Title

Chapter 23

Identifier

http://www.nflibrary.ca/nfplindex/show.asp?b=1&ref=oo&id=298181

page

240-253

Bibliographic Citation

1812; the war and its moral : a Canadian chronicle / William Foster Coffin.

10167813

1812; the war and its moral : a Canadian chronicle / William Foster Coffin.

Type

Text

extracted text

240

CHRONICLE OF THE WAR.

DEMONSTRATION ON FORT GEORGE.

It fell as a heavy blow upon the British, but it caused no discouragement among the people of Canada. It roused much indignation, and caused a renewed outburst of dogged resolution, but
the immediate advantage to the Americans was immense. It gave
them undisputed possession of the waters of Lake Erie and Lake
Huron. It relieved them from all apprehension on their Western
frontier, and enabled the Cabinet of Washington to concentrate
their energies avd their forces on the long contemplated project
against Montreal.
In retracing our steps from West to East, we may be allowed to
express surprise, that Harrison had not followed vigorously in the
same direction, and treading with his Kentucky horse on the
retreating footsteps of Proctor, reached, simultaneously, with him
his refuge at Ancaster. The position of Burlington Heights might
thus have been assailed on all sides, by land and lake, for speedy
means of communication with Chauncey and his fleet at Niagara
could easily have been found, and the British force advanced on
the Niagara frontier, would have been placed between two fires ;
and cut off from reinforcements and supply, would have been exposed to the fate which had just befallen the army of the West, or
the Right Division.
For, be it remembered, that after the successful actions at
Stoney Creek and the Beaver Dam, the British advanced posts had
occupied the latter position, and the American forces on Canadian
soil, though they held no more than the ground they stood on, still
fringed the whole Niagara frontier between Fort George and
Fort Erie, and that Commodore Chauncey occupied the safe and
convenient refuge of the harbour mouth of the River Niagara.
In the interval between the engagement at Stoney Creek, and the
battle of the Thames, Sir George Prevost had made a tour of inspection
in Upper Canada, and had made bold to attempt a demonstration,
as it was afterwards called, on the works held by the Americans at

Fort George. If this demonstration meant anything it must have
contemplated the storming and the capture of Fort George, far the
idea of a purposeless demonstration cannot be entertained. And
yet the capture of this work would have resulted in exposing the,
town of Newark and the captors themselves, in an inferior position,
to the powerful fire of Fort Niagara ; while the occupation of Fort
George by the Americans weakened the American army in the
field, and kept a large detachment of good troops uselessly entrapped upon the Canadian frontier. Nevertheless, on the 24th
August, Sir George made a formal attack upon this post, drove in
the pickets, looked the defences in the face, and retired, as Veritas
says

241

The King of France, with forty thousand men,
Walked up the hill, and then, walked down again.

Sir George appears to have been afflicted with a strange infirmity of military purpose. His error consisted, not so much in the
failure of the attempt, as in attempting at all, either without
plan, or without resolution. To woo a Queen, or to command
victory requires a daring spirit :—
"Fain would I climb, but that I fear to fall,
If thy heart fail thee, climb not at all."

The Governor General returned to Kingston and to Montreal,
taking with him De Rottenburg,—the Lieutenant Governor,—in
his train, and having done little to infuse courage and confidence,
or prepare the minds of men to encounter the trials to come.
On receipt of the intelligence of Proctor's disaster, General
Vincent prudently withdrew from St. David's and the Beaver Dam,
and again concentrated his forces at Burlington Heights. He also
called in his outposts from Long Point on Lake Erie and made
every preparation for a desperate struggle with Harrison. The
universal feeling at this moment was " no surrender," and yet

CHRONICLE OF THE WAR.

