotic usurper who had now gained such an absolute
ascendancy over the destinies of the French nation,
was never any thing more than his passive submission
to necessity, until he could recover himself from some
untoward dilemma into which his folly and ambition
had brought him ; so was it soon discovered to be the
case with the peace of Amiens. His invincibles had
been driven, by the British troops, from the shores of
Egypt ; his fleets had been either taken or locked up in
French ports by the immortal Nelson and his compatriots ; and, in order to recover himself, he is induced
to accept of the terms of what is called the Treaty of
Amiens ; but reckless of all good faith, it was scarcely
promulgated to the world, until every term of that
treaty was violated, and Europe again convulsed by a
relentless war. But even during the short interval
of repose which succeeded the treaty of Amiens, the
maxims of the new government were sufficiently indicated in the impolitic restraints and prohibitions by which
the commercial intercourse of the countries was fettered.
England, however, in all this, never pretended that such
measures afforded a legitimate ground for hostilities

THE LATE WAR.

19

since every nation being supreme within itself, has a
right to determine whether it shall or shall not receive
the commodities of foreign states ; but if the commercial
mimosity of France could not have justified England in
leclaring war, it certainly afforded her a just and solid
ground for entertaining jealousy against a power thus
hostile to her interests, and called upon her to watch all
the proceedings of that power with the most scrupulous
vigilance.
The unrivalled commercial greatness, to which
England had arisen, at this time, surpassing all
what history had ever recorded at any preceding
period, and all that even the most flattering visions
of her statesmen had ever contemplated, was an
object of bitter and increasing mortification to the politicians of France ; her naval supremacy, which was
founded on the prosperity of her commerce, and promised
for it an indefinite duration, filled their minds with jealousy and apprehension. These feelings rose to the
highest pitch after the peace of Amiens. Europe seemed to learn, for the first time, that the commercial grandeur
of England possessed a stability which had never been
supposed to belong to this species of power. It had withstood the shock of the most extended and desolating
warfare ; and at the close of a contest of long duration
and unparalleled fury, in which the empire had sometimes contend with the combined energies of Europe, it not
only remained untouched but had mightily extended
itself during every year of hostility. The war had terminated in the establishment of a naval power, which
had gathered strength by all the efforts made to weaken
it ; and had now risen to that proud eminence, which bid
defiance to all rivalry. The rulers of France reflected on
these matters with bitterness corresponding to the disappointment of their hopes ; they despaired of being able
for this enormous power by any ordinary efforts ; and
could think of no way by which its further growth
might be checked, but by the entire sacrifice of their

20

HISTORY OF

commerce and resources. They hoped that by excluding
the productions of British industry from their ports, and
by prohibiting the use of British commodities throughout
France and her dependencies, they might gradually
undermine this overgrown power ; while their depraved
policy at the same time sought to inculcate a belief
among their subjects, that such measures would promote
the industry of France. Thus was a system established,
(if indeed so rude and impolitic a thing deserve the
name,) in direct opposition to all the views of modern
science ; a system, which was in truth but a barbarous
extension of the old theories, that so many enlightened
men had endeavored to banish for ever from the world.

THE LATE WAR.

21

CHAPTER III.
The Relation in which the affairs of America stood with
those of France as regarded Great Britain,—Great
Britain fully succeeds in annihilating the Commerce &c
of France merely by following the footsteps of that Government—Issuing of the " Berlin Decree"—That
Decree executed with inexorable Force—Passing of the
British" Orders in Council" in retaliation—The Orders in Council fully justified by the Law of Nations—
Blockade of the British Islands an open Violation of
the Law of Nations—Rights of Neutral Nations the
sane in War as in Peace.
ME measures adopted by France, as set forth in the
foregoing chapter,had a twofold connection with the affairs
of America. In the first place, the American statesman
entertained much the same feelings with respect to the
commercial and naval greatness of England with their
friends in France ; their understandings were in general
of the same character, and their tempers equally as violent. They, as well as the French politicians, wished
to render their country great by commerce ; and as the
established ascendancy of Great Britain appeared to
them to stand in their way, they scrupled not about the
means which might be employed to remove it. Their
minds were not susceptible of a generous emulation, ;
envy was the only feeling which a near view of the naval and commercial greatness of England could excite in
their bosoms. They had no dread of France, who had
in the course of the war lost her commerce, her colonies
and her ships ; whose power never came into contact
with their own ; whose resources of all kinds were exclusively devoted in the prosecution of a war, in the
result of which, they vainly thought that America had
no interest. But they hated England, her commerce
and her power, as cordially even as the members of the

HISTORY OF

THE LATE WAR.

French government did : and had America been as little
dependent on commerce as, France, had her citizens been
as indifferent to its real interests, or had her rulers possessed the same despotic sway over their fortunes, which
the French government had assumed over those of its
own subjects, it is probable that Mr. Madison and his
auxiliaries would at once have followed the example of
Buonaparte, by prohibiting all commercial intercourse
with the British empire. But the Americans had not
yet been wholly overawed by theiriulers ; and it became
necessary to pursue a more indirect and insidious course
with them, than that which had been followed by Buonaparte in his dealings With a people whom he had
entirely sUbdued.

moment when the fleets of Great Britain actually blockaded all the ports of France and her dependencies.
Neutral vessels bound to, or returning from a British
port, were made liable to capture by this singular decree
Matters remained for some time in this state, the French
ruler being unable to execute his decree, and the British
government being averse to advance further in so barbarous a warfare. But having again proved successful
in his northern campaign. Buonaparte resumed with
fresh vigor his prohibitory system ; he confirmed all the
provisions of the Berlin Decree ; excluded the merchan
dize of Great Britain and her dependencies, and
accompanied these prohibitions with the severest penalties.

22

The measures pursued by France in the execution of
her anti-commercial system, suspended for a while the
international law of Europe, and afforded to the rulers of
America the pretext which they had sa long di sired, for
gratifying their animosity against England. The commercial hostility of France during the peace, although
never considered by Great Britain as a ground for war,
was not however forgotten when hostiliCes were renewed:
and the English ministers therefore determined to employ
the naval power which was at their command, to the
annihilation of the foreign commerce of their enemy.
These measures Were such as the interests of the British
empire demanded, and which a state of hostility fully
justified ;' and they completely sucecded in accomplishing the object which they had in view. The foreign
commerce of France was annihilated ; her industry
checked ; her resources wasted ; and her ruler discovered,
when it was too late, how gross were the errors which
he had committed. It was however, impossible to retract ; and he resolved to carry his commercial war to
the Utmost pitch of fury. In this temper did Buonaparte
issue his famous Berlin Decree , which renewed all the
old prohibitory regulations, and ludicrously declared the
British Islands to be in a state of blockade, at the very
-

23

Every article of British produce was searched for,
seized and committed to the flames ; while the most cruel punishments were inflicted on the subjects of France,
who dared to violate these arbitrary laws. This violent
system had now reached its height, and it seemed to be
the determination of the French ruler to have it executed with the utmost rigor ; the British government, therefore, could no longer, either in prudence or honour, delay
the retaliation which its power enabled it to inflict.
The famous Orders in Council were therefore issued ;
all trade to France or her dependencies was strictly
prohibited ; all vessels, of whatever nation, which ventured to engage in this trade, were declared liable to
seizure, and France and her dependencies were thus
reduced to that state of blockade, with which she had
vainly threatened the British Islands. The Orders in
Council admitted but of one single exception to this
general blockade of the French empire. The French
decrees had declared all vessels liable to seizure which
had touched at a British port, the Orders in Council, to
counteract this provision, declared, on the other hand,
that only such ships as were in that situation should be
permitted,to sail for France. Thus did the utter extinction of the foreign trade of France result as a natural

24

HISTORY OF

consequence of the very measures of her own government; measures, which no despotism, how ignorant
soever, would have ventured to adopt, had it not trusted
to a power which effectually silenced all popular
opinion.
Two questions have been put on these Orders in
Council, were they founded in justice, and were they
supported by reasons of expediency ? On the first point,
with which alone foreign powers had any concern, the
advocates of these measures had a very easy task to
perform ; for nothing surely can be more obvious to those
who know any thing of the law. of nations, than the
right of Great Britain to retaliate on her enemies their own
violence and injustice. What has been called the rule
1756, forms the first link in that chain of commercial
restrictions, which in the sequel became so complicated ;
and the perfect equity of this rule has always appeared
manifest to the most enlightened minds. France, like
the other European powers who possessed distant colonies, endeavored to secure for herself the monopoly of
their markets ; and during peace strictly prohibited all
strangers from carrying on trade with them. When she
goes to war with England, however, the superiority of
her enemy's naval power compels her to relax the rigour
of her colonial policy ; and she is willing that neutral
vessels should bring home the produce of her American
settlements. By the interference of these neutrals,
however, the British are manifestly deprived of the
advantages which their naval power would otherwise
secure to them ; of the chance of captures, and the
certainty of reducing colonies without striking a blow.
But no neutral can, upon any pretext, claim greater
Advantages after, than she enjoyed before the war ; she
has, a right to insist that her relative condition to the
belligerents shall not be rendered worse by the hostilities
in which they may engage, but she can have no right to
demand that it should be improved. By admission,

25

THE LATE WAR.

however, to the colonial trade of France during war,
a trade from which neutrals are excluded by France
herself during peace, the condition of the neutral is
manifestly improved ; it is improved at the expense of
England, who is deprived of the chance of captures and
conquests, which her power would otherwise give her ;
and it is improved to the great gain of France, whom
the interference of neutrals protects against the overwhelming power of her enemy. There can be no doubt
as to the equity of the rule of the war 1756, that rule
of which France and America have so loudly complained. The Orders in Council of January, 1807,
which was not issued till after the Berlin Decree had
been published by Buonaparte, was also justifiable on
the very same principles ; it went merely to exclude
neutrals during war from a branch of the enemy's trade
to which they had no access in time of peace. So far
then the measures adopted by the British government
rested on the clearest principles of international law.
And what were the measures adopted by France ?
had they any foundation in the acknowledged principles
and usages of public law ? The decree of Berlin prohibited all commerce in British commodities ; France
indeed had a right to do this, however fatal the
measure might be to her own interest, and that of her
dependencies ; and had the Berlin Decree gone no
further, although it might have had the effect of embittering the hostile spirit of the two countries, it neither
could have justified, nor would it have been met by any
specific act of retaliation on the part of England. But
the French ruler, in a moment of despair, ventured to
declare the British islands in a state of blockade, and to
interdict all neutrals from trading with a British port.
This was a violent infringement of the law of nations ; a
daring insult on neutral rights ; an act of mad injustice,
which loudly called upon all parties to avenge themselves
of its authors. The honour of Great Britain pre-emineatly demanded that she should repel this outrage

THE LATE WAR.

HISTORY OF

26

with becoming spirit ; and although she at first seemed
willing to treat so impotent a measure with contempt
alone, and to wait its result on the conduct of America,
ydait will not be denied that the right still remained to
her of ' exercising retaliation when the proper season
should arrive. The date of the publication of the Milan
Decree appeared to her to be that season ; time enough
had been allowed to the different neutral powers to
remonstrate against the enemy ; they had failed to improve the opportunity afforded them ; and England
could no longer remain silent when a new decree was
issued, more unjust and insulting than its predecessor,
more absurd and barbarous than any thing which had
ever occurred among civilized nations. She therefore,
issued her Orders in Council, which in effect reduced
the French empire to a state of blockade, and cut off the
whole commerce which neutral nations had hitherto
ea ad on with the enemy. Of these measures France
of course had no right to complain, and a very little
reflection will suffice to chew that if America had any
just grounds of remonstrance, she should have offered
them to France alone, and not to England, against whom
she was so prompt to bring forward her accusations.
.

27

the enemy, and that of course, they were to be treated
in the same way as if they had actually declared war
against the nation to whose interests they stood opposed.
It was on some principle of this kind, that he declared
the ships, of all neutrals which submitted to what he
called the tyranny of the English, denationalized—an
uncouth and barbarous word invented to serve the occasion of these unhappy times, when Europe was no longer
under the guidance of wise and sound principles.
To submit to any thing which France pretended to
call a departure from the international law of Europe,
was therefore held sufficient to denationalize the ships
of neutral powers ; and although the application of this
principle may frequently have been erroneous, there-eau
be no doubt that the principle itself was just. If France
violated the law of nations, as she unquestionably did
by her Berlin Decree ; and if America calmly acquiesced
in this insulting invasion of her rights, there can be no
sort of doubt that she thus made herself a party in the
quarrel which France had with England; that she in
effect conspired with the common enemy, and that her
ships were, to use the jargon of the French government,
clearly d-nationalized." Had England therefore meditated hostility towards America ; had she been anxious
to avail herself of a pretext for a quarrel ; had she been
desirous of exacting from a secret enemy the full penalties of her accession to the cause of the other belligerent ;
slie might very well have proceeded, on the simple fact
of American acquiescence in French violence, at once to
have treated the Americans as enemies.
-

44

France was the first of the belligerents to violate the
law of nations. She issued the Berlin Decree, and followed it up by the other, dated at :Milan, by both of
whieh, the Americans and all other neutrals were prevented from maintaining their usual intercourse with
England. These measures were in their principle a
direct invasion of neutral Tights, and it was therefore the
duty of neutral powers to have remonstrated against
them with firmness. But America did not thus resist ;
and she in this manner committed herself with the enemy.
It was a principle tenaciously maintained by Buonaparte
on all occasions, that those who did not resist an injury
offered them 13by either of the belligerents, were no
longer to be considered as neutrals ; that by their acquiescence, they made themselves parties' to the cause of

A candid exposition, therefore, of the rights and duties
of belligerents and neutrals, must completely exculpate
England from all blame in issuing her Orders in Council.
It is the doctrine of all jurists, that the rights of neutrals
during war are exactly the same as during peace ; the
neutral powers are entitled to demand of either belligerents that in their intercourse with the other, they shall

28

HISTORY OP

not be subjected to greater restraints than they experienced during a season of tranquility ; but no neutral is,
by any means, entitled to require more than this, or can
expect that a belligerent should sacrifice to the convenience of the neutral, any of the just rights she may
acquire by a state of war. The principle of this doctrine
is obvious ; no nation can expect that a foreign power is
to sacrifice its own immediate interest to her convenience
or advantage. When we come to consider these general principles, with reference to the case of America,
their force seems to be irresistable. Suppose that America
had been entirely out of the question, that her nams
were unknown in Europe, and that she had still remained
in her ancient state of dependence on the British empir e ;
5. .11;17ti5e for a moment, that the question had arisen
entirely between Great Britain and France ; that Franco
had violated the law of nations, by presuming to declare
the British islands in a state of blockade, and then let
any impartial person say what is the policy which Great
Britain would have been entitled and called upon to
pursue ? She would clearly and evidently have had a
right to do the same thing to France, which France had
attempted to do to her, that is, she would have been
entitled to declare the French empire in a state of blockade with all possible vigor. Such then was her undoubted
right ; and will it be pretended that America—that a
foreign nation was entitled to interfere with her, in the
exercise of her rights ? It is of no importance to the
thing in hand to enquire, whether the blockade of France
was, or was not, on the whole beneficial to England ;
that was a matter for England alone to consider ; it was
a question with which America had no sort of concern ;
and it is of the rights of America alone that we now
speak. America, then, had no right to complain of the
exercise of the powers which England possessed by her
superiority, as one of the great European belligerents ;
which she derived immediately from that state of hostilities, in which she, and not America, was inolved, and
1

THE LATE will.

2'3

which, of course, she had a right to improve to her own
advantage, and the annoyance of her enemies.
There is still another light in which this momentous
question may be considered, with reference to the established law of nations. It is in the power of England
to exclude America or any other nation from trading
with herself, and it is in the power of France to do
the same. Suppose, then, that both nations had mutually agreed to treat America in this manner, could
she have ventured to complain ? But it is the same
thing whether these powers do so directly, and in conjunction, or indirectly by means not less efficacious;
whether they exclude the Americans by the operation
of a peaceful league between themselves, or by
series of measures adopted during war. If France,
by attempting to exclude all neutrals from British
ports, communicated to her enemies a right to retaliate,
can the Americans interfere ; or are they in a worse
condition than if the belligerents had separately, and
in a.time of profound peace, determined to renounce all
commercial intercourse with them ? Surely not ;
they could not, with the slightest appearance of justice, complain ; they could not demand that their
condition should be improved by a state of European
warfare ; they could not claim the forbearance of
England towards her enemies, for the sole purpose of
confernng a favor upon neutrals; they could not, in
short, upon any sound principle, object to the Orders
in Council.
Different opinions were entertained on the question as to their expediency ; and although these famous
measures are said to have been, in the first instance,
strongly pressed upon ministers by the mercantile interest, there can be no doubt that the government was
in some measure deserted by this powerful body, before the Orders in Council were finally repealed. The
discussions which at intervals ensued on this subject,
C2

30

ISIS-TO RY OV

were signalized by the uncommon zeal and acuteness of the advocates on both sides ; and an account.
of them, in the order in which they occurred, will, it
is believed, form an interesting subject to introduce
the history of the war, and will tend to exhibit the
agitated state of the public mind on this question, at
this period in Great Britain; and show from whence
the American government inferred the extreme poverty
of the British mercantile and manufacturing interests,
from the effect of those edicts.

THE LAT& WAR.

34

CHAPTER IV.
An extremely hostile Disposition manifested towards
Great Britain by the President and Congress of
the United States—Affectatio n
of Impartiality in
the Discussions of the American Congress, on the
Conduct of Great Britain and France—Ef
ect produced on the public Mind in England, in Consequence
of the hostile Attitude America had assumed—Serious affair between the crews of two French Privateers
Si American Seamen at the Port of Savannah—Vaunting Language of America—Implicit Confidence of the
British Government in the Loyalty and firm Attachment of the People of Canada—That Confidence
confirmed—Various .Discussions in England • on the
Propriety or impropriety of going to War with
America.
f

ALTHOUGH
the question arising out of the Orders in
Council formed, at first, the chief subjct of dispute
between Great Britain and America, yet many other
points,, in the course of discussion, were introduced,
scarcely less dfficult of arrangement. At the meeting of the
American congress, in the end of the preceding year, the
speech delivered by the president gave evident indications
of a very hostile spirit towards Great Britain ; and as
this speech was followed by a report of the select com
mittee of congress for foreign affairs, which was no less
warlike, the hopes which had been entertained of an
amicable arrangement seemed to vanish. The committee, with a
wonderful affectation of impartiality,
began by a general complaint as to the wrongs which
America had sustained, both from France and England,
in the seizure of the property of the citizens of the
United States, when peaceably pursuing their lawful
commerce on the high seas; and reprobated the defence
which had been offered by each party, that its acts
-

32

HISTORY Of

of violence were merely retaliatory, on similar acts
committed by its antagonist. The Americans, it was
said, violently assailed, by both these European States,
withdrew their citizens ' and property from the ocean,
expecting redress from the justice of the belligerents;
but having failed in this object, they had recourse to
the non-intercourse and non-importation laws. To induce the European powers to return to a system of justice,
they had offered commercial advantages to the belligerent
which should first revoke its commercial edicts; and had
to impose more severe restrictions on the other. But
here did the mask fall to the ground ; here did all semblance of impartiality cease, from the report ; which proceeded to announce that France, profiting by the friendly
offers of the United States, had, on the 1st November,
1810, declared the repeal of the decree of Berlin ; that
the British were thus bound to Lave revoked their Orders
in Council, but instead of this, they had advanced still
bolder pretensions; they had affected to deny the practical extinction of the French decrees, and had insisted
that France should renounce the whole system of her
commercial warfare against Great Britain, of which
these decrees originally formed a part. That the exclusion of British produce and manufactures from France
and the states in alliance with her, was a means of commercial warfare with which the United States had no
concern ; and that France would never concede to the
unauthorised demands of America, those rights which
she considered as the most powerful engine of the war ;
that the outrages of England had not been confined to
the commerce alone of the United states ; that by the
seizure of American seamen, which was still carried en
with unabated rigor and severity, the greatest insult was
offered to America ; and that the only question now
was, whether the Americans should tamely submit, or
resist by those means which circumstances had placed
within their reach. That it had now become the sacred
duty of Congress to call forth the patriotism and resources of the country ; and the committee, therefore,

THE LATE WAR.

33

earnestly recommended, " That the United States be
immediately put in an armour and attitude demanded by
the crisis, and corresponding with the national spirit and
expectations."
As soon as the accounts of the warlike preparations
in America were made known in Great Britain, it became an universal opinion that war with that country
was now inevitable. The report of the committee of
Congress certainly breathed an uncommonly hostile spirit
towards England, and left no room to expect an amicable or conciliatory arrangement. Its reasonings were
wholly founded on the assumption that the prohibitory
decrees of France had really been repealed, Whilst the
daily conduct of that power, and the experience of the
government of America, positively and peremptorily
contradicted that assumption.* The committee attempted
to avail themselves of a captious and quibbling distinction between the international law asserted by France,
and the municipal regulations established for the government of the commerce of that country ; still the French
government continued to declare that no British goods
*The justice and fairness which have been evinced on the
part of the United States towards France, both before and since
the revocation of her decrees, authorised an expectation that her
government would have followed up that measure by all such
others as were due to our reasonable claims, as well as dictated
by its amicable professions. No proof, however, is yet given of
an intention to repair the wrongs done to the United States ; and
particularly to restore the great amount of American property
seized and condemned under edicts, which, though not affecting
our neutral relations, and therefore not entering into the question
between the United States and other belligerents, were nevertheless founded in such unjust principles that the reparation ought to
have been prompt and ample.
in addition to this, and other demands of strict right, on that
nation, the United States have much reason to be dissatisfied
with the rigorous and unexpected restrictions to which their trade
with the French dominions had been subjected.