242

there can be no doubt, but that fears which acquired strength as
they flew, had magnified the danger to such an extent at Quebec,
that orders were given at this critical moment, for the complete
evacilation of all Canada, west of Kingston. Officers of rank and
zeal, among whom the most conspicuous was Sir John Harvey,
interfered to avert a measure pregnant with ruin, but so sure was
the American Government that Vincent would save the " kernel"
and Harrison only find the " shell" that they ordered their successful General back to Detroit, and by the aid of Perry's fleet
threw the " Conqueror of the Thames " and his army on the
Niagara frontier, in support of the combined operations planned
from Sackett's Harbour and Lake Champlain on Montreal.
Thus, by degrees, Montreal became the grand centre of American strategy. Immense preparations had been made for a coup
de foudre which was to terminate the campaign in a blaze of red
lights with melodramatic effects. In the words of an American
writer of no mean rank, the Hon. B. Gardinier of New York, once
a Member of Congress :* " The Democrats concerted a grand
campaign. The whole season was employed in tremendous preparations. Public expectation was perpetually on the stretch. The
Secretary of War was in the vicinity of the armies. Perry had secured Lake Erie, Chauncey had hemmed in Yeo. Wilkinson sounded
his bugle. Hampton rose in his strength. From East to West
was nothing heard but the dreadful note of preparation and the
easy capture of Montreal. From both armies came letters teeming
with assurances of victory. Victory was the cry of a thousand
trumpets."t And again, from the same writer, we have an enumeration of the forces prepared for the invasion. " When Wilkinson
lay at Grenadier Island, the army of the North amounted to
* From the " Canadian Inspector," being an answer to Veritas, pp. 24, 25.
Examiner, p. 317.

WILKINSON AND HAMPTON.—ADVANCE ON MONTREAL.

243

10,000 men Hampton had 5,000, which with 6,000 militia
augmented the force destined to reduce Lower Canada to 21,000
men. Opposed to this army were 5,000 regulars-2,000 of which
were in Upper Canada." *
This writer was not far wrong in his estimate of the relative
strength of the British and American forces. The original plan of
the American campaign, as enjoined on General Wilkinson, had
embraced the surprise and capture of Kingston and the seizure of
Prescott—as a whet to a growing appetite, only to be appeased by
the conquest of Montreal.f General Hampton having assembled
his strength at Plattsburg was directed to penetrate across the
Seigniory of Beauharnois, emerge on the shores of the St. Lawrence,
and occupy the coast of Lake St. Louis between the mouth of the
Chateauguay and the Indian Village of Caughnawaga. From
hence he could at any time unite with Wilkinson on the Island of
Montreal, between St. Ann's and Pointe Claire. The Isle Perrot
was regarded as a point d' appui, and intended so to be held, and
the flotilla which had transported Wilkinson was prepared to aid in
effecting the junction. This conjoint operation followed in the
footsteps of its military predecessors. Like Amherst in 1760, and
Montgomery in 1775, Wilkinson and Hampton manoeuvred to
attack Montreal on its most accessible side. Then, as now, Montreal was not to be assailed in front with impunity. From Lachine
down to the Island of St. Helen's, the rapids of the River St.
Lawrence—a stream, very wide—in some places, very shallow,
abounding in rocky reefs, and in rapid currents—and impassable,
except in a class of vessels which can not be extemporized—
present obstacles which, with a little precaution, may be made
insurmountable.
* Examiner, p. 91, Vol. II.
f Armstrong. Vide
Letter, dated War Department, Sackett's Harbour, Sept.
22, 1813. Appendix, Vol. II, p. 201.

COLONEL DE SALABERRY.

244

CHRONICLE OF THE WAR.