President's Message to Congress, 5th Nor. 1E311.

HISTORY OF

3-4

should be admitted into French ports, notwithstanding
that these goods may have become the property of neutrals ;
thus were the Americans completely shut out from a
branch of commerce, of the peaceful enjoyment of
which they had long been in possession, and in which,
df course, they had an undoubted right to engage. Even
though the Berlin and Milan decrees had, as far as regarded their practical operation on the great high way
of nations, been fairly revoked, yet their principle was
still retained, to a degree which not only called upon
neutrals generally to protest against them, but on account
of their practical bearing on America, particularly, demanded from them a firm and decided resistance. The
British government did not insist, as was vainly affected
to be believed by the committee, that America should at
any time interfere with the domestic regulations of
France ; but she certainly insisted that America should
not, by lending herself to the enemy, or by passively
submitting to conditions which had never until now
been imposed upon any neutral nation on earth. Nothing
could, probably, more forcibly exhibit the hostile disposition of America towards Great Britain, and her servile
duplicity towards the ruler of France, than her submission to the blockade of the British Islands—an act of
the French emperor which America herself had declared
to be an open violation of the public law of nations,
and when France did not employ a single vessel to
enforce it. Even though the decrees of France had
therefore been rescinded, that repeal must have been
totally nugatory, since, by a municipal regulation which
America strenuously defended, a palpable violation df
the rights of neutral nations was still committed ; neutrals *ere still coMpelled to comply with the measures
of France, to the injury of British commerce ; thus
proclaiming to the world a principle of ,a description
altogether nevi and extravagant. From all these it may
be fairly seen that America had no grounds whatever,
except her base traffic with the French ruler, for declaring
war against Great Britain; nor were they warranted by
-

THE LATE WAR.

36

an exposition of their finances to hazard a proceeding
so violent and unjust.
During the time that the American legislature was
engaged denouncing in the severest terms the injustice
of Great Britain, and apologizing .for the outrages of
France, an affair of a very serious nature occurred at
Savannah, which had nearly opened the eyes of
America to the insolence of the French towards a nation
which had so completely debased itself by its servile
compliance to the measures of that government. One
evening, about the middle of November, 1811, as two
French privateers were lying in the port abovementioned, a reucontre took place between a party of American
seamen and a party of the crews of the French privateers, in which three of the Americans were stabbed
and severely wounded. The American seamen then in
the port, being highly exasperated at the conduct of the
French, rose, en masse, with a full determination to
revenge themselves by the destruction of the privateers ;
they, therefore, in pursuance of this design, seized and
set fire to one of them and burnt her to the water's
edge. The other privateer was immediately taken possession of, by a party of the Savannah volunteers, who
protected her until between eleven and twelve o'clock
at night, at which time the American sailors procured a
lighter-boat, filled her with tar and various combustible
materials, towed her along-side the remaining privateer
to which they made her fast, and then set her on fire,
which soon forced the guard to abandon their charge,
which was speedily destroyed. In this instance, amongst
many others, the French were unquestionably the aggressors; their arrogance and insolence towards America
on every occasion became absolutely past endurance ;
yet had not the spirit of the people urged them here to
redress their own wrongs, it is more than probable that
the government, as in circumstances of a similar nature,
would never have thought of interfering.

36

THE LATE' WAR.

RISTORY OF

The sentiments which were contained in the report of
the committee of the legislature, before alluded to, were
violently supported in the House of Representatives ;
and it was actually declared by one speaker in that house,
to be the unanimous opinion of that committee, " That
the encroachments of Great Britain were such as to demand war, as the only alternative by which to obtain
justice." Others of the members dilated largely on the
power whict America possessed to harass and annoy
Great Britain both by sea and land ; that it was in their
power completely to exhaust her colonies, and to annihilate her trade by an active system of privateering. Their
vanity even carried them so far as to boast of the easy
conquest would be made of Canada—a threat which at all
times excited ridicule in Great Britain, knowing well
how strongly the people were attached to the laws and
institutions of the mother country. Indeed so well were
the British government aware of the loyalty and valor
of the brave yeomanry of Canada, that she actually
risked the salvation of the country from the grasp of the
enemy into their hands ; and well was that confidence
repaid, for they actually appeared to rejoice iu suffering
every description of privation, to afford them an opportunity of harassing and finally repelling the proud invader in every incursion he made. There were, however,
still to be found, in England, many persons who highly
deprecated a war with America, as one of the greatest
evils which could befal that country ; and who, notwithstanding the length to which the vanity of America had
carried her in her unreasonable demands, still entertained
a hope that hostilities might yet be averted. No person
could certainly have felt a desire of having a war with
America, merely on its own account ; but at this period
it was impossible to discover by what means the calamities of a war could be avoided, consistent with the honor
of the British nation, when the absurd pretensions of
the government of America were taken into consideration.

rrtt

37

They had, at various periods, made use of the language
of defiance, daily boasting of the ability they possessed
of utterly destroying the commerce of Great Britain, and
of their power of conquering Canada ; all considerations
were therefore set aside, and on war they were fully
resolved. Under such circumstances, for Great Britain to have succumbed would have been a sacrifice of
her honor, inasmuch as it would have been yielding to
menace and insult of the most degrading kind. It would
have been no better than cowardice of the most dastardly
description, for Great Britain to have rescinded her
Orders in Council at this period ; and it was a fact
proved to a demonstration, that America never intended
to stop here, or the French emperor did not intend to
allow her to rest satisfied with this concession. The
ministers of the British nation therefore determined to
act upon the principle so elegantly unfolded by Mr.
Burke : " That in small, weakly states, a timely compromise has often been the means, and the only means,
of drawing out their puny existance. But a great state
is too much envied, too much dreaded, to find safety in
humiliation. To be secure, it must be respected'
Power, and eminence, and consideration, are things not
to be begged ; they must be commanded ; and they who
supplicate for mercy from others, can never hope for
justice through themselves." The conduct of the British
ministers, however, in this affair, was not altogether
undeserving of reprehension : they had determined,
through the semblance of fear, to make no concession to
America, and thereby cast on that country the odium of
first having recourse to arms. Yet after that nation had
declared her unalterable resolution for war, and adding
that, notwithstanding this, she was determined to wait
until her preparations were esaplete, for Britain to allow
her time for such preparationb., and not strike the blow
at an enemy whom, from the most palpable evidence,
she had ever suspected of the basest political treachery

38

HISTORY OY

THE LATE %VAL

39

all the diplomatic relations which occurred between

in
the two countries, and whom she knew to be irreconcilably bitter end rancorous, was honorable to a fault.
such
To have attacked them at such a time and under wis e
circumstances, would have been a policy both
and vigorous.

CHAPTER V.
Motion made in the House of Commons, by Mr. Whitbread, for Copies of official correspondence between
British and American Ministers, to be laid before the
House—Charges in Mr. Whitbread's Speech against
British Ministers, for Inattention and Incivility in
their Intercourse with those of America—Mr. Whitbread's Motion strenuously opposed in the House of
f.
Commons—The Charges against British Ministers by
Mr. Whitbread rebutted—Mr. Whitbread's Motion in
the house put and negatived.
IN order, however, to avert the calamities naturally
attendant on a state of hostilities with America, it was
moved in the House of Commons on the 13th of February, by Mr. Whitbread, " That a humble address be
presented to the Prince Regent, praying that he would
give directions to lay before the House copies of all correspondence which had passed between the British and
American ministers, from the 1st of January, 1810, bo
the latest period, together with the documents referred
to in the correspondence. It was urged by Mr. Whitbread, In support of this measure, " That although the
governments of -both countries had, from the beginning,
professed to be actuated by the most friendly and
conciliatory dispositions towards each other, the breach
between Great Britain and America had been widening
from day to day, till it appeared that war between the
two countries must be the inevitable consequence of the
perseverance of England in her present system ; that the
information demanded by this motion was already before
the whole world, with the exception of the two houses
of parliament ; that it had been the practice of the
House, when she entertained suspicions that the business of the state was not well conducted, to require
information from the executive power ; and that the

40

HISTORY OF

only ground upon which such information had ever been
refused was that a disclosure might disturb or impede
the impending negotiations ; as the information required
was already before the world, no such plea could in this
case be offered."
" From a perusal of the papers, it appeared that the
conduct of those who managed the negotiations had
been very culpable, yet it was impossible to bring a
charge against them until the documents were produced.
The British ministers at home had behaved with the
greatest inattention to the American envoy, and had
shown a neglect amounting to diplomatic incivility,
while our ministers in the United States have acted in a
manner scarcely less repulsive. The conduct of Mr.
Jackson and Mr. Foster, while in America, had not
been conciliatory ; while the correspondence of Marquis
Wellesley with Mr. Pinkney, which commenced in
January, 1809, and terminated in February, 1810, had
been such as to raise the indignation of the American
government. The behaviour of Mr. Pinkney, on the
other hand, had been deserving of great praise. When
he entered on the duties of his mission, a strong feeling
existed in America in consequence of what had occurred
in the course of Mr. Jackson's embassay ; and the
Americans were naturally anxious as to the character of
the person who was to be named by Great Britain to
renew the negotiation. On the 2nd of January, 1809,
Mr. Pinkney again wrote to the Marquis Wellesley on
the subject, but no answer was given to this letter till the
14th of March. On the 15th, Mr. Pinkney again wrote
to Lord Wellesley respecting the English system of
blockade, a subject most interesting to America ; but to
this letter he did not receive an answer for more than a
fortnight. On the 30th of April, Mr. Pinkney wrote to
Lord Wellesley on the subject of the Berlin and Milan
decrees, but to this letter he never received any answer
at all ; and a complaint which he made against the infamous practice of forging ships' papers in London, and

TILE LATE WAR.

41

making an open traffic of them, was treated with the
same neglect. That many other instances had occurred
in which the communications of the American minister
had been treated in a manner not less contemptuous, and
in particular to his letter of the 15th September to Lord
Wellesley, on the subject of the blockade of Elsineur
by Sir James Saumarez, and stating some circumstances
relating to the seizure of four American seamen in the
Viola, he received an imperfect answer only on the 6th
of December, which noticed the letter so far as it related to the blockade, but said nothing at all on the
subject of the impressment. That the latter subject
was one of the greatest delicacy ; and although the seamen had afterwards been released by virtue of a judgement of Sir William Scott, yet the secretary of state had
considered the original complaint as unworthy of his
notice. Such had been the conciliatory spirit of the
noble secretary, who permitted the sentence of a court
of justice to answer the communication of a foreign
minister, whom he himself would not take the trouble of
satisfying on so interesting a point. Although Mr. Pinkney had, on numerous occasions, addressed the British
minister on the subject of the Berlin and Milan decrees,
he had never received any satisfactory answer, and he
accordingly demanded his audience of leave."
,

"Little appeared to have been afterwards done towards
effecting the important objects which both governments
professed to have at heart. Mr. Foster had been sent
out with no new instructions ; he went to offer what had
been previously rejected, and to restate what had often
before been stated in vain, so that his mission was only
productive of disappointment. That it is of the utmost
Importance to conciliate America; this object might at
one time have been thought unattainable, but from some
measure recently adopted by Congress, for admitting.
British manufactures into the ports of the United States,
there was reason to believe that it was still the wish of
the Americans to avoid a rupture. The prosperity of.
D2

IIISTORY OT

TIIE LATE WAR.

America contributed largely to the welfare of this country; and that America had committed no fault, except
that, as she was placed in an extraordinary situation as
the only neutral in the world, she had endevored to
avail herself of the advantages her situation afforded.
The intelligence which had so recently been received
from America, made it more important than ever, thoroughly to consider this subject ; that the bill spoken of,
as likely to pa ss through Congress, would give umbrage
to France; and it was the duty of the British government to endeavor, by conciliation, to avail itself of any
difference of this kind, which might arise."

trade, nay, even the whole coasting trade of her
enemies. It was for America to decide the question of
peace or war ; she had adopted a new system, and
made new and unheard of pretentions, to which she
knew well that Great Britain never would, nay, consistent
with her honor, never could concede. By moving for
papers, it must be intended to create a discussion on
them when granted; yet any parliamentary discussion
which could take place on the subject, must necessarily
increase the irritation on both sides. The spirit of
conciliation always professed in the diplomatic correspondence, between the two countries, had been most sincere
on our side ; but the British government would never
abandon these maritime rights, which the country had
so long maintained, and which were necessary to her
greatness. The Marquis Wellesly had acted wisely
in declining to go into details as to the principles of the
blockade which we were called upon to abandon. The
first letter of Mr. Pinkney, alluded to in the debate,
had been written for the purpose merely of asking Lord
Wellesley some questions on this point ; but the British
government was determined not to confound with the
discussion on the Orders in Council, this question of
blockade ; and therefore it was absurd to suppose that.
England should stand ready to declare to France how
much of her rights she would surrender, in order to
purchase for the Americans a revocation of the tyrannical and obnoxious edicts of Buouaparte. As to the
letter of Mr. Pinkney, on the subject of the recall of
Mr. Jackson, which was said, with so much emphasis,
not to have been answered by Lord Wellesley, the
American minister himself had, in his correspondence
with his own government, stated that he had had communications with Lord Wellesley- on the subject, and
repeated opportunities of personal intercourse ; and that
he had been informed by his lordship, and had no
doubt of the fact, that a minister would be sent out to
America without delay. If the letter had not been
formally answered, therefore, the omission was fully

42

Several members strongly opposed the motion of
Mr. Whitbread for the production of the copies of the
correspondence between the two governments, and he
and his friends were highly censured for the allegations
they had brought against the government of Great
Britain, regarding their conduct towards America, and
on their strict adherence to the Orders in Council.
" The British government," said they, " instead of having acted unjustly towards America, had the strongest
case against that power, that one nation ever had against
another; no benefit could result from a premature agitation, in the House of Commons, of the differences between the two countries; but, on the contrary, the
greatest inconvenience and mischief might thus be
produced. government had uniformly expressed but
one sentiment in regard to the dispute with America,
and was sincerely desirous that a war with that country
might be avoided, if that could be done without injury
to the maritime rights of Great Britain, which never
could be yielded to the pretensions of France. The
prosperity of America was not so essential to the welfare of Great Britain as many persons affected to imagine ;
all the predilections of America closely united her to
France ; and partly from the influence of these feelings,
partly from more sordid motives, she insisted that England should allow her to take up the whole carrying

43

44

HISTORY OF

explained, and the information desired by Mr. Pink ney
had been communicated to him in another manner.
The ostensible reason of Mr. Pinkney, for demanding
his passport, was that no minister had been sent to
America ; yet he had been previously informed, that the
delay in sending out a minister had been occasioned
wholly from the situation in which the government found
itself for the two months preceding, in consequence of
His Majesty's illness. The Orders in Council did not
onginate with the present government, the system having
been acted upon by those who now complained so loudly
of it; no one, in the proper exercise of his reasoning
faculties, could dispute the justice of these Orders in
Council, who was not, at the same time, prepared to
deny our right of retaliating upon the enemy its own
excesses; & those who attributed the commercial distresses of the country to the Orders in Council, must have
forgotten that the continental system was of itself sufficient to account for the distress which had occurred."
" The late repeal by France of her decrees, was a
mere pretence, since the principles of the system were
still preserved with vigour ; for in a letter lately written
by Tureau the French minister to the American government, he declared: That it is to be clearly understood,
that France would not consent to alter that system of
exclusion adopted by all Europe against the commerce
of Great Britain, the wisdom and policy of which system was already clearly developed in its effects against
the common enemy ; that neutrality was entirely disregarded in every state over which France had any
influence .. Such was the language of France through
her own minister, which openly declared that she had
said to each state in succession, I must take away your
liberty and independence in order to injure England :
and could it be doubted, that Great Britain was thus
entitled to call on neutral nations to assert and maintain
their rights ? The correspondence between this country and America was not finally closed ; and while a

THE LATE WAR.

45

hope remained, how faint soever, it should be by all
means cherished, and nothing should be done which
might increase irritation." The question of Mr Whitbread, for the production of the correspondence, was
then put to vote and negatived by an overwhelming majority.
Whatever might have been the inducements held ou st
by France to America, for pursuing such a line of conduct
as she did, does not here form a matter of discussion ;
but certain it was, that the most monstrous and egregious
falsehoods and misstatements were invented, and industriously and indefatigably propagated throughout the
United States, obviously intended to widen the breach
already existing between the government of Great
Britain and that country. It was said, and there were even
members of the American congress found who alluded
to it in their speeches, that Great Britain had actually
demanded of the United States to pass a law authorizing
the introduction of the produce and manufactures of the
British Islands into the ports of America; and for compelling France to receive such goods as of
production. Mr. Foster, in a communication. to Mr.
Monroe, denied this statement in the most positive and
unequivocal terms ; and notwithstanding, Mr. Monroe in
his answer to Mr. Foster (which, by the bye, was not
sent for more than a month afterwards, still harped and
talked of what he called " the novel and extraordinary
claim of Great Bilitain, to trade in British articles with
her enemy." How wilfully gross was such a misstatement, when made by the chief secretary of the government, and uniting it to the extraordinary demand which
that country so often made upon Great Britain, that she
should believe the vague declarations made by France,
that she had abrogated her Berlin and Milan decrees,
when every act of that government explicitly contra-

46

HISTORY OF

TIM UT& V941.B•

dieted that declaration.* Mr. Munroe, the American
secretary of state, urged a complaint, that ships' papers
of America were counterfeited to a large extent in Great
Britain, and in a way scarcely capable of detection. Mr.
Forbes, in return, very justly complained of the great
partiality the United States had ever shown to France
and her commerce ; that in all the diplomatic intercourse of America, she unerringly kept in view the
*But the enemy has at length laid aside all dissimulation ;
he now publicly and solemnly declares, not only that those decrees
still ( ontinue in force, but that they shall be rigidly executed
until Great Britain shall comply with additional conditions equally
extravagant ; and he further announces the penalties of those.
decrees to be in force against all nations, whiCh shall suffer their
flag to be, as it is termed in this new code, " denationalized."
In addition to the disavowal of the blockade of May, 1806, and
of the principles on which that blockade was established, and in
addition to the repeal of the British Orders in Council, he deMends an admission of the principles, that the goods of an enemy,
carried under a neutral flag, shall be treated as neutral ; that
neutral property under the flag of an enemy shall be treated as
hostile; that arms and warlike stores alone (to the exclusion of
stip timber and other' articles of naval equipment,) shall be regarded as contraband of war ; and that no ports shall be considered
as lawfully blockaded, except such as are invested and besieged,
in the presumption of their being taken [en prevention d'etre
pris,] and into which a merchant ship cannot enter without
danger.
By these and other demands, the enemy in fact requires, that
Great Britain and all civili zed nations shall renounce, at his ar•
bitrary pleasure, the ordinary and indisputable rights of maritime
war ; that Great Britain, in particular, shall forego the advantages of her naval superiority, and allow the commercial property,
ss well as the produce and manufactures, of France and her confederates, to pass the ocean in security, whilst the subjects of
Great Britain are to be in effect proscribed from all commercial
intercourse with other nations; and the produce and manufactures of these realms are to be excluded from every country in
the world to which the arms or the influence of the enemy can
extend.
,

Extract from the Declaration of the Orders of
Council, April 21, 1812.

47

interests of that nation ; and even carried her partiality
so far as to allow French ships of war to enter and
clear from her ports, and permit them to expose for sale,
in the ports of the United States, prizes taken from
British merchants who had actually laded and cleared
from those ports at which they were sold. But to this
complaint, so well founded as he knew it was, of such
base national treachery, Mr. Monroe never found time
to reply. Such was the conduct of America, as a neutral
nation,--to allow the ships of war of one belligerent to
take merchantmen, the property of the subjects of another belligerent, at the very mouths of their harbors,
and tow them into their ports and sell as lawful prizes ;
and such was the manner in which the negotiation was
carried on by the United States government, and on
which Mr. Whitbread and his friends in the House of
Commons, have been so lavish in their eulogiums

48

HISTORY OF

CHAPTER VI.

Mr. Whitbread's Motion again introduced into the House
of Peers by the Marquis of Lansdowne, and in the
House of Commons by Mr. Brougham—Outline of the
Arguments in Favor of that Motion as far as concerned
the Relations between Great Britain and the United
States.
AT the time when Mr. Whitbread moved to produce
the correspondence between the two governments, seyee
nil members betrayed a strong desire to unite that subject with that of the Orders in Council, with a view to
procure a decision against both measures, without a fair
and candid discussion of the subjects. The time, however, which had been so long anticipated, and by many
so ardently looked for, at length arrived, when this subject of so vast importance was to be considered. It was
introduced in the House of Peers by the Marquis of
Lansdowne, and in the House of Commons by Mr.
Brougham., The motions in both houses were framed in
exactly the same terms, calling for a committee to be appointed to take into consideration the situation of the commerce and manufactures of the country, with a particular
referenee to the Orders in Council and the trade by
shipping licence. As this subject was so intimately
connected with the affairs of America, at this time, it
shall here have a due consideration.
Those who supported the motion, contended that the
commercial calamities of the kingdom had now risen to
such *bright, and the complaints and clamor of the
intuaufaclusers were so loud and general, that the legislature of the country was bound in duty to listen to
those complaints, and to inquire into the cause and existence of the evil, and the manner of providing a remedy
to remove it ; that it was the duty and interest of all

THE LATE WAR.