Now, as then, no enemy can cross the River St. Lawrence
below the Island of St. Helen's, until he has subjugated the South
shore, and has scuttled the gunboats of England. These are some
of the conditions precedent of a passage of this great river in
summer. In winter the navigation will take care of itself. The
American War Department was well aware that if, by a sudden
irruption, they could occupy the fertile and inviting valley of the
Richelieu, seize Sorel, and cross the St. Lawrence, they would,
hazardously, place an immense river between themselves and their
supplies ; expose their army to attack both from Quebec and
Montreal, and invite every available war-ship of England to interrupt reinforcements and intercept retreat. They eschewed therefore any line of advance which would put them on the St. Lawrence
below Montreal. To assail the city in front was impracticable
without the aid of boats of a description which is not portable, and
the last, and, perhaps only, practicable, expedient, was a descent on
the Island from the West and an advance upon the city by the
olden route of Lachine. It is not necessary to dwell further here,
upon what, when occasion serves, will be shown hereafter, that,
such being the unavoidable conditions of an advance on Montreal,
the facilities of defence, developed by the necessities of the attack,
if rightly improved, render Montreal a military position of great
strength, resembling to a certain extent Vicksburg on the Missisippi—but in many respects superior.
These considerations, perfectly well understood by every instructed officer in the American service, led to the only feasible
scheme of attack, had the execution been equal to the plan.
The combined operation was well designed, and the better, that
either force, under Hampton or under Wilkinson, was in itself,
more than sufficient in numbers and equipment to have attained
the object in view. Wilkinson's force was 10,000 men—infantry,
cavalry, and artillery, admirably supplied and transported by

245

water. The men landed and fought in light marching order—the
very knapsacks were cared for in the boats. Hampton by his own
account had with him " 4,000 effective infantry and a wellappointed train of artillery." * And then, without speaking of
cavalry, by which we know that he was accompanied, and without
taking into account the 6,000 militia which, from the best American authority, we also know, that he had at his disposal, there
can be no question, but that the American invading force from the
Plattsburg frontier came up to the strength assigned to it by Sir
George Prevost in his Despatch of the 30th October,—that is to
say, to 7,200 combatants.
To encounter these combined forces, were dispersed below
Kingston, on the line of the St. Lawrence, and in the District of
Montreal, over a surface of at least 300 miles—in garrison, in
camp—on outpost and in hospital some 3,000 troops, regular and
militia. Of this force 1,600 men were in line on the South of
the St. Lawrence, to repel Hampton's invasion. The advanced
column, watching the frontier, consisted of 350 men.
The renewed preparations at Burlington in Vermont, and at
Plattsburg in the State of New York had, from an early period in
the season, attracted attention in Lower Canada. These preparations could have no other object in view than an irruption on
Montreal, through that part of the District of Montreal lying
west of the river Richelieu. Isle aux Noix—St. John's and
Chambly—were the garrisoned points directly menaced—but
garrisons can rarely do more than protect the posts they occupy ;
and it was necessary to provide for the observation as well as the
defence of an extended frontier. To this advanced column, therefore, scattered in a widely extended order, was confided the safety
of the frontier. It was commanded by Colonel de Salaberry. It
* Letter to Secretary of War, 12th October, 1813.

246

CHRONICLE OF THE WAR.

became the duty of this officer to anticipate irruption or sortie, and
to detect from the sound and flash of the distant gun the intended
course of the projectile.
As early as September, the American General Hampton had
transported across Lake Champlain the force collected at Burlington, and at the head of 5,000 men had attempted an invasion of
the District of Montreal. On the 29th September he had despatched his elite u);tder Majors Snelling and Hamilton to surprise an
outlying picket at Odelltown. This was a hamlet buried in the
dense forest, which for many leagues, in those days, covered the
frontier. All the roads and pathways through the " bush " had
been cut up, obstructed by abattis, and made impassable, during
the preceding campaign by de Salaberry and his axe-men ; still
had Hampton pushed forward vigorously, his riflemen might have
held the outskirts of the woodland, while his pioneers cleared away
the obstacles in their rear. Three or four leagues of black-ash
swamp once surmounted, and he would have emerged among the
farms and populous parishes of an open and cultivated plain. But,
both parties of the elite were misled or misdirected. The attack
upon the picket was but partially successful—the alarm was given
—the abattis were manned by a few frontier Light Infantry and
by a handful of Indians under Captain Mailloux, who multiplied
their number by an incessant fusilade, while yells of horrid augury
reverberated through the gloom. These brave men held their own,
until they were reinforced by the flank companies of the 4th Battalion of the embodied militia under Major Perrault * and by the
Canadian Voltigeurs commanded by Colonel de Salaberry.
This indefatigable officer was Hampton's fate ;—
Hal who comes here?
Art thou some god, some angel, or some devil,
That makes my blood cold, and my hair to stand ?
. Speak to me. What art thou?