49

persons throughout the community to prosecute this
enquiry, and to go hand in hand with the movers in its
support ;. that even the conscientious dissentients to the
present motion, with reference to the source and extent
of the evils existing, must feel desirous of having the
sentiments contained in the motion defended and established . That all with whose approval the system of
1806 met, must certainly be desirous to know to what
extent it had been maintained by that of 1807 ; that
those persons who did not, in the first instance, actually
disapprove of the new system, but felt surprised at its
unlooked-for consequences, must feel solicitous to ascertain if there be not sufficient grounds for a change of opinion ; that others who yet entertained a favourable
idea of the general policy at present pursued, might conceive some doubt as to the expediency of the manner in
which it was followed, and others again who reprobated
the new system from its beg,inning, and were even
prepared to spew their predictions verified, must feel a
peculiar anxiety to avail themselves of an opportunity of
unfolding the madness and folly of government, and of
repressing the calamities that threatened the whole
kingdom. That after a fair and impartial inquiry had
been instituted, and it were found that the evils of which
the country so loudly complained were without a remedy, the people would then be prepared to bear them
with more fortitude.. That it was of the utmost importance to know, since the Orders in Council had ever
been represented as being of a retaliatory nature, what
that system was on which it was pretended to retaliate.
That the course of policy by which France was actuated
might be clearly traced to one of the great moving principles of the government of l3uonaparte, namely, that of
crushing the commerce of its enemy, even though its
own mercantile interests should become the ultimate
sacrifice: to this point centered all the measures of that
government. That the distresses prevailing among the
mercantile establishments throughout France, originating
from this very source, were represented by the people

50

HISTORYOjr

of every commercial city and town in the empire. But
what was the reply of Buonaparte to these representations? They were told that it was now too late in the
day to speak of commerce ; that France had now become
a country of arms, and that it was the desire of the
government to see nothing but soldiers and peasantry ;
and in view of supporting this principle by means of
theory, Talleyrand had published a book in which he
struggled to exhibit the encouragement of arms and
agriculture as the only sound and natural policy of the
French nation, since the time in which the storm of the
Revolution had subsided. Now, under these peculiar
circumstances, it was asked, did not the true policy of
Great Britain demand of her to foster her own commerce ; and in whatever part of the globe the very
semblance of neutrality appeared, it was her interest to
nurse and encourage it into existence ; but by the measures of retaliation on her enemy to which she has had
recourse, she has risked the advantages of both, and has
only been inflicting a punishment on an enemy, which,
under those circumstances, he was not capable of feeling.

belligerent or the other. That ever since the British
Orders in Council had been issued, the commerce of tae:
country had evidently been on the decline ; the returns
which were presented of the exports and imports of the
year 1809, thew the amount of exports to the continent of Europe to have fallen short of that of 1808, net
less than ten millions, and that to America not less than
five millions, making an aggregate failure of that year
of fifteen millions. But that in April, 1809, a complete
modification of the Orders in Council had taken place;
the former sweeping system had been substittitechby a
blockade of only a limited extent—Holland, the coast of
Germany as far north as the Einc:, and' that' part of
Italy situated between Pisaro and Orbitello. Thus had
the old system' been entirely abandoned, anti"
retaliatory measures laid entirely aside. However, the
government of France had still had recourse to means,
for severity, far surpassing any thing of the kind they
had yet adopted ; and so far were they from betraying
any embarrassment from the policy of Great Britain,
that they had driven the anti-commercial system to its
utmost extremity. That a lamentable evidence was
afforded of the calamities produced by the commercial
Measures to which England had so tenaciously adhered,
in the melancholy and distressed state of 011 r commercial
and manufacturing towns and cities, and in the enormous
increase of the number of bankrupts In one town alone,
[Liverpoold in the small space of four weeks, the poor
had actually increased to four times their number.
These proofs of distress exhibit a fearful and appalling
state of affairs, and cannot be met by referring to the
custom-house books, whatever may he the account;
given by these to the country ; in answer to statements
of this description, we have only to direct our attention
to our jails overflowing with debtors, our poor-houses
filled with mendicants, and moreover, to some of our
most populous and hitherto wealthiest counties, where
the distress had arisen to so appalling a height as to have
driven the people to a state of open rebellion. That,
-

-

`

The magnanimous and dignified character of the
British nation rendered it a duty for her to have protected
and encouraged a neutral nation, like America, in every
branch of commerce ; separated as America was from
her enemy by a widely extended ocean, which, to him,
was impassable. That next to the evils resulting to our
commerce from a war between Great Britain and America, would be those arising from a war between America
and Prance ; the designs of the enemy would then be
complete, for there is not a port on the continent from
which British trade would not then be excluded. That
the whole course of policy which we had pursued, had
hitherto been marked by an unwarrantable hostility to
neutral nations ; and there was but one language spoken
by all the measures we had yet adopted, namely, that
they must either declare themselves on the side of one

51

THE LATE WAR.

52

HISTORY OF

notwithstanding the fallacy of the custom-house accounts,
still they did not conceal the lamentable truth of the
decrease of the mercantile interest of the country ; that
when the exports of 1811 were compared with those of
the preceding year, in those accounts, a very great falling
off was discovered ; nay, notwithstanding the year 1808
had been the least propitious of any year ever known in
the country, yet the year 1811, in the amount of exports,
had actually sunk beneath even that. That very little
credit is to be placed in the accounts of the custom-house ;
as a proof of which we need only revert to the circumstance, that although they exhibited an increase of the
amount of exports.in 1809 over that of 1807, to the enormous amount of twenty millions, yet it was afterwards
discovered that this great increase of exportation had
been sent to markets where there was not the least demand for the goods, and consequently the next year the
most part of the goods exported were returned upon our
hands, and thereby an additional value was occasioned to
the imports, in proportion to the value sent back to us.
Such proofs as these, staring us in the face, ought to
admonish us how little regard the custom-house books
are entitled to, in proving the existence of distress with
which the manufacturing and commercial interest of the
kingdom had been visited. That that system, pregnant
with so many evils—the system of granting licenses—had
grown out of the unparalleled state of our commercial
affairs ; the number of licenses granted in 1807 did not
exceed 1,690, but by the year 1810 they had actually
swelled to the number of 18,000. It was a fact that
all remaining of the principles of the Orders in Council
were, by these licenses, conceded to the enemy ; and thus
were we pursuing a trade, to a participation of
which he was admitted, but from which neutral nations
were precluded, unless such as chose to avail themselves
of the license system. That a more impolitic course
could not be pursued by Great Britain than thus to give
encouragement to the commerce of her enemy, and that
too, at the expense of neutral nations, since the regula-

THE LATE WAR.

33

tions laid down for the government of those acting under
the authority of such license, were shamefully violated
in every letter ; they were in fact secretly pursuing a
traffic with the enemy, and that in-the very way of which
he was most desirous, and to prevent which, there was
no way whatever, except lining the whole coast of the
enemy with British ships of war, and by thismeans establishing a real and not a nominal blockade. That the
result of this license system had been an enormous
increase of foreign ships in the ports of Great Britain,
and establishing an extensive and well organized nursery of seamen to man the fleets of the enemy. That
in Great Britain, the consequences arising from the system of granting licenses had been no less alarming ;
that the controul of the commerce had passed entirely
into the hands of the executive government. But were
this the only danger to which this system was subject,
it would yet be comparatively harmless ; but it was
subject to abuses of a greater magnitude, and which
spoke powerfully in favor of the present inquiry. That
prodigious errors had, in the issuing of them, been frequently committed ; that one class of individuals possessed opportunities of information of which others were
totally denied, and that it had become necessary for the
members of the Board of Trade to hold correspondence
with merchants which was calculated to unfold secrets
which might be used for the most unworthy purposes
That under this system it was at all times in the power

of the enemy to ascertain the articles we were desirous
of exporting, ands what we might wish to have exported
from the continent ; it would certainly then be a fault of
his own if he did not turn such information to his own
advantage, and reduce our commerce completely under
his own controul.
But the greatest evil to which this system was subject, was that which it produced on the morals of the metr•
cantile branch of our community ; they were allured into
speculations which, commenced with forgery, are carried
E2

54

HISTORY 0.17

on by a course of perjury, and terminated in the most
bare-faced frauds. That the very conditions of these
licenses were disgraceful to that government that issued
them ; that besides the ships' regular papers, the licenses
allowed the captains of ships to take on hoard other
sets of papers which were forged from beginning to end,
and when the ships arrived at their destined ports, these
forgeries had all to be confirmed by the most solemn
oaths of the captain and all his crew. In support of all
this, a letter of a very singular description was then
referred to ; it was written by a person who had made
a regular profession of the forgery of ships' papers ; it
read thus: " Gentlemen, we take the liberty herewith
to inform you, that we have established ourselves in this
town, [Liverpool] for the sole purpose of making simulated
papers, which we are enabled to do in a way that will give
ample satisfaction to our employers, not only being in
possession of the original documents of the ships' papers
and clearances from the various ports, a list of which we
annex, but Mr. G.B. , having worked with his b rotl e r, Mr.
J. B., in the same line, for the last two years, and understanding all the necessary languages. Of any changes that
may occur in different places on the continent, in the various custom-houses and other catees,and which may render
a change of signature necessary, we are careful to have
the earliest information, 'tot only from our own connections, but from Mr, J, B. who has proffered his as4stance
in every thing, and who has for some time made simulated papers for Messia. B. and P. of this town, to whom
we beg leave to refer you for further information. We
remain, &c." Such were the degraded and miserably
disgraceful expedients to which this new system had
driven the British merchants. It was not a sufficient
reply to palliate the guilt attendant on such transactions
to say, that had our merchants not committed those
crimes, others would certainly have taken the advantage,
and perpetrated them ; though the universe besides
should commit itself by such a shameful and unprincipled procedure let not Great Britain, the character of
;

THE LATE WAR.

whose merchants had always in former years been proverbial for probity and honor, descend to this depth of
shame and degradation.

-

A great deal was urged against the Orders in Council
relating to the effects they were likely to have on
American manufactures ; that they would tend to increase their growth in the New England States, till at
length they would supercede the British manufactnres
in the South American markets. That it was not derogatory to the national character of England to endeavor to conciliate America; that they had not been
haughty or violent in advancing their claims ; that it was
a natural expectation, since they believed firmly in the
repeal of the French decrees, that the repeal of our
Orders in Council should follow; that in common courtesy to France, AMerica was bound to believe what had
been solemnly asserted by the French government,
that her deneees had in truth and verity been repealed.
Much clamor, and that without the least foundation, had
been raised for the security of our maritime rights ; but
no question had ever been made by America to those
rights in their fair and liberal interpretation. And finally, that it was a singular feature in affairs, to hear the
advocates of the Orders in Council opposing investigation, who, had these orders been really servicable to
the country, had of all others least reason to fear inquiry

$6

HISTORY OY

CHAPTER VII.

The Distresses in the Manufacturing and commercial In-

terests of Great Britain chargeable to the Orders in
Council, completely disproved—The Distresses in the
manufacturing Branches in England only imputable to
a Propensity of wild Speculation engendered amongst
those Classes, by the unperalleled Prosperity of the
British Trade in the years 1809 and 1810.

IN reply to the foregoing arguments, it was said, that
the distresses alluded to in the manufacturing and commercial interest, had not arisen from any effect of the
Orders in Council; that these distresses were not general ; and the papers on the table, so far were they from
supporting these assertions, that they actually contradicted them. That the view was the most ridiculous
and absurd imaginable, which had been taken of the
state of commerce ; that the very year in which the
Orders in Council had been enforced, which occurred
in 1807, the amount of exports was about thirty-four
millions and a half, and in the year following it was
about the same, but in 1809 it rose to upwards of fifty
millions; in 1810 it fell to about forty-six millions, leaving an immense increase since the year 1807, the year
in which the Orders in Council were first issued. How
ridiculous and unfounded were the reports which those
supporting the motion for inquiry had so laboriously
circulated; that millions of British property had been
confiscated by Buonaparte ; and even were they admitted as truth, had not the least relation with the subject
of the Orders in Council. That the American nonintercourse law and the other measures adopted by that
government, instead of impeding the commerce of Great
Eritain, had laid open to our merchants a direct trade
with the Spanish and Portuguese colonies, and had thus
proved of infinite benefit to the commerce of this coun-

TI1E LATE WAR.

57

try. That in order to dispel that delusion which certain
persons have been so studious in imposing on the country, it is only necessary to present a fair account of the
exports to America and the West Indies, during the
years from 1807 down to the present time. In 1807
the value of exports amounted to nearly fifteen millions;
in 1808, notwithstanding that our trade to the United
States was partially prohibited, it amounted to nearly
sixteen millions; in 1809, the year in which the nonintercour&e law was acted upon, it amounted to upwards
of nineteen millions ; and in 1810, the law of nonintera,urse being still in existence, our exports to America,
including the West Indies was nearly twenty millions
and a half in value. It would appear, then, that in the
years between 1807 and 1810, the enormous increase of
nearly six millions of pounds sterling had taken place in
the export trade of this country to America alone. That
the account given of the injury sustained by British
shipping, from the effects of the Orders in Council, had
been most wilfully and wantonly exaggerated and misrepresented; but which, by a reference to facts, could
be very easily contradicted and disproved. In the year
1807, the whole British shipping actually employed
amounted to 311,000 tons; in 1808, 436,000 tons; in
1809, 539,008; and in 1810, 609,000 tons; so
that in, the years between 1807 and 1810 an increase of
298,000 tons had actually taken place. The number of
seamen employed in that shipping also increased from
88,000 to 102,000 ; and notwithstanding the fact, that
foreign shipping also increased, yet let it be borne in
mind, that this foreign shipping, in the circumstances of
the world, had contributed largely to the prosperity of
British commerce.
A complaint has been urged by some, that to the
foreign shipping of the continent a partiality had been
discoverable, over those of America, to such we would
reply, that Great Britain never made any such distinction ; and if the Americans did not participate in tlia

58

59

TIIE LATE WAR.

HISTORY OF

trade lately carried on, they had none but themselves to
blame That from an immediate intercourse with the
Spanish and Portuguese colonies in South America,
Great Britain derived a very great advantage ; that the
advantages of commerce, and the objects for which the
navigation act was principally intended, were thus
equally promoted. If the British Orders in Council had
never been issued, France would have remained uninterruptedly in the peaceable enjoyment of a trade with
the whole world, and thus been enabled to supply herself with the raw materials of her manufactures, an
object for which she was particularly anxious, and to
which her whole efforts were unceasingly directed.
It might be enquired, from what cause did' the Orders
in Council originate ? PrariCe issued a decree that
there should be no fartheitrale to England ; the natural
answer of England was, that nothing should be exported
from France but as she permitted I OW by her maritime
superiority she bad the power of enforcing 'her mandate.
She, too,' possessed • a right of apprising neutrals, that if
they countenanced restrictive edicts of one belligerent,
inimical' to all commercial interests, they must likewise
snbthit to regulations which she should dictate in defence
of those interests. 'That the government of great Britain
had ever cultivated a friendly disposition towards America, while on- the contrary that of France had been
extremely hostile. On every opportunity .which presented itself; had • France seized and deArroyed the
property of American citizens. That the go rernmeut
of France had evinced many prods of its insincerity in
its regulations with • America, and - more particularly in
the repeal of its decrees ; and even in the courts of admiralty in England had those marks of insincerity on the
part of France' Mattifested themselves. That many
persons who support the motion, either from ignorance
of the fact, or intentionally to serve some purpose. or
other, had drawn a line of distinction between sequestration and condemnation, while with the French
,

government the difference existed only in name, but in
effect they are one and the same thing ; and by the easy
term of sequestration had France condemned much
property of citizens of the. United :States. That notwithstanding the great length which some had allowed
themselves to be carried on the subject of perjury, as
connected with the Orders in Council and license trade,
and the feeling manner in which the immorality attendant on such a traffic had been depicted, yet let it be
remembered that the system of perjury had been in existence long before ,the Orders in Cmkneil sr, license
traffic had been known in the kingdom. That at Embden a house was established.for no other pupese whatever
but to practise frauds of that description,-for which a
regular commission of two per cent was. charged, and
allowed; and even though the license trade and Orders
in Council were abolished, the country would have to
return once more to the system of neutralization which
was mainly supported by tyranny, in the mode by which
it was pursued. Many schemes have been called into
contribution with a view to impress on the minds of the
people, that their distresses were wholly imputable to
the Orders in Council; it is true,•that subject was most
learnedly discussed on, but the picture was most extravagant, and only existed in the minds of those by whom
it was propagated, if indeed it had even an existence there. That the exportations from this country in
the year 1809 had been returned on our hands, or any
part of them, was an assertion founded on some gross
error ; the very goods of that year's exportation found a
ready and profitable market, which market remained
open to us until the spring of 1810. With the declaration of the French government staring us in the face,
that no repeal of the commercial decrees of that country
could take place, until Great Britain should, in the first
instance, abandon her right of blockade, how childish it
were to talk of the actual repeal of those decrees ; under
this delusion, too, America has been loud in her claims
upon Great Britain to rescind so much of her commercial
.

,

HISTORY OF

THE LATE WAR.

regulations, of 1807, as would leave the commerce of
that country perfectly free. But let it be first enquired
where such a measure would end ; were England to
repeal her Orders in Council and abandon the license
trade, a trade would at once be opened by which America
would be enabled without interruption to carry the
produce and manufactures of France and her depeuttencies to every port in the world ; while England would
be entirely shut out from that trade which her enemies
were only enjoying by her permission. That no doubt
can exist in the mind of any person in the world, who
will take pains to consult the evidence we have on the
subject, that the commercial restrictions adopted by the
French government, although they, in some measure,
affected this country, inflicted a severe wound on their
trade and resources ; that since the Orders in Council
were issued in 1807, the commerce of France had
experienced a severe falling off, as appeared evident
from the affairs of her national bank, and the transactions in her money market ; and in like proportion has
her revenue failed since that period.

to the world, that a question in which was involved so
much importance to the nation, should be decided on
the narrow and sordid principle of profit and loss.

60

it was said that an appointment of a committee of the
House of Commons, for the purpose of considering the
measure now before them, could answer no good end,
without that committee, by an interference with the
affairs of America, Ehould controul the deliberations of
the cabinet, a proposal not at all likely to find support
in this house. At the deliberations of such a committee,
persons of conflicting interests were to be examined ;
some from whose connection with the trade of America
have naturally imbibed certain prejudices in its favor ;
others again who stand connected solely with the trade
to the continent of Europe, and whose prejudices must
therefore stand opposed to those of the first class ; under
such a state of things, it would be impossible for a committee to arrive at any conclusion. On the whole, it
would be an act both mean and despicable to announce
i.

61

But there is yet a quarter to which we may look, as
having produced many of the evils which may have
afflicted our commercial and manufacturing interests,
viz. the unexampled prosperity of British trade in the
years 1809 and 1810, which had begotten such a spirit
of wild speculation amongst our merchants and manufacturers, that in the event of the least stagnation, in
connection with the French decrees, could not fail of
drawing in its train all the evils alluded to. Under
such circumstances, is this house to set their seal to a
prejudice imbibed by the manufacturers, and no doubt
originating from corrupt motives, that all the distresses
which befel them have grown out of the bad policy of
their own government. That not the least connection
exists between the Orders in Council and the license
trade ; that the property of British subjects has no other
means of admission into the continent of Europe, only
under cover of neutrality ; and in order to pursue a
trade between enemies, it is necessary to grant neutral
licenses, that a treasonable and unlawful intercourse may
be prevented, and that neutrals may not be subjected to
British seizure. That there is no available means, under the existing circumstances of Europe, by which
England could have carried on a trade with the European continent, entirely pure and irreproachable ; but to
say that in consequence of the frauds practised on that
trade, it ought to be entirely abandoned, betrays a vile
hypocrisy. But admitting, for argument's sake, that a
repeal of the Orders in Council had taken place, and
that Americans, without interruption, had been permitted to carry the sugars of the Island of Cuba into
France, and in return to carry back to South America
the manufactures of Germany, while the French decrees were still in full operation upon the trade of Great

F

HISTORY OF

THE LATE WAR.

Britain, there would yet have been as was remarked of
the present systern,1 " forgery in the origin, and perjury and fraud in the conclusion of the transactions."

retaliation ? A remark had been made, that, should
Great Britain retaliate, it ought to be in that manner in
which the enemy had inflicted the injury on her ; how
wild and extravagant would be such a mode of proceeding. If it were the choice of the enemy to violate the
law of nations, in a case where his own risk was nothing,
(as he had nothing to lose, at the same time we had
every thing at stake,) will it be once pretended that we
were hound to chastise him in a way in which he would
not feel the consequences of his madness and folly ?
The very object for which the Orders in Council were
issued was never intended to destroy the commerce of
the continent of Europe, but to compel the continent to
trade with Great Britain, and to ensure to Great Britain
alone an exclusive right to that trade.