FRENCH FAMILIES OF NOBLE DESCENT.
Ghost.

Thy evil spirit, Brutus

Brutus.

Why com'st thou ?
Ghost. To tell thee thou shalt see me at Philippi.

and, on the pretext of want of water, in a very wet countrndy, a
very wet season, Hampton withdrew from Odelltown—fell back on
his own frontier, and moved his force westward, to find his Philippi
on the banks of the Chateauguay.
Charles Michel d'Irumberry de Salaberry, Seigneur of Chambly
and Beau Lac, was descended from a noble Basque family—of
which a brave cadet had earned renown and rich feudal possessions under the French Crown, in Canada.* He was one of that
chivalrous race of men, whose very names embellish Canadian
story with picturesque illustrations. The younger branches of many
noble French houses had sought service and settlement in a
country peculiarly adapted to the genius and traditions of men to
whom arms were the only career, and with whom the sword was
the guidon to fortune. The process of French colonization in
Canada had been unavoidably military. The cultivator of the soil
was in ceaseless contest with the savagery of nature and of man. He
could never abandon the sword for the plough-share. He was
compelled to use both, with alternate hand. The feudal system
of medival France was well calculated to encounter this condition
of things. The same martial polity, which had, five centuries
before, inspired the " Assizes de Jerusalem," engrafted its prototype the " Coutume de Paris " on the soil of Canada. The Saracen
in the East, and the Savage in the West, would own no obedience
but to the mailed hand. This military code provided at once for
• Of the family of the brave Colonel de Salaberry, C.B., the eldest son,
Alphonse, is Adjutant General of Militia for Lower Canada. Louis, the second
son, lives at Chambly. Charles, the third, is colonel of a regiment of Volunteers in the district of Quebec. Of the ladies of his family, one daughter is the

widow of the late Augustus Hatt, Esquire, and now resides at Sorel.
• Vide p. 85.

247

248

CHRONICLE OF THE WAR.

colonization and defence, and harmonized with the antique associations of the colonists. " In 1598 Henry of Beam authorized the
granting of fiefs, chatellaines, and baronies in Canada to men of
gentle blood for the tutelage and defence of the country." * And
the Bearnoise or Basque family of de Salaberry profited, and not
unworthily, by the wise liberality of their fellow countryman.
Their father and the grandfather of Colonel de Salaberry had borne
the " panache blanche" in full front of the fight against the
standard of England, but from the hour when, by sacred treaty,
their allegiance had been transferred to the sceptre of England,
they bowed reverently to the last behest of their native Prince,
and, at his command, gave "foi et hommage" to the British
Crown.t And to that great obligation they, and the mass of their
fellow countrymen, have ever been nobly faithful since. De Salaberry and three brothers took service in the British army. Two
died under the blazing sun of Hindostan,—one fell in the deadly
breach of Badajos. Our Canadian hero served in the West Indies.
He had commanded the Grenadier Company of the 60th regiment,
4th battalion, in many fierce engagements. He distinguished
himself in 1795 at the conquest of Martinique, and had survived
the miasmata of Walcheren. On returning to Canada he turned
* Garneau, Vol. I, p. 182.

f In a note to Mr. J. M. Lemoyne's interesting collection, entitled " Maple
Leaves," we find the following record of French Canadian services to the
British Crown twenty-five years after the Conquest :" A party of distinguished Canadians on the 8th June, 1775, offered their
services to Major Preston in Montreal to retake Fort St. John from the Americans, and did so on the 20th June, placing it in the bands of a detachment of
the 7th Regiment, or Royal Fusiliers, under Captain Kineer. They were the

SKIRMISH AT THE FOUR CORNERS.