62

It was ridiculous to imagine from the policy of Buonaparte, that he was inimical to all trade; he undoubtedly was
to British commerce, but as regarded that of his own, he
seemed to have its interest very much at heart. That
the government of the United States had coalesced with
him not only in requiring the repeal of the Orders in
Council, but also an entire abandonment of the system of
blockade practised by Great Britain ; it was therefore
idle to think, that a repeal of the Orders in Council was
sufficient to conciliate America. The principles upon
which these orders were founded were entirely retaliatory, and as such were they described by Mr. Canning ;
it had however been deemed expedient on the part of
Great Britain to mitigate them in favor of neutral nations
which fully evinced the desire of the British government
to confine the evil wholly to the enemy. The injury
sustained by the neutral through the operations of the
Orders in Council, where the principle of retaliation was
closely adhered to, was merely incidental, and which
could not be avoided and therefore became, on the side
of the government of Great Britain, a matter of deep regret ; but on whom had been forced the measures from
which it resulted
Persons who raised such strong objections to the principles of retaliation with an enemy, would have done
well to have borne in mind that no other method is attainable, by which to enforce obedience to the law of
nations. Let a considerable power once presume to
hold in contempt every principle of honor which the
civilized nations of the world have hitherto held sacred,
and to set at open defiance all law, by which nations have
as yet suffered themselves to be governed, and to prosecute a war in violation of all this, how is it to be arrested in its mad career but by recurring to measures of

63

What a mode of reasoning was that which impute 1 to
the Orders in Council all the embarrassments which
have recently overtaken the commercial interests of the
country, when it was incontestibly proved that for two or
three years after these orders had been issued, an effect
diametrically opposite to this had been the result, and
when the commercial difficulties had evidently been
traced to causes very different.
In reply to those who complained of the immoral tendency of the system of granting licenses, as exhibited in
the form of the licenses themselves, it was observed
that the very clause which had undergone such a severe
censure had been framed by the previous administration,
and that the present ministers in their offices found them
prepared and digested by those vely persons who now
affected to be so much scandalized by the discovery. It
was surely a childish idea t o imagine for a moment, that
the commercial interests of France felt no effect from
the British Orders in Council ; the impoverished state of
her custom was a sufficient proof against such an opinion ;
if it were not, look to the tenor of an address from her
senate to Buonaparte, where it was confessed that no

64

THE LATE WAR.

HISTORY or

longer did the people of France enjoy a commerce;
except what their canals afforded them ; while it was
tully and unequivocally admitted, that, in every respect,
they labored under the most unparalleled commercial
erribarralsmen•;.
That undei no principle of reasoning was Great Britain
under an obligation to suff.ir an arrogant power like
France to prescribe laws to neutral nations, without
making an effort to induce those neutrals to assert their
rights ; from which is plainly observable that the leading object of the famous Orders in Council, was, not
only the chastisement of France for her insults, but to
incite America to disentangle herself from a connection
into which, in an evil hour, she had unhappily suffered
herself to be involved, and to resume that situation of
rank and independence which she had once held among
the nations of the world.
Such are the outlines of those celebrated debates on
the causes which led to the war with the United States,
in both houses of parliament, the result of which was,
that the motion introduced into the House of Lords, by
the Marquis of Lansdowne, and that into the House of
Commons, by Mr. Brougham, were negatived by a large
majority.

'A

65

CHAPTER VIII.

The United States Government appears, for a time, more
amicable towards Great Britain—Suskcions, on the
Part of the British Government, as regarded those
Pretensions—Reasons for those Suspicions--Extrava.
pant Demand of Buonaparte.
THE American government seemed, for a time, bo
exhibit a more amicable disposition towards Great Britain, partly, no doubt, in consequence of the increasing
acts of plunder and piracy perpetrated by the French on
their merchant vessels, under the favorite title of sequestration ; and partly in consequence of the recent
discoveries made of the impoverished state of the public
finances.* Yet there was still much reason to doubt
the sincerity of their proposals of pacification, but that
The United States revenue is derived from two sources ;• the
duties on importation, and the sale of public lands. The du ties
on importation, it was admitted, would be diminished by a war
with Great Britain; but, even under such a deficit, they were
estimated at six millions of dollars, while the sale of public lands
would produce above half a million more. A deficiency, to the
extent of two millions and a half in the general revenue, would
thus arise ; and to meet this, it was proposed the t an addition of
50 per cent should be made to the duties now in existence. Such
was the state of the American revenue, with a view even to the
peace establishment ; and it was the principle of the government
of that nation, that the increased expenditure, occasioned by war,
should be provided for by loans.
In the event of any farther deficiency, the duties on salt were

to be restored, and a selection of " external taxes," as they were

called, were recommended ; and it was supposed that there would
be no difficulty in raising the permanent revenue of the United
States to nine millions of dollars per, annum. The difficulty of
raising the loans at home was, however, foreseen ; nor did any
chance of finding them abroad present itself ; and the American ruinister of finance was aware that an interest far above that

F2

HISTORY OF

it was merely an illusion to gain time for preparing measures for prosecuting a war with effect. It must be
acknowledged that at the time there existed strong
grounds for suspicion that the latter reason predominated ; for while the United States government offered
for consideration, to the ministers of Great Britain,
under other modifications, the treaty which had been
concluded by the plenipotentiaries of the two governments, in 1806, but refused to be ratified by Mr.Jefferson,
that government was at the same time negotiating a loan
of eleven millions of dollars for the se rvices of the current year, with which to carry on the war. The
circumstance, that the American government was fully
aware that if the British government assented to that treaty in its present form, and at that period, she would have
surrendered every pretension she then held forth, taken in
connection with that of their treating for a loan for the
use of the public service, was a full betrayal of the
motives by which they were actuated. These grounds
of suspicion were the more strengthened by bills which
were introduced about the same time into the American
legislature, estimating the loans of 1813 and '14 at
eighteen millions of dollars for each year ; and notwithstanding a strong opposition was made to such a measure,
a measure which menaced the United States with an
overwhelming debt, and of course an intolerable taxation
for an indefinite length of time, vet so intent were they
on war that it received the sanction of that body.
It was only a short time subsequent to the passing of
the above estimates, that a bill of a very uncommon
nature passed the legislature of that country. The bill
in question provided, that any foreigner guilty of impressing American citizens on board of a foreign ship,
should, %Olen arrested, be tried and, if convicted, suffer
aliov.-ed l e ' law would be necessary to secure a regular supply of
:money, that the public service, in the event of war, might not
i mpeded:

Trm LATE WAR.

617

death as a pirate. Now, the intention of this, as well
as of many other bills which at that time received the
sanction of the legislature of America, could not be misapprehended ; in defiance of all their affectation towarde
a pacific disposition, the spirit which rankled in the
bosom of that government was clearly evident ; and
every effort made by the British government to avert
the impending hostilities, only seemed to widen the
breach between the two countries.
However, it immediately became evident to Great
Britain, from the course pursued by the French government about this time, that it was necessary she should
make a full and positive declaration of the principles
by which she should be governed, as regarded the new
state of commercial hostilities into which the trade of
the whole world had been drawn.
The French minister of foreign aff,iirs, on the 10th of
March, introduced into the conservative senate, an official report by which all doubt was henceforth removed,
as regarded the manner in which the ruler of France
was determined to persist in the prosecution of his wild
and extravagant principles. The government of Great
'Britain, after this, lost no time in issuing a declaration
stating, that the novel and extraordinary principles to
which the French government had recourse, had called
for measures of retaliation on the part of England. His
Majesty had always been desirous to exercise his undoubted right with as little injury aspossible to neutrals,
and had at all times professed his readiness to revoke the
Orders in Council, so soon as the decrees of the enemy
were fairly repealed, and the commerce of neutral
nations restored to its accustomed course. The state of
Europe, in the year 1809, had enabled His Majesty to
reduce these benificent views to practice, and to confine
the retaliatory measures to France and the countries on
which the French yoke had been most strictly imposed ;
and Ills Majesty had readily availed himself of so favor;

68

HISTORY OF

able an opportunity for abridging the miseries of war.
The government of the United States had still remained
dissatisfied : it had been pretended by that government
that the French decrees were revoked, although ample
proofs of their existence at a recent period had been
brought forward. The enemy had now, however, laid
aside all dissimulation, and had declared that the ships
of every power which refused to acknowledge his prin..
ciples, were (to use the language of his own code,)
denationalized. In addition to the disavowal of the
blockade of 1806, and the repeal of the Orders in Council, he demanded the admission of the principle,
that free ships should make free goods; that neutral
property, in the hands of enemies should be treated as
hostile ; that arms and warlike stores alone, to the
exclusion of ship-timber and other articles of naval
equipment, should be regarded as contraband of war ;
and that no ports should be considered as lawfully
blockaded, except such as were invested and besieged,
in the presumption of their being taken, and into which
no merchant ship could enter with safety.
The enemy thus demanded that the established law
of nations should be overthrown, that Great Britain should
forego the advantages of her naval superiority, and that
her commerce should be excluded from every country
Of the world, to which the influence of France might extend. Acting on this principle, the enemy did not hesitate to incorporate, with his own dominions, all states
which refused to sacrifice their national honor at his
command. The provisions of the treaty of Utrecht,
which were founded on a voluntary compact, were referred to as evidence of principles which were to be
established by force ; and thus had France departed from
the very conditions on which the pretended repeal of her
decrees had been accepted by America. It had therefore become the duty of America to relax the measures
of severity, which, by misconception she had adopted
towards Great Britain ; and as a proof of the desire of the

THE LATE WAR.

G)

iiritish government to fulfil its engagements, it was
df•!clared that so soon as the Berlin and Milan dbarees should be actually and unconditionally revoked,
the British Orders in Council should be considered, without any farther declaration, as at an end ;
reserving, at the same time, to His Majesty, the m os t
ample powers to re-establish any measures of this kind,
should it afterwards appear that the repeal by the enemy
had been illusory.

70

HISTORY OF

THE LATE WAR.

CHAPTER IX.
The Effect produced upon the public Mind in Consequence
of the preceding Declaration—Lord Stanley moves in
the House of Commons, for a Consideration of the
Petitions then on the table, respecting the Distresses—
A Discovery of Henry's pretended secret Mission to
Boston made to Congress in a Message from the President—That Subject undergoes a partial Investigation.
)

NOTWITHSTANDING such a display of magnanimity

and justice on the part of Great Britain, as was exhibited in the foregoing declaration, even in England, it
was looked upon, by those hostile to the Orders in
Council, in no other light than as an official answer to
the petitions then before parliament, complaining of the
disastrous effect which had been produced by the operation of these orders. In pursuance of such a supposition,
Lord Stanley availed himself of the earliest opportunity,
after the promulgation of this declaration on the part of
His Majesty's government, to introduce into the House
of Commons, a motion that the house should resolve
itself into a committee of the whole, in order to take
those petitions into consideration. This motion was
sustained by arguments differing but little in tenor
from those adduced on a former occasion, the substance
of which is contained in the preceding chapters, except
in a very few instances. As regarded the declaration
itself, it was maintained that the measures of the French
government were neither new nor extraordibary but
had, in principle, been adopted, although with less
rigor, by the British government, in the years 1739 and
1756 ; and were actually such, as all independent states
had a right to pursue. The measures of the French
government had proved wholly impotent, till they were
supported by the retaliatory system to which the British
government had recourse. The petitions on the table

71

concurred in attributing the distresses of the country to
the Orders in Council; yet the declaration lately issued
had announced the determination of government to adhere to its principles, regardless of the general calamity
which prevailed in every district of the country. This
resolution reduced the measures of the British government, and the prosperity of British commerce, to a
dependence on the will of the enemy ; and although it
had become impossible to obtain employment for the
lower orders, and the price of provision was rapidly
advancing, there seemed to be no prospect of redress.
Mr. Rose, in reply to this view of the subject, said,
" that if British.goods were found on board of an American ship trading between America and China, by the
Berlin Decree, they must be forfeited ; and that it was
absurd, therefore to talk of the decree as a mere municipal regulation. Although the Berlin Decree had been in
a great measure inoperative until the peace of Tilsit,
because the enemy had not till that period the means
of enforcing it, yet immediately afterwards, the French
had marched their troops into all parts of the continent,
for the purpose of carrying their system into effect; and
the consequences had been immediately felt in the extreme depression of the commerce of this country. In
the event of a repeal of the Orders in Council, in the
existing state of Europe, the ports of France would then
be open to American commerce, and by which means
the enemy would be easily supplied with the raw materials, and thereby enabled to manufacture them and
compete with England directly in the 'market of South
America, and in every other place to which her precarious
trade might extend. The falling off in the direct trade
of this country to America had been in a great measure
compensated by the increase of our exports to other
countries, to which the same commodities had formerly
been carried in American ships. Of the exports of
America, amounting annually to forty-five millions of
dollars, thirty-eight of which went to Great Britain and

72

HISTORY Of

her allies, and only two millions to France and her dependencies, whose friendship the government of America
seemed so anxious to cultivate. But there was no necessity for a protracted debate ; the distresses of the country
were unquestionably great ; the people seemed to look
to the Orders in Council as a source of relief ; and in
such circumstances the ministers did not think of resisting inquiry, but gave their consent to the motion for
appointing a committee."
A very extraordinary occurrence transpired about this
crisis. It was communicated to the congress of the
United States, in a message from the president, that,
" While the United States were at peace with Great
Britain, a secret agent of the British government had
been employed in certain states, more especially at the
seat of government of Massachusetts, in fomenting disaffection to the constituted authorities of the country, for
the purpose of seducing the southern part of the Union
into a political connection with Great Britain."
In delivering the message to Congress, containing this
charge against the British government, the president
accompanied it with certain papers purporting to be
communications between a person of the name of
Henry, the secret agent alluded to, and certain officers
of His Majesty's government. Henry, in his communication to Mr. Munroe, the United States secretary, on
the subject, pretended to have been employed by officers
of the highest authority under the British government, and under the sanction of the British cabinet, for
the express purposes stated in the president's message ;
and in consequence of the refusal of the British government to allow him a reward commensurate with the nature
of the services on which he said he had been employed,
he expressed the strongest feelings of disappointment and
of revenge toward the government, by whose servants
he pretended to have been employed. The first of
Henry's pipers alluded to, purported to be a letter

TLIE LATE WAR.

73

from the private secretary of Sir James Craig, then
governor in chief of Canada, &c., from Quebec, dated
January, 1809, enquiring whether he [Henry] would
engage in a secret embassy to Boston. The second
purported to be the instructions of Sir James Craig to
Henry, directing him to form an acquaintance with some
of the leading Federalists in the southern states, to aster
tain what they conceived of a separation from the Union,
and how, in such an event, they would be disposed to
avail themselves of the aid of the British government
to promote their views. The next of these papers
produced, was a memorial to Lord Li rerpool, in which
Henry expatiated largely on the important services
which he said he had rendered to Great Britain, while
(in his mission to the United States ; that through the
influence alone which he had exercised over the governor and legislative assemblies of Connecticut and Massachusetts, the public acts of those bodies had greatly
repressed the hostile disposition of the United States
government against Great Britain. The envelope enclosing this memorial was a letter to Mr. Peel, from
Henry, claiming a large reward for the services performed on his mission. The next in succession was a letter
from Mr. Peel, purporting to be written at the request
of Lord Liverpool, stating that, as the opinion of Sir
James Craig, respecitng the merits and services alluded
to iu the memorial, had not been received, and as no
wish had been expressed by Sir James that the claim
should be preferred to this country, it has been determined to transmit the memorial to Sir James Craig's
successor in the government of North America. There
were other papers of the correspondence, but the slight
importance of which do not entitle them to notice.
No sooner:did the news of this arrive in England, than
motion was brought forward in the House of Peers,
by Lord Holland, that copies of the whole correspondence connected with the pretended mission of Henry
should be laid on the table of that house. " The grounds

74

HISTORY OP

upon which this motion was founded," said Lord Hol
land, " were obvious : a serious charge, affecting the
honor of Great Britain, had been made by the United
States government, and it was proper to have it investi
gated. The British ministers had been charged, not merely with employing Henry to procure and communicate
intelligence on subjects which might be lawfully inquired
into, but to induce some of the states of the Union to
cast off their allegiance to their lawful government•
What would have been the public feeling in England,
or the conduct of the government, if, while Andreossi
were here dtfring the peace of Amiens, he had been
detected carrying on a secret intercourse with the malcontents of Ireland. Who would have hesitated, if
such an event had occurred, to have advised immediate
hostilities, unless a satisfactory explanation had been
immediately offered ? And what bounds should we
set to our resentment against those who had dared to
insult the honor, and to intrigue against the peace of
the country. It could afford no matter of defence for
the conduct of Sir James Craig, or of the government,
cif indeed the government had been accessary to these
proceedings,) that the American government had been
making preparations to invade Canada ; for although such
a state of things warranted Sir James in taking all proper means for defence, and in doing every thing to secure
the most (=met information, yet it by no means entitled
him to attempt the seduction of the American people
from their allegiance."
Lord Liverpool's reply to the foregoing was a full and
complete defence of the British Cabinet from the accu
sations which had been thus so unbecomingly preferred
against them by the government of the United States
In the course of his Lordship's speech he went on to
state, that the employment of Henry, by Sir James
Craig, had not been authorised by government ; nor
was it even known at home that such a person was
employed, till many months after the transactions were

THE LATE WAIL

75

eoncluded. It was necessary, however, to attend to the
situation in which Canada was at that time placed,
with respect to the government of the United States.
In consequence of the embargo act, great heat and
clamor prevailed in America at that time; that country
assumed a very warlike and menacing attitude ; not
only were defensive measures adopted, but on the 25th to
November the governor of Massachusetts received orders
to hold 10,000 men in readiness to march at a
MO •
ment's notice, a circumstance which was quite notorious,
and frequently mentioned in the public journals of the
day. This army could have but one solitary object, the
invasion of Canada ; and such, accordingly, was the
a impression made on the mind of Sir James Craig, which
many other circumstances, and particularly the sudden
enrolment of 50,000 volunteers by the government of the
United States, tended to confirm. Mr. Erskine, the
minister then resident in America, had also entertained
the same suspicions, and had sent an express to Sir
James Craig, inforrainghirn that Canada or Halifax was
Is to be immediately attacked. Such were the circumstances in which Sir James Craig was placed, at a moment
too, when the separation of some of the states, in the
event of a war, had become the subject of general speculation. Sir James had already received communications
!tom Henry, a person who professed to be well acquainted with the sentiments of the people of the southern
states ; and whatever falsehoods and exaggerations
might have been industriously propagated, the object of
the governor of Canada, in sending Henry into the
United States, was not to excite discontent, but to obtain
information, which, in the event of a war, might have
enabled him to avail himself of the prevalent temper
and disposition of the people in these states.
.

As a proof that the instructions of the governor, (such
as they were,) had reference only to a state of hostilities, no sooner did Sir James Craig learn that the points
in discussion had been adjusted, than he sent orders to

76

HISTORY Of

Henry to return. Ministers had been more anxious to
caution Sir James against the employment of individuals who might disturb the harmony subsisting between
Great Britain and America ; and the motives for recommending Henry for a reward were entirely dictated by
a wish to make him a fair remuneration for his services,
without intimating any opinion as to the policy of the
mission with which he had been entrusted.
After all, at the close of this discussion, both parties were
decidedly agreed that the conduct of the U. States President (to say the least of it,) was highly unbecoming and
indelicate, to lay the papers before congress, posse „sung
the eery limited infortliation on the subject which b.e
did at the time, without ever requiting an explanation,
or in the least apprizing the British government of his
intention ; it was therefore said, as no shadow of reason
existed for charging the British government with such
a mode of proceeding as that mentioned in the American
president's message, parliament snould reject at once
any motion for interference on the subject ; and as the
accusation was prepared against ministers, to leave th
ministers alone to manage it. The motion was rejecte
by a large majority.

THE LATI WAR.

77

CHAPTER X.
America evinces a still more hostile Attitude tounmds Great
Britain—Letters of Marque and Reprisal issued by
the American Government against British Property—
Movement of a strong American Force towards Detroit ;
Perfidy of the French Government more manifest—
The Repeal of the Orders in Council again considered.
THE United States government now began to exhibit
that warlike disposition towards Great Britain, which
had previously indicated itself in so many different
ways, with much more violence than hitherto ; and it
was obvious that the final declaration of hostilities was
close at hand ; though it was evident that a degree of
hesitation and fear was the only existing barrier against
this last act of folly and madness. A resolution was
presented to Congress, to seize all British merchandize
in the United States; to detain all subjects of his Britanic majesty, and to grant letters of Marque and reprisal
against British property in general ; and it still became
a matter of less doubt that these hostile measures of the
government of America were but the precursor of
resolutions of a more determined cast.

The next act of the American government was to
station an army of eight thousand men at Detroit, under
the command of a general. The purpose for which it
was intended, namely, the conquest of Canada, was no
longer made a secret. Many respectable towns and corporate bodies, who had an interest in preserving peace
with Great Britain, remonstrated strongly against this last
measure ; which probably aided not a little to subdue,
for a time, the ardent desire so plainly expressed by Mr.
Madison and his partizans to accelierate the war.
G2