249

his military experience to good account, and raised tte corps of
Canadian Voltigeurs. At the head of this corps, as has been
already related, with the advance of Colonel D'chambault he
had, in the campaign of the preceding year, repulsed the first
attempt made by Dearborn on the debateable ground of La
Cole. '
On Hampton's retirement from Odelltown he was promptly
followed up. Salaberry overtook him at the Four Corners, or cross
roads of the Chateauguay—via qud, se findit in ambas—about five
miles within the American frontier, and near the source of the
river. Here an attempt was made to surprise the American
camp, which failed through the accidental discharge of a musket,
when Salaberry, finding himself to be discovered, collected about
fifty of his Voltigeurs, and a handful of Indians, and made a
vociferous onset on the advanced detachment of the enemy, consisting of about 800 men. The Americans fell back in confusion,
and enabled him to withdraw without loss. These small affairs
had infused mutual confidence into the commander, and his men,
and contributed to the great success which was shortly to follow.
Under the smoke of this light skirmish, de Salaberry fell back
on his supports, following the descending course of the Chateauassistance of a number of Volunteers, from Quebec and Three Rivers, Messieurs
de Montisson, Duchesnay, de Rigouville, de Salaberry, de Tonancour, Beaubien,
de Musseau, Moquin, Lamarque, Fauchier, and others, started for St. John's
near Montreal, to relieve the 7th and 26th Regiments, then in charge of the
fort ; and who expected a siege ; but after being beleaguered, the fort surrendered on the 2nd November to Gen. Montgomery. The Canadians and the two
regiments were carried away prisoners of war—Congress refusing to exchange

de Montigny, d'Eschambault, and others. For this service, General Carleton

the Canadians they being too much attached to the English Government, and
too influential in their own country.' Two—Messieurs de Montesson and de
Rigouville—died prisoners of war. De Lacorne, Pertuis, and Beaubien had
been killed during the siege. De Lotbiniêre had an arm shot off. De Salaberry

publicly thanked them. In September of the same year, this party, with the

was twice wounfled."—Pp. 66, 67.

Chevaliers de Belestre, de Longueuil, de LotbiniOre, de Rouville, de Boucherville,
de Lacorne, de La Bruiere, de St. Ours, de Levy, Pertuis, Hervieux, Gamelin,

250

CHRONICLE OF THE WAR.

guay. Ilk knew the ground thoroughly, having long before
examined it, with the foresight of one charged with the safety of
the outposts of the army.
He could now see the course of the projectile. He had indeed
already anticipated its line of flight, and was already prepared to
counteract the blow. For some days previous he had been occupied in choosing his positions and in fortifying them with the ready
materials the Canadian forest offers. His dispositions for this
purpose were made with great judgment.
It is impossible not to be struck by the meagreness of detail
which characterizes both British and American narratives of this
important action—but to the American the subject was not a
pleasant one, and to the English writer not very intelligible. The
scene of action was remote from the daily track of travel and of
strife. It was neither seen nor sought. The battle was fought by
French Canadian militia-men. These men dispersed to their
homes—doubtless they " fought their battles o'er,again " by their
own fire-sides, but the English writer had not much opportunity to
hear from their lips the changes of the fight. The Despatch of
Sir George Prevost dwells more upon his own slight intervention
at the close of the action than upon the incidents of the contest.
The report of the American Adjutant General, King, is curt and
conclusive : " 25th October. The plan of the attack adopted by
the General was to detach Colonel Purdy with the elite and the
1st Brigade, forming the most efficient part of the army, across
the river ; and by a night march gain the fording place on the left
of the enemy's line, re-cross the river at that point, and at dawn
of day attack the enemy's rear ; while Izzard's Brigade, under his
own direction, should pursue the march, and at the same hour,
attack it in front. The whole of this plan miscarried shamefully;

SKIRMISH AT THE FOUR CORNERS.

251

Purdy's column, probably misled, fell into an ambuscade, and was
quickly beaten and routed ; and that of Izzard, after a few discharges, was ordered to retreat." And this report is a fair introduction to a more detailed story of the fight.

DESCRIPTION OF GROUND.—PREPARATIONS FOR DEFENCE.

CHAP. XXIV.
Story of Chateauguay. The " Temoin oculaire." Hampton advances from Four Corners.
De Salaberry faces right about, and returns to meet him. First rencontre—HaltsThrows up breastworks and abattis. Disposition of defenders—Ford in the rear.
American attack on abattis—Impracticable. Attack on flank and rear, partially suecessful—llepulsed—Broken by flank fire. Retreating Americans fire on each other.
Hampton, daunted, withdraws fro‘m front of abattis and retreats. Force engaged.
Brilliant conduct of officers and men. Honour to De Salaberry.

It is always satisfactory that the party most interested should
be enabled to tell his own story, and by a fortunate occurrence,
this source of satisfaction has been supplied. The Redacteur of
the " Courier d'Ottawa,"•Dr. L. E. Dorion, has re-produced most
opportunely the narrative of a " Temoin oculaire," dated 3rd
November, 1813. This narrative appears to have been published
in some of the journals of the day. If a guess may be hazarded
as to the authorship, it might be, perhaps not unjustly, ascribed to
the late Commander Jacques Viger of Montreal. Ample in detail
and minute in circumstance, it gives, with all the proverbial ease
of the French raconteur, incidents which correspond in the main
with the relations of more pretentious writers. The following
account of the Battle of Chateauguay will be little more than the
story told by the " Temoin oculaire " done into English. The
original will be found in the Appendix.
The American army at the Four Corners, under Hampton, after
having for some time attracted the attention of our troops, on the

253

21st October moved direct on our frontier. That same afternoon
about 4 p.m. his advanced guard drove in our advanced videttes.
They were thrown out to a place called " Piper Road," about
ten miles from the church at Chateauguay. Major° Henry, of
the Beauharnois militia, in command at the English River, notified
Major General de Watteville, who ordered up, at once, the two
companies of the 5th Incorporated, Militia, commanded by Captains
Levesque and Debartzch, and about two hundred men of the Militia
de Beauharnois. This force advanced about two leagues until, at
nightfall, it halted at the extremity of a thick wood into which it
would at that moment have been imprudent to penetrate. At
daybreak they were joined by Colonel de Salaberry with his
Voltigeurs and Captain Fergusson's Light Company of the Canadian Fencibles. Thus composed, de Salaberry pushed on, along
the left bank of the river, about a league, and there encountered
a patrol of the eneihy. He instantly halted his force. He had
some weeks before carefully reconnoitred this very ground, and
knew that the whole course of the river presented no better position. The forest was intersected by ravines which drained a
swamp on his right, and fell into the river which covered his left.
Upon four of these ravines, which were like so many moats, fosses,
in his front, he threw up breastworks. The three first lines were
distant perhaps 200 yards from each other. The fourth was half
a mile in the rear, and commanded a ford, by which an assailant
coming from the right bank of the Chateauguay might have got
into his rear. It was most important to guarantee this, the weak
point of the position. Upon each of these lines of defence a
parapet of logs was constructed, which extended into the tangled
swamp on the right ; but the front line of all, following the sinuosities of the ravine in front, formed almost an obtuse angle to the
right of the road, and of the whole position. This whole day—the
22nd—was employed vigorously in strengthening these works